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Services offered by computing systems continue to play a crucial role in our every day 
lives.  This thesis examines and solves a challenging problem in making these services 
dependable using means that can be assured not to compromise service responsiveness, 
particularly when no failure occurs. Causes of undependability are faults and faults of 
all known origins, including malicious attacks, are collectively referred to as Byzantine 
faults.  
Service or state machine replication is the only known technique for tolerating 
Byzantine faults. It becomes more effective when replicas are spaced out over a wide 
area network (WAN) such as the Internet – adding tolerance to localised disasters. It 
requires that replicas process the randomly arriving user requests in an identical order. 
Achieving this requirement together with deterministic termination guarantees is 
impossible in a fail-prone environment. This impossibility prevails because of the 
inability to accurately estimate a bound on inter-replica communication delays over a 
WAN. Canonical protocols in the literature are designed to delay termination until the 
WAN preserves convergence between actual delays and the estimate used. They thus 
risk performance degradation of the replicated service. We eliminate this risk by using 
Fail-Signal processes to circumvent the impossibility.  
A fail-signal (FS) process is made up of redundant, Byzantine-prone processes 
that continually check each other’s performance. Consequently, it fails only by crashing 
and also signals its imminent failure. Using FS process constructs, a family of three 
order protocols has been developed: Protocol-0, Protocol-I and Protocol-II. Each 
protocol caters for a particular set of assumptions made in the FS process construction 
and the subsequent FS process behaviour. Protocol-I is extensively compared with a 
canonical protocol of Castro and Liskov which is widely acknowledged for its desirable 
performance. The study comprehensively establishes the cost and benefits of our 
approach in a variety of both real and emulated network settings, by varying number of 
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v
Contents 
Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................iii 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... iv 
Contents........................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. ix 
List of Tables................................................................................................................ x 
List of Notations and Abbreviations ......................................................................... xi 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................  1 
1.1 The Consensus Problem ................................................................................... 2 
1.1.1 Replication Context .................................................................................. 3 
1.1.2 Defining Consensus.................................................................................. 3 
1.1.3 Why reaching consensus is hard?............................................................. 4 
1.1.4 Total Order Broadcast: an Equivalent Problem........................................ 5 
1.2 Thesis Background ........................................................................................... 6 
1.2.1 Type 1 Protocols....................................................................................... 6 
1.2.2 Type 2 Protocols....................................................................................... 7 
1.2.3 Our Approach ........................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Thesis Objectives.............................................................................................. 8 
1.3.1 Thesis Statement....................................................................................... 8 
1.4 System Context and Assumptions .................................................................... 8 
1.5 Contributions .................................................................................................. 11 
1.6 Dissertation Structure ..................................................................................... 12 
2. Related Work ......................................................................................................... 14 
2.1 Circumventing the FLP impossibility: Brief survey ...................................... 14 
2.1.1 Relaxing deterministic guarantees.......................................................... 15 
2.1.2 Relaxing asynchrony .............................................................................. 16 
2.1.2.1 Partitionable System........................................................................... 17 
2.1.2.2 Non-partitionable System................................................................... 20 
2.2 Our Proposed Approach ................................................................................. 22 
2.3 Non-Partitionable Crash-Tolerant Protocols .................................................. 24 
2.3.1 Paxos: The Part-Time Parliament........................................................... 24 
2.3.2 The Chandra and Toueg Algorithm........................................................ 28 
2.3.3 Paxos vs. Chandra-Toueg Algorithm ..................................................... 29 
2.3.3.1 Similarities.......................................................................................... 29 
2.3.3.2 Differences ......................................................................................... 30 
2.4 Non-Partitionable Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Protocols .................................. 30 
2.4.1 BFT......................................................................................................... 31 
2.4.1.1 The Algorithm .................................................................................... 31 
2.4.1.2 Communication with Client ............................................................... 32 
 
 
 
vi
2.4.1.3 Normal-Case Operation...................................................................... 32 
2.4.1.4 Garbage Collection............................................................................. 34 
2.4.1.5 View Changes..................................................................................... 34 
2.4.2 Discussion............................................................................................... 36 
2.4.3 FS-Newtop.............................................................................................. 36 
2.5 Summary......................................................................................................... 37 
3. Basics on Implementing and Exploiting Fail-Signal Processes ......................... 39 
3.1 Behaviour of a Fail-Signal Process ................................................................ 39 
3.2 Requirements and Assumptions for Fail-Signal Processing .......................... 43 
3.2.1 Assumptions ........................................................................................... 44 
3.3 Implementation and Operational Details........................................................ 45 
3.3.1 Working State ......................................................................................... 47 
3.3.1.1 Use of Comparator Timers ................................................................. 48 
3.3.2 Direct failure detection ........................................................................... 48 
3.3.2.1 Scenarios leading to failure detection................................................. 49 
3.3.3 From Failing to Signalled State .............................................................. 49 
3.3.3.1 Malicious Behaviours Leading to Failing State ................................. 50 
3.4 Protocol-0: The Basic Protocol....................................................................... 50 
3.4.1 System Context....................................................................................... 51 
3.4.2 Protocol Design ...................................................................................... 52 
3.4.2.1 Who Becomes the New Coordinator? ................................................ 52 
3.4.2.2 How to Become the New Coordinator?.............................................. 53 
3.4.3 Data Structures ....................................................................................... 55 
3.4.3.1 Messages Used ................................................................................... 56 
3.4.3.2 Variables and Functions Used ............................................................ 56 
3.4.4 Algorithm ............................................................................................... 57 
3.4.4.1 Description – Main Part...................................................................... 59 
3.4.4.2 Description – Install Procedure .......................................................... 60 
3.4.4.3 Description – Coordinator Task ......................................................... 61 
3.5 Correctness Arguments .................................................................................. 61 
3.6 Critical Analysis ............................................................................................. 66 
3.6.1 Discussion............................................................................................... 66 
3.6.2 Using 3-state FS process model to solve consensus............................... 67 
3.6.2.1 Reduced coupling within FS processes .............................................. 68 
3.6.2.2 The last coordinator ............................................................................ 70 
3.6.2.3 Relaxing Assumption 2 (failure pattern assumption) ......................... 71 
3.7 Summary......................................................................................................... 74 
4. Protocol I - Normal part ....................................................................................... 75 
4.1 Background..................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 System Model ................................................................................................. 76 
4.3 Protocol-I ........................................................................................................ 77 
4.3.1 Operative processes and quorum............................................................ 78 
4.4 Description of Normal Part ............................................................................ 81 
4.4.1 Message Formats .................................................................................... 82 
4.4.2 Algorithm Steps...................................................................................... 83 
4.5 Qualitative comparison with Normal Part of BFT ......................................... 85 
4.6 Implementation............................................................................................... 86 
 
 
 
vii
4.7 Experimental Setup ........................................................................................ 87 
4.7.1 Strategies for varying workload of the system ....................................... 88 
4.7.2 Presentation of Results ........................................................................... 88 
4.8 Performance Study I ....................................................................................... 89 
4.8.1 Order Latency......................................................................................... 90 
4.8.2 Throughput ............................................................................................. 95 
4.8.3 Summary of Observations for Study I.................................................... 97 
4.9 Performance Study II...................................................................................... 98 
4.9.1 WAN Emulator Service.......................................................................... 99 
4.9.2 Components of the WAN Emulator ..................................................... 101 
4.9.3 Emulated Network Configurations....................................................... 103 
4.9.4 Experiment Results............................................................................... 105 
4.9.4.1 Order Latency................................................................................... 105 
4.9.4.2 Throughput ....................................................................................... 108 
4.9.5 Summary of Observations for Study II ................................................ 111 
4.10 Sources of Random Delays .......................................................................... 112 
4.11 Summary....................................................................................................... 114 
5. Protocol-I: Install Part ........................................................................................ 116 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 116 
5.1.1 The Big Picture..................................................................................... 117 
5.2 Objectives ..................................................................................................... 118 
5.3 Problems ....................................................................................................... 119 
5.3.1 Consultation with other processes ........................................................ 119 
5.3.2 Dealing with Incomplete AckHistory ................................................... 119 
5.3.3 Dealing with Planted AckHistory ......................................................... 120 
5.4 Outline of Install Part ................................................................................... 123 
5.5 Data Structures ............................................................................................. 124 
5.5.1 Messages............................................................................................... 124 
5.5.1.1 STATUSi(j)....................................................................................... 125 
5.5.1.2 STARTc+(c)........................................................................................ 125 
5.5.1.3 STARTc+,i(c) ...................................................................................... 126 
5.5.2 Variables and other data structures....................................................... 126 
5.6 Algorithm Steps............................................................................................ 127 
5.6.1 Description ........................................................................................... 129 
5.6.2 An Example Scenario ........................................................................... 130 
5.6.3 Exceptional Case: Last Coordinator ..................................................... 131 
5.7 Construction of STARTc+(c).......................................................................... 132 
5.7.1 Preparation of PRE-STARTc+(c) ........................................................... 134 
5.7.2 Adjusting STARTc+(c) using received PRE-STARTc+(c)....................... 137 
5.8 Identifying Source Number .......................................................................... 137 
5.9 Retrieval Procedure ...................................................................................... 139 
5.10 Discussions ................................................................................................... 139 
5.10.1 Why only one Status_Pool(c) is sufficient to construct STARTc+(c)? .. 139 
5.10.2 Why (f+1)-START?............................................................................... 141 
5.10.3 Garbage collection of Status_Board..................................................... 142 
5.11 Performance Comparison ............................................................................. 142 
5.11.1 Defining Fail-Over Latency.................................................................. 142 
5.11.2 Selecting parameter values ................................................................... 145 
5.11.3 Experiment Results............................................................................... 146 
 
 
 
viii
5.11.4 Observations ......................................................................................... 151 
5.12 Install-II – Optimized version of Install Part................................................ 152 
5.12.1 Construction of STATUSi(c) ................................................................. 153 
5.12.2 Construction of PRE-STARTc+(c) ......................................................... 154 
5.13 Correctness proof for Install-II ..................................................................... 157 
5.14 Install vs. Install-II........................................................................................ 158 
5.15 Summary....................................................................................................... 160 
6. Protocol-II ............................................................................................................ 162 
6.1 Assumptions ................................................................................................. 162 
6.2 Implications of the New Assumption Set ..................................................... 163 
6.2.1 Status of an FS Process......................................................................... 163 
6.2.2 Change in Acceptors............................................................................. 164 
6.2.3 Number of FS processes ....................................................................... 164 
6.2.4 Impact on Install ................................................................................... 165 
6.3 System Architecture ..................................................................................... 166 
6.4 Protocol Design ............................................................................................ 167 
6.4.1 Definition of eligible().......................................................................... 169 
6.4.2 Showing unwillingness for a configuration.......................................... 169 
6.4.3 Fail-Signal FSi(j) .................................................................................. 170 
6.4.4 Other minor changes............................................................................. 171 
6.5 Summary....................................................................................................... 172 
7. Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................. 173 
7.1 Summary....................................................................................................... 173 
7.2 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 176 
7.3 Future Work.................................................................................................. 176 
References ................................................................................................................ 179 
 
 
 
ix
List of Figures 
1.1. System Architecture of the Replicated Service ......................................................... 9 
2.1. Concurrent Overlapping Group views..................................................................... 19 
2.2. A Taxonomy of approaches to circumvent FLP impossibility................................ 24 
2.3. Paxos Algorithm steps (a) Part 1 (b) Part 2 ............................................................. 27 
2.4. Chandra and Toueg’s Algorithm steps .................................................................... 28 
2.5. Normal Case Operation of BFT .............................................................................. 33 
2.6. View-Change Protocol ............................................................................................ 35 
3.1. Three states of FS process ....................................................................................... 40 
3.2. A Fail-Signal Node.................................................................................................. 43 
3.3. Operational Architecture of FS Process .................................................................. 46 
3.4. Output Checking and Endorsement......................................................................... 47 
3.5. System Architecture ................................................................................................ 51 
3.6. Possible role transitions during protocol execution................................................. 53 
3.7. Tasks executed by an operative FS process............................................................. 58 
3.8. Install Procedure ...................................................................................................... 60 
3.9. Coordinator Task ..................................................................................................... 61 
3.10. 4-State model of an FS Process with Assumption 2A........................................... 72 
4.1. System Architecture used by Protocol-I.................................................................. 77 
4.2. Proof for the bounds on Quorum size...................................................................... 80 
4.3. High-level and Detailed illustration of Normal Part Operation .............................. 82 
4.4. Sequence of actions performed in COMMIT Phase................................................ 83 
4.5. Fail-Free 3-phase Operation of the two protocols. .................................................. 85 
4.6. Order latency at p3 for f = 2 using various crypto techniques. ................................ 92 
4.7. Order latency at p4 for f = 3 using various crypto techniques ................................. 93 
4.8. Throughput at p3 for f = 2 using various crypto techniques..................................... 96 
4.9: The WAN Emulator Architecture ......................................................................... 100 
4.10. Three components of a WAN Emulator .............................................................. 101 
4.11. Emulated WAN Configurations .......................................................................... 103 
4.12. Order latency at p3 for f = 2 using various network configurations. ................... 107 
4.13. Throughput at p2 for f = 1 using various network configurations........................ 110 
5.1. All 5 phases of Install part of Protocol-I ............................................................... 124 
5.2. Structure of (a) STATUSi(j) and (b) STARTc+(c) messages ................................... 126 
5.3 Algorithm for Install Part ....................................................................................... 127 
5.4. Extended representation of phase 2 of Install part ................................................ 133 
5.5. Steps for START construction; construct_Start() .................................................. 134 
5.6. Install part of the two protocols (a) BFT (b) Protocol-I ........................................ 143 
5.7. Timeline for events occurring during execution switch for the two protocols...... 144 
5.8. Fail-over latency at p4 with f = 1 using various network configurations............... 148 
5.9. Fail-over latency at p3 with f = 2 using various network configurations............... 149 
5.10. Fail-over latency at p7 with f = 2 using various network configurations............. 150 
5.11. Fail-over latency vs. Batching Intervals with f = 2 using Slow WAN at various 
processes....................................................................................................................... 151 
5.12. START Construction Procedure........................................................................... 156 
6.1. Three Communication Phases of Install for Protocol-II........................................ 166 
6.2. System Architecture .............................................................................................. 167 
 
 
 
x
List of Tables 
4.0. General Representation Scheme for Processes in BFT and Protocol-I ................... 89 
4.1. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 2. .................. 94 
4.2. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 3. .................. 94 
4.3. Throughput for p3 with various batching intervals when f = 2................................ 97 
4.4. Throughput for p4 with various batching intervals when f = 3................................ 97 
4.5. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 1. ................ 108 
4.6. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 2. ................ 108 
4.7. Throughput at p2 for various batching intervals for f = 1...................................... 111 
4.8. Throughput at p3 for various batching intervals for f = 2...................................... 111 
5.1. Fail-over latency at p4 for both protocols with f = 1 using Batching_interval = 1500 
msec .............................................................................................................................. 147 
5.2. Fail-over latency at p3 and p7 for both protocols with f = 2 using a stable 
Batching_interval ......................................................................................................... 147 
 
 
 
xi
List of Notations and Abbreviations 
 
n Number of nodes in the replicated server system 
f Fault-tolerance degree (maximum number of failures) of the 
replicated server system 
Ni ith node of the replicated server system 
si ith service process hosted on Ni (executing service application) 
pi ith order process hosted on Ni (executing order protocol) 
m Message used for communication between two processes 
D(m) Digest of m computed by using a cryptographic hash function 
D 
PA  Paxos Algorithm [Lam01] 
CTA Chandra-Toueg Algorithm [CT91] 
rnd# Proposal number for PA/Round number for CTA (iteration 
number) 
φ Fault-tolerance degree (maximum number of failures) of fail-
silent/fail-signal/fail-stop process 
ISIQ Identically Sequenced Input Queue 
FS Fail-Signal 
CT Simple Crash-Tolerant protocol derived from Protocol-I 
BFT Byzantine Fault-Tolerant order protocol of [CL99] 
v View number for BFT 
cli ith client of the replicated server system 
o Order number assigned to a request 
c Coordinator process number (For Protocol-0, -I and –II, c ≥ 1 
normally and c = -1 during Install execution) 
h and H Low and high watermarks for BFT 
p′i ith shadow order process  
Pi ith FS process implemented by pi and p′i 
FSi Double-signed fail-signal message from FS process Pi 
Π Set of all FS processes 
π Set of all order processes co-located with service processes 
π′ Set of all shadow processes 
max_committedi Largest o committed by pi 
Ai Largest o acknowledged by pi 
 
 
 
xii
start_oc Starting o from which a new coordinator Pc starts its ordering 
regime 
Signalledi Set of FS processes from which pi has received fail-signal 
messages 
Order_Pool Set of all ORDER messages sent/received by a process 
Ack_Pool Set of all ORDER messages acknowledged by a process 
eligible() Number of the process eligible to be the next coordinator 
(sometimes used to refer to the process itself) 
Σi ith system configuration with Pi as coordinator 
Acceptorsi Set of all acceptors in Σi 
ni Number of acceptors in Σi = |Acceptorsi| 
fi Maximum number of processes that can fail in Σi 
VQi Valid quorum size in Σi 
Qi Smallest valid quorum size in Σi 
c+ Number for the process executing Install part (Protocol-I and -
II) as new coordinator (eligible() = c+) 
c- Number of a predecessor coordinator process 
PCmx The largest o that Pc+ knows to be possibly committed by some 
correct process. 
CCmx The largest o that Pc+ knows to be certainly committed by some 
correct process. 
m_ci(j) The largest o for which an ORDERj(o) is committed by pi 
Ai(j) The largest o of ORDERj(o) for which an ACKi(o) is produced 
by pi 
commit_count Vector containing largest committed request number for every 
client 
Status_Pool(c) Set of STATUS(c) messages sent/received 
Start_Pool Set of STARTi,j(c) messages received from every process pj 
Foundation_Pool(c) Set of first arriving Qc STATUSi(c) messages  
Advanced_Pool(c) Set of STATUSi(c) messages arriving after first Qc ones 
s Source number 
Commit_Boardi List of the largest max_commitedj value received by pi in any 
ACKj(o) message from every process pj (in Install-II) 
LWi the largest element in Commit_Boardi which is less than or 
equal to at least Qc elements. 
  
 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Computers are increasingly pervading our everyday lives. We use them for a variety of 
services – from simple email service to financial dealings (e.g., cash withdrawal, 
holiday booking, Internet Auctions etc.) to entertainment (e.g., computer games). The 
underlying infrastructures providing these services are generally complex and consist of 
a number of computers connected by a network. They are often structured as per the 
well-known Client-Server paradigm. This paradigm identifies computers as clients and 
servers, where a client contacts a server requesting for some service provision. Server 
processes the request and provides the results back to the client.  
The increasing trend of using computer systems also brings with it a high 
degree of reliance being placed on these systems. With this growth in dependency, the 
most crucial concern evidently becomes one of reliability and availability. That is, 
service requests should be processed correctly and service provision should proceed 
without interruption. This concern is central to system design due to the increasing 
susceptibility of such systems to hardware and software faults and malicious attacks. 
Hence, it is desirable, and more often essential, to have systems that can continue 
working correctly even in the presence of a reasonable number of faults.  
The state machine replication [GS97, Sch93, DGG05] is a well-known 
approach to achieving fault-tolerance in distributed server systems and the only one for 
tolerating Byzantine faults. The approach is intuitively simple. The service that needs to 
be fault-tolerant is implemented as a deterministic state machine and then replicated 
over a number of redundant computers that are assumed to fail independent of each 
other. These computers execute the service process independently for each request to 
produce result. The results produced by them are used to mask out erroneous and/or 
absent responses from faulty replicas. Thus, these replicas collectively build a fault-
tolerant service.  
For replication to be effective, it is important that correct replicas generate 
identical responses for a given request. This leads to the following two requirements 
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that need to be met.  First, the service in question must be built as a deterministic state 
machine: given that correct replicas are in identical states, processing a given request 
will lead to producing identical results and identical state changes at correct replicas. 
Building a service as a deterministic state machine need not be a trivial task and we 
refer the reader to [TS90] for the subtle issues that need to be addressed.  
Secondly, correct replicas must process the requests in identical order. 
Specifically, requests received from various clients at various replicas should be (i) 
identical and (ii) executed in the same order. The replicas therefore need to coordinate 
with each other to ensure that the second requirement is met. To achieve this 
coordination, replicas are provided with a primitive called the Atomic Broadcast or 
Total Order Broadcast. The protocol that implements this primitive will be referred to 
here as the Total Order protocol.  
Total order is a typical instance of the “agreement” problem whereby 
distributed replicas unanimously arrive at an identical decision through exchange of 
messages and without any external assistance. In total order, the decision is on the order 
in which a given request (or any other event) needs to be viewed/processed in relation to 
other requests (or events). Other instances of the agreement problem include non-
blocking atomic commitment and group membership. The former is concerned with 
decision of whether a transaction should be committed whereas the latter deals with 
deciding whether a replica is considered to be part of the group.  
Reaching consensus refers to solving the agreement problem. It has been 
shown that a solution to the most agreement problems can be devised by using a 
solution to reach consensus. In this chapter, we formally define consensus and discuss 
what makes reaching consensus a nontrivial task. Furthermore, the system context in 
which we intend to solve the problem is presented and the basic assumptions considered 
throughout this thesis are listed. The last two sections discuss thesis contributions and 
outline the thesis structure. 
1.1 The Consensus Problem 
This section presents the model of a networked system hosting a replicated service. It 
then formally defines the consensus problem. It also discusses the difficulties that make 
reaching consensus impossible in the given system context. 
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1.1.1 Replication Context 
We consider a distributed system of n nodes (machines) hosting a replicated service. 
For simplicity, we will assume that each node hosts a service process executing the 
service application and an order process running some total order protocol. Let us 
represent the order processes by a set {p1, p2, ..., pn}.  
A correct node behaves according to its specification and the processes hosted 
by it are termed to be correct. A node or a process that is not correct is termed faulty. 
The most benign form of faults found in literature is crash. A node crashes when it halts 
execution of all processes it hosts. On the other extreme, a Byzantine fault causes the 
node to fail arbitrarily and no assumption can be made about the behaviour of a faulty 
process. We consider the authenticated Byzantine fault model in which the faulty 
behaviour is arbitrary but only within the assumed cryptographic constraints. That is, a 
faulty process cannot modify messages of a correct process undetectably and cannot 
forge a correct process’s encrypted message. Note that any algorithm that tolerates 
Byzantine faults is also crash-tolerant. Similarly, if an algorithm cannot tolerate crash, it 
cannot certainly tolerate Byzantine faults. 
The nodes are connected via an asynchronous network and communicate with 
each other only by message passing. Communication delays between, and the relative 
processing speeds of, any two nodes are assumed to be unknown. The only assumption 
this network model makes is that the bounds on communication delays and relative 
processing speeds are finite (but unknown). Due to its no-known-bounds aspect, the 
asynchronous network is the most general model of communication system and covers 
any wide area network such as the Internet; it also abstracts reliable implementations of 
1-to-1 and 1-to-many communication schemes involving repeated transmission of 
messages until acknowledgements are received from destination(s).  
1.1.2 Defining Consensus 
The consensus problem can be informally defined in the following way. Each correct 
process pi proposes a value vi and decides on one (any one) of the proposed values v in 
such a way that the decision is identical with all correct processes. Thus, the processes 
are said to have reached consensus on the proposed values.  
Formally, this decision process is required to satisfy the following properties. 
(i) Integrity – If a correct process decides v then v was proposed by some process. 
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(ii) Agreement – No two correct processes decide differently. 
(iii) Termination – Every correct node eventually decides. 
Some consensus solutions satisfy a variant of the agreement property called 
Uniform Agreement. This is a weaker property and a consensus satisfying this property 
is called uniform consensus. Uniform agreement is defined as follows 
Uniform Agreement – No two processes (correct or faulty) decide differently. 
Note that, unlike agreement, the uniform agreement version of this property 
does require even the faulty processes to decide identically, which is even harder to 
achieve [CS00]. However, this only makes sense in fault models where a failure does 
not involve a process making erroneous state transitions. Since Byzantine processes 
make arbitrary state transitions, guaranteeing this property for a faulty process in this 
case is impossible. Hence, we will consider non-uniform consensus only. 
First two properties ensure the service execution to be consistent at all correct 
processes. This is called safety property of a consensus algorithm. It results in identical 
sequence of inputs at all correct service processes. The third property ensures that the 
service processes continue execution and keep producing outputs for incoming client 
requests. This property of a consensus algorithm guarantees responsiveness and is 
called liveness property. 
1.1.3 Why reaching consensus is hard? 
Fischer, Lynch and Patterson [FLP85] establish that consensus cannot be solved with 
deterministic termination guarantees in an asynchronous network even with crash fault 
model. They state that, even with the strongest failure model, where processes only 
crash i.e., fail quiescently, it is impossible to find a deterministic consensus solution in 
an asynchronous network environment. This fundamental result is famously known as 
the FLP impossibility. The result has been proved for crash faults only but, it is also 
valid for less benign faults like Byzantine faults.  
The core to this impossibility result is the argument that it is impossible to 
distinguish a crashed process from a slow one. The slowness of the latter can be due to a 
slow network connection or slow processing or both. This inability to safely distinguish 
crashed process from a slow one may result in choosing between one of the two 
situations.  
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(i) Say a correct process chooses to wait for a response from every other process. In 
this situation, it may end up waiting for a response from the crashed processes 
forever. This violates liveness property stated above. 
(ii) Say correct processes are made to use timeouts to avoid the forever waiting 
situation. Two correct processes may timeout on different correct but slow 
processes. This will result in inconsistency in the state of correct processes and 
violates safety property. 
Based on this core argument, [FLP85] formally proves that reaching consensus 
is impossible in this system context. However, there are several ways in which this 
impossibility can be circumvented and this investigation has been an active research 
area in the past two decades. 
1.1.4 Total Order Broadcast: an Equivalent Problem 
It has been shown that consensus and total order broadcast are equivalent problems. 
[DDS87] show that total order broadcast can be transformed into consensus whereas 
[CT96] show the other way round. Hence, it has been proved that the impossibility 
result holds for both problems. Moreover, if a solution exists for one, it can be 
transformed to solve the other. In this thesis, we focus on solving total order broadcast 
but the solutions proposed here are valid for both problems. We present the formal 
specification of total order broadcast below.  
Formally, total order broadcast is described in terms of two primitives TO-
broadcast(m) and TO-deliver(m) [DSU04]. When a process p invokes TO-broadcast(m) 
(respectively TO-deliver(m)), it is said that p TO-broadcasts (respectively TO-delivers) 
message m. These primitives satisfy the following three properties. 
(i) Termination – If a correct process TO-broadcasts message m then it eventually 
TO-delivers m. Moreover, if a correct process TO-delivers m, then all correct 
processes eventually TO-deliver m. 
(ii) Integrity – For any message m, every correct process TO-delivers m at most 
once and only if m was TO-broadcast by some process. 
(iii) Total Order– If two correct processes p1 and p2 TO-deliver messages m1 and m2 
then p1 TO-delivers m1 before m2, iff p2 TO-delivers m1 before m2. 
Note that, as for consensus, we ignore the uniform variants of Termination, 
Integrity and Total Order properties here as they do not apply to Byzantine fault model.  
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We now discuss how a total order protocol is used to implement state machine 
replication. As mentioned earlier, every node of the replicated server system executes a 
service process and an order process. The order processes execute a protocol that 
ensures the above three total order broadcast properties. On receiving every new request 
from a client, order processes communicate with each other to assign a unique and 
identical order number. Hence, all correct order processes forward all clients’ requests 
in identical order to the corresponding service processes for execution. This leads to 
identical result generation at various replicas (with deterministic service processes).  
1.2 Thesis Background 
Solving consensus is the main objective of this thesis. However, being crucial to 
distributed system applications, consensus problem has been studied extensively. 
Researchers have tackled the problem from different perspectives by making various 
assumptions and relaxing certain classical asynchrony restrictions in order to 
circumvent the FLP impossibility. A large number of approaches have been proposed to 
solve this problem based on different failure and communication models. However, we 
solve consensus by using a novel approach named Fail-Signal to circumvent the FLP 
impossibility. To appreciate the novelty of our approach and to show where this 
approach stands in relation to other works, we first present a brief overview of the two 
other common approaches below. A concise survey of these well-known and most 
commonly used approaches adopted to circumvent FLP impossibility is given in chapter 
2. For clarity, we refer to them as type 1 and 2 in the following text. 
1.2.1 Type 1 Protocols 
Type 1 protocols, e.g. [CL99, YMV+03], are deterministic and their termination is 
guaranteed, even in failure-free runs, only when message delays over the network are 
perceived to remain stable for a suitably long duration. Such system-level requirements 
for termination are presented in [CT96] in terms of mistake-prone failure detectors. 
(They make mistakes when timeouts they employ to suspect process failures turn out to 
be too small.) Consensus performance is influenced by how often and how long the 
timeout values chosen for failure suspicion (delay convergence) remain too small 
compared to actual delays. Similarly, a partial synchronous model introduced in 
[DLS88] assumes that some bound on communication and processing delays either hold 
or will eventually hold.  
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Protocols in this category tend to be coordinator-based. That is, in these 
protocols a process is given the role of a coordinator and the ordering is enforced by this 
special process. [Lam98] and [CT91] are considered the pioneering works in this 
category for crash-tolerant environment. Moreover, some Byzantine fault-tolerant 
protocols also employ failure detectors and take a coordinator based approach. Among 
these, [CL99], also known as BFT, is the most famous for its high performance and low 
overhead cost.   
Known works on performance evaluation of type-1 protocols are limited to 
fail-free and mistake-free environments e.g., [KS07, ADG+03, JMM07] and we know 
of no work that investigates on how to adaptively choose timeouts to minimise 
mistakes. (Establishing the efficacy of any such adaptation may not be easy as well.) 
Thus, using these protocols for providing consensus when communication delays (say, 
over the Internet) can fluctuate widely will be akin to letting TCP be used without any 
congestion control mechanism, such as [Jac88], that adapts the timeout values used for 
packet re-transmission. 
1.2.2 Type 2 Protocols 
Type 2 protocols are randomized in nature and require that the random choices made by 
processes independently from a finite set of values converge; this requirement is 
guaranteed in probabilistic terms to be a certainty with the passage of time [EMR01, 
MNC+06]. The more the number of processes seeking consensus and the more different 
are their initial values/intentions, the longer it may take for the convergence to occur 
(choice convergence). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no Byzantine fault-
tolerant multi-valued randomized protocol has been proposed. 
1.2.3 Our Approach 
Our approach to circumvent FLP impossibility is to avoid having quiescent failures. We 
use fail-signal abstraction [MES03] that employs internal redundancy to detect and 
signal internal failures. A fail-signal process is composed of redundant processes and 
halts on detection of an internal fault. Hence, it converts Byzantine behaviour of the 
constituent processes to crash accompanied by fail-signalling. [MES03] has 
demonstrated on a preliminary level the use of FS process to increase the tolerance level 
of a group membership service [EMS95] from crash to Byzantine. We focus on 
developing coordinator-based Byzantine-tolerant order protocols. 
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1.3 Thesis Objectives 
The thesis objectives are listed below.  
− To device a conceptually new class of coordinator-based protocols that does not 
require any convergence like the ones mentioned above for termination and hence 
its performance is solely decided by the prevailing communication delays and 
having to cope with real failures.  
− To develop a solution that is practical for building high-performance dependable 
system. We particularly aim for the protocols that offer fast and low-overhead 
performance when there are no failures in the system. The intended consensus 
solution should only induce reasonable latency so that the service responsiveness for 
the requesting clients is not much affected specially in fault-free situations.  
− To measure the performance of the developed protocols and compare with some 
other well-known protocol to establish the differences. We intend to experimentally 
evaluate the costs and benefits of the adopted approach. 
− Lastly, to achieve above targets while retaining the following as much as possible. 
(i) Keeping the redundancy level i.e., number of replica processes in the system 
to the established optimum value for the considered system context.  
(ii) Keeping assumptions regarding network and failure models to the weakest 
possible. 
Thus the thesis statement can be succinctly put as follows. 
1.3.1 Thesis Statement 
This thesis designs and develops a family of order protocols using the fail-
signal approach and demonstrates the practical viability of the approach through a 
comprehensive performance study projecting the cost and benefits both in absolute and 
relative terms. 
Next section presents the system model for which this thesis aims to solve the 
consensus problem. We also list all basic assumptions made. 
1.4 System Context and Assumptions 
We consider a distributed system of n nodes. Each node Ni hosts a service process si and 
an order process pi, as illustrated in figure 1.1. The service application is assumed to be 
a deterministic state machine.  
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Figure 1.1. System Architecture of the Replicated Service 
Replica nodes are connected via an asynchronous network like the Internet. As 
mentioned earlier, bounds on the communication delays over the network links and 
relative processing speeds of the nodes are not known. The only assumption made about 
the network is that these bounds are finite. Hence, it is assumed that if a correct process 
attempts to send a message infinitely large number of times, the message reaches its 
intended destinations eventually. Note that unlike other deterministic protocols [CL99, 
YMV+03], we do not make any system-wide assumption regarding eventual 
stabilization of communication delays even to ensure liveness. The network is assumed 
to be unreliable i.e., messages can get discarded, delayed, replicated and re-ordered. A 
strong adversary having control over the network can also alter the messages but 
restricted by the cryptographic assumptions stated below. 
We assume a (cryptography-constrained) Byzantine fault model. Replicas may 
fail in Byzantine manner but the failures are to be independent of each other. No 
assumption can be made for the behaviour of such a node and hence the hosted process. 
Faulty nodes can crash, loose data, alter data, delay and/or block communication 
system, delay non-faulty nodes and send incorrect protocol messages to cause damage 
to the service. Moreover, multiple faulty nodes can collude cleverly in arbitrary ways to 
mislead the correct processes. Hence, the adversary can perform in any way to 
undermine the processing of correct processes but it is assumed to be computationally 
bound and can never subvert the following two cryptographic assumptions.  
Every process uses cryptographic techniques for authentication during message 
communication [Tsu92]. Every message sent to other processes is signed and every 
message received is verified before consumption. We assume the following 
 
10 
 
(i) Cryptographic hash function D is used to compute message digests. The hash-
functions used are assumed to be 1-way and collision-resistant. That is, if D is the 
hash function used and a message m produces digest D(m) then it is not 
computationally feasible to compute m given D(m). Also it should not be possible to 
find two distinct messages m and m′ such that D(m) = D(m′). 
(ii) All messages sent are signed by using digital signatures. It is assumed that known 
cryptographic techniques, such as public-key RSA/DSA signatures, are robust 
enough to prevent message spoofing and replays and to detect message corruption. 
Hence, it is assumed that a faulty replica can not forge signature of a correct process 
undetectably. 
Like any other Byzantine fault-tolerant replicated system, we assume that the 
total number of faulty replicas does not exceed a given bound, say f, over the life time 
of the system. Hence, considering the optimum redundancy level for a replicated state 
machine, the total number of replicas is taken as n = (2f+1) [Sch93]. Note however that 
the optimum number of replicas for achieving consensus for an f-Byzantine fault-
tolerant system is (3f+1) though [LSP82, DLS88]. We will retain this optimum number 
of replicas for the second of three protocols we develop and use one extra replica for the 
other two. Note that to keep the number of replicas in the system as close as the 
optimum, use of encryption becomes necessary. However, encryption is expensive in 
terms of performance and an efficient solution may be possible without using 
cryptography techniques but higher redundancy.  
Furthermore, we assume that this (replicated) service has a finite set of 
authorised clients. Every client has a unique identifier i and is denoted by cli. Every 
client communicates with the replicated service by sending authenticated requests to all 
service processes over an asynchronous network. The requests are processed by service 
processes and results sent back to clients. Clients wait for (f+1) identical replies 
corresponding to each request they send. All clients are assumed to be non-faulty. For 
ease in maintaining the record of the latest request of each client, it is assumed that 
every client sequentially numbers its request message. Hence, every request message 
sent by a client is tagged with the sequentially increasing sequence number before 
signing. 
Finally, we assume that a trusted dealer initializes the system and all the nodes 
with cryptographic keys and hash functions. 
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1.5 Contributions 
The first contribution of this thesis is to formally describe the semantics of fail-signal 
(FS for short) abstraction. We describe the behavioural characteristics of an FS process 
in detail using a state transition diagram involving three states: Working, Signalled and 
Failing. While the first two assure consistent behaviour from an FS process, the failing 
state admits an inconsistent behaviour whereby an FS process can send a correct 
response to some destinations and a fail-signal to others. This is akin to a crashing 
process omitting to send a multicast to a subset of destinations – benign form of two-
facing behaviour.  
Second contribution is a major one in the form of  designing a family of three 
total order protocols that use FS process to achieve coordinator-directed ordering. The 
characteristic of an FS process is studied carefully that leads to a systematic design 
process.  
The first protocol, named Protocol-0, is the most basic. Its design retains the 
classical assumptions made in the traditional construction of an FS process using two 
ordinary, Byzantine-prone processes. The assumptions are two fold: (i) the constituent 
processes, if correct, will not find each other untimely or erroneous, and (ii) one of them 
will not fail. The design also makes an additional, simplifying assumption that an FS 
process will not enter into the failing state.  Despite this, the design of Protocol-0 is not 
straightforward. Even though the FS process itself does not exhibit 2-facing behaviour, 
the asynchronous network can make it appear to behave so, by selectively delaying or 
re-ordering messages/fail-signals generated by an FS process. The lessons learnt thereby 
are used to develop other protocols. Protocol-0 is argued to be correct and is an 
improvement over the work in [MES03] in terms of the number of replicas used. A 
primitive version of Protocol-0 was presented in the form of a consensus engine for 
large-scale self-organizing network applications in [IE07]. 
The other two protocols permit an FS process to enter the failing state but relax 
the assumptions involved in FS process construction differently. Protocol-I retains (i) 
above but allows both the constituent processes to fail but assumes that successive 
failures of the constituent processes will be apart at least by a pre-specified amount of 
time. We note here that the inter-failure threshold period is specified only qualitatively 
and not quantitatively. Protocol-II, on the other hand, retains assumption (ii) but permits 
correct constituent processes to find each other untimely occasionally.  
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All three protocols developed are structured in two parts. Normal part is 
executed in failure-free situations. The second part is called Install part and is executed 
when the coordinator signals a failure. Normal part is a relatively straightforward 
algorithm with simple communication steps as typical of many other total order 
protocols. Whereas, Install part is rather complex and is the part that deals with 
inconsistencies caused by Byzantine faults. Moreover, we study all intricacies and 
necessities of the latter part and propose an optimized version called Install-II together 
with correctness proofs.  
The third contribution is also a significant one in the form of demonstrating the 
practicality of the fail-signal approach for Byzantine fault-tolerant ordering. We 
experimentally evaluate the performance of both parts of Protocol-I to observe the 
trade-offs, if any. An extensive experimentation is performed in various network 
configurations by varying parameters like the total number of replicas, cryptographic 
techniques and system load. Normal part is evaluated on a LAN cluster and on a couple 
of emulated WAN configurations. Install part is experimented on the emulated 
configurations. Moreover, the performance of both parts in terms of latency (and 
throughput for Normal part) is also compared with that of BFT [CL99]. BFT is famous 
for its practicality and is the closest in terms of design to the protocols in this thesis. 
Finally, a crash tolerant protocol, developed by simplifying Protocol-I is also 
implemented. Normal part of the two Byzantine protocols, namely Protocol-I and BFT, 
are also compared with the crash-tolerant version to see the effect on performance when 
tolerance level increases from the most benign to the least. The performance study of 
Normal part over LAN also appears in our seminal paper [IE06]. Over all results show 
that the proposed protocol is optimistic and outperforms BFT in normal runs. However, 
a performance trade-off is inevitable in failure situations where the proposed protocol 
yields high latency values.  
1.6 Dissertation Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
− Chapter 2 explores the common ways of eluding FLP impossibility result while 
designing a consensus/total order protocol. This chapter serves as a brief survey of 
the solutions available in literature and focuses on the description of the body of 
work having similar design techniques to this thesis. The approach undertaken in 
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this thesis is briefly introduced and its place in the taxonomy is also identified. This 
chapter is supported with a discussion on the working of canonical crash and 
Byzantine fault-tolerant order protocols like Paxos, Chandra-Toueg algorithm and 
the protocol of Castro and Liskov [CL99]. 
− Chapter 3 consists of two parts. The first part formally introduces the fail-signal 
abstraction. The construction of a fail-signal process and the underlying assumptions 
are described in detail. A three state behavioural model is presented for fail-signal 
process with one of the states shown to permit a two-facing behaviour. In the second 
part of this chapter, a simple Byzantine fault-tolerant coordinator-based protocol, 
named Protocol-0, is designed using fail-signal processes. The purpose of Protocol-
0 is to demonstrate basic design strategies. Protocol-0 assumes absence of the failing 
state and uses the simplified fail-signal process. Finally, the last section discusses 
how inclusion of the failing state affects the working of protocol and proposes 
improvements for an advanced protocol design. 
− Chapter 4 adopts the recommendations forwarded in chapter 3 and discusses the 
design of an advanced protocol named Protocol-I. It is devoted to describing Normal 
part executed in failure-free situations. Description is followed by exhaustive 
experimental evaluation of performance of Protocol-I and BFT. Two performance 
studies are presented, one measuring the performance in LAN setup and other in 
emulated WAN configuration. A number of parameters are varied to measure and 
compare latency figures of the two protocols.  
− Chapter 5 presents Install part of Protocol-I. This is the most sophisticated part of 
the protocol and deals with arbitrary behaviour of faulty nodes. This chapter also 
presents results from experiments to compare performance of Protocol-I with BFT 
in emulated WAN settings. Moreover, an optimized version of Install is proposed at 
the end which is also accompanied with correctness proofs. 
− Chapter 6 presents Protocol-II. The system model is similar to the one used in 
Protocol-0, while the protocol design is closer to Protocol-I. Hence, we only discuss 
the amendments over Protocol-I which need to be done in both fail-signal process 
construction and protocol design. 
− Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by presenting summary and discussing possible 
future works.  
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Chapter 2 
Related Work 
 
This chapter presents a brief survey of the most common approaches taken to 
circumvent the FLP impossibility. Moreover, it introduces the approach used in this 
thesis as a different way of solving the agreement problem. Some well-known protocols 
that share common underlying concepts with the protocols presented in this thesis are 
also explained. 
We first restate the impossibility result to highlight the factors that give rise to 
the impossibility result. Then we describe the two most commonly used approaches to 
circumvent the FLP impossibility and explain how these approaches get around this 
result by tweaking one of these factors. These approaches include introducing 
randomization and restricting asynchrony. The latter is further divided into partitionable 
and non-partitionable classes of protocols. The fail-signal approach is introduced as the 
third category and the earlier work that comes under this class is also visited. Thus, a 
brief taxonomy of all approaches is presented.  
In the rest of this chapter, we focus on explaining some canonical protocols 
implementing non-partitionable systems. The discussed protocols are the closest in 
design strategies to our protocols and will serve to explain the basic concepts well. We 
first describe two well-known crash-tolerant protocols; Paxos [Lam98] and Chandra-
Toueg’s [CT96] algorithm to present the basic principles. Furthermore, a Byzantine 
fault-tolerant protocol commonly referred to as BFT [CL99] is explained in detail. This 
protocol is best known for its high performance and is considered a standard for 
comparison with the protocols designed in this thesis. Finally, the only work found in 
literature that uses fail-signal processes named FS-Newtop [MES03] is also explained 
briefly.    
2.1 Circumventing the FLP impossibility: Brief survey 
In this section we discuss two well-known approaches that have been commonly used to 
circumvent the FLP impossibility [FLP 85]. To recall, we state the impossibility result 
below with emphasis on the three major factors that contribute to this result.  
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“A deterministic solution to reaching consensus cannot be achieved if the network is 
asynchronous and if replicas can fail even merely by crashing.” 
We observe that the three factors which together make the impossibility result 
hold are: 
(i) deterministic solution,  
(ii) asynchronous network and  
(iii) failures (even just crashes). 
Relaxing/removing even one of these factors will allow us to get around the 
Impossibility. The two most common approaches used to find a solution have been 
targeted to relax the first two factors. Before describing these approaches in detail, we 
present the concept of using oracles which is core to most of the proposed solutions. An 
oracle is a component which is associated with each replica process. This component is 
queried by the process while making a choice to reach agreement. Depending on the 
type of choices an oracle assists to make, and hence the factor of impossibility result it 
helps to relax, an oracle can be one of the two types [DSU04, EMR01]: (i) Random-
Oracle (R-Oracle for short) and (ii) Suspector-Oracle (S-Oracle for short). Further 
details about these types are given in the sections of the approaches they are used in. 
2.1.1 Relaxing deterministic guarantees 
The aim of this approach is to provide a probabilistic solution to consensus instead of a 
deterministic one. Hence, number of steps required to complete execution are not 
known. The idea is to seek a solution whose execution will terminate before some time t 
with certain probability. The probability of termination before t goes to one, as t 
approaches infinity. Hence, the liveness property is weakened. Algorithms that follow 
this approach are called randomized algorithms and use R-oracles. R-oracle is a 
component that generates random numbers from some probability distribution when 
queried by the associated process.  
In general a typical crash-tolerant algorithm executes as follows. Each process 
pi initially proposes a value oi and multicasts to all processes. It maintains the initially 
proposed values received from all other processes in a vector vali[1 : n] [EMR01]. It 
also maintains a variable esti as its estimate of the decision value and initializes it to oi. 
Then the execution goes in asynchronous consecutive rounds, updating esti each time. 
The protocol progresses in such a way that estimates at all processes eventually 
converge to a single decision value. This eventual termination guarantees liveness. On 
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the other hand, the protocol ensures that the final converged value is one of the initially 
proposed values in vali and hence guarantees safety.  
Each round consists of two phases. In the first phase, each process pi multicasts 
its current estimate esti to all processes. It waits for first phase messages from at least 
majority of processes. If these messages from a majority correspond to the same value 
o, then esti is updated to o, otherwise esti is set to a special value ⊥ which represents an 
invalid estimate value. In the second phase, the updated esti value is multicast. On 
receiving second phase messages from a majority, pi takes one of the following actions. 
− If the estimates received in a majority of messages correspond to same value o, pi 
decides o. Else,  
− If at least a single message contains o as estimate, esti is updated to o. pi moves to 
next round. Else,  
− If all messages contain ⊥, a value from vali is randomly chosen by using R-oracle 
and esti is updated to that value. pi moves to next round. 
 A randomized protocol can be categorized as binary or multi-valued 
depending on the proposed value oi to be a binary or a multi-valued number 
respectively. In case of a binary protocol, the first step of proposing oi and maintaining 
vali becomes unnecessary. Hence, R-oracle acts as a coin-flip mechanism and randomly 
chooses 0 or 1 in phase 2.  
A large number of crash- [Ben83, EMR01, CMS89] and Byzantine fault-
tolerant [Rab83, CD89, AH90, FM97, KS01] randomized algorithms have been 
proposed. Since, this thesis is concerned with deterministic solution to reach consensus, 
further details about randomized protocols are not discussed. Interested reader is 
referred to [Asp03] which presents an extensive survey of randomized protocols. 
2.1.2 Relaxing asynchrony 
The second, well-known approach to circumvent FLP impossibility is to relax the strict 
assumption about the asynchrony of the communication network. Hence, some timing 
restrictions are applied on the asynchronous model with a caveat that there may be 
periods of instability during which the applied restrictions may not hold and the system 
should be designed to behave in a predictably safe manner during such periods. The 
restrictions take the form of choosing likely bounds on message communication delays 
and processing speeds and it is assumed that there will be a time after which these 
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bounds will hold for sufficiently long amount of time. However, this assumption is only 
made to guarantee liveness. Hence, the system is assumed to go through periods of 
stability during which the protocol is guaranteed to terminate. The notion of stable 
periods [DLS88, CF99] is referred to as well-behaved executions in [KR01]. The latter 
also presents bounds on number of communication steps for crash-tolerant consensus 
protocols in both synchronous and asynchronous network models.  
This class of protocols uses S-oracles to make progress. S-oracles are special 
modules that wait on timeouts for some “heartbeat”/“I am alive” messages to be 
received periodically from other processes. When the expected message from a given 
process is missing for a few, consecutive times, then that process is suspected. These 
timeouts are chosen based on the experience with the network performance so that (i) 
incorrect suspicions are minimal and, (ii) any two correct and connected processes that 
suspect each other, eventually begin to see each other correct and connected. With this 
assumption of eventual correctness of timeout bounds used, consensus can be solved in 
asynchronous environments. 
We divide the protocols that use relaxed asynchrony assumptions into two 
categories based on the steps taken by the correct processes on receiving the list of 
suspected processes from their respective suspectors. In the first category, called 
partitionable system, the suspected processes are considered failed and are excluded by 
the unsuspected processes from the group of processes that need to reach agreement. 
Hence, suspicions define membership of the group of processes that can participate in 
protocol execution. Whereas, in the second category, called non-partitionable system, 
the suspected processes are allowed to participate but the role they play in protocol 
execution changes. The two systems are explained below. 
2.1.2.1 Partitionable System 
The protocol execution moves through a sequence of views at every process pi, where a 
view is a set of processes which are deemed to be correct and connected to pi. Every 
process queries an S-oracle to get the list of suspected processes. The core specification 
of a partitionable system is that a suspicion leads to the exclusion of the suspected from 
the current view only through agreement being reached with the unsuspected: the 
process pi whose current view is V will construct the next view (V- S) only after every 
process in (V- S) has announced its suspicion on every member of S. However, to avoid 
inconsistencies, once a process has announced its suspicion to other members, it should 
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not unilaterally reverse its suspicion, even if it sees an overwhelming evidence to do so. 
By transforming suspicions into "agreed failures", a way (albeit imperfect) is found to 
get around the inherent inability to distinguish slow processes from crashed ones: a 
suspected process may indeed be functioning or communicating slowly, but it will be 
treated as a crashed one if, say, every one else in the group suspects it. With this 
imperfect way of 'distinguishing' crashed ones from slow ones, consensus can be solved 
not necessarily among all correct processes, but perhaps within subgroups of mutually 
unsuspecting processes. 
Reaching agreement on the suspected is central to partitionable system. It also 
helps sort out inconsistent failure suspicions held by mutually unsuspecting members. 
When p1 is seeking the exclusion of p2 through agreement, if a third process p3 (which 
p1 does not suspect) does not suspect p2 then p3 can refute p1's suspicion of p2; p1 can 
then either reverse its suspicion of p2 or add p3 to its suspect list. Further, an incorrect 
suspicion need not be symmetric: when p1 suspects p2, p2 may not suspect p1. It can also 
be intransitive: p1 suspects p2, p2 suspects p3, but p1 does not suspect p3. This 
asymmetry and intransitivity in the suspicion chain are sorted out when agreement on 
suspicions is waited for. But the agreement on suspicions cannot prevent the formation 
of concurrent, overlapping views as explained by the following example. 
Say, a partitionable replicated system consists of processes p1, p2, p3 and p4 as 
illustrated in figure 2.1. At system start, all processes work in the same view consisting 
of all four processes. Assume that p1 suspects p4 and the suspicion is confirmed by p2 
and p3, as a result, the view of p1 is changed to exclude p4 (p2 and p3 will also update 
their views to exclude p4). On the other hand, p4 has not (yet) suspected anyone, so its 
view remains unchanged. This is however a temporary situation, as p4 will eventually 
suspect p1, p2 and p3 (since these have stopped communicating with p4) and its view will 
be updated to exclude them. It is proved in [BDG+95] that no non-blocking 
implementation can guarantee absence of overlapping concurrent views.  
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Figure 2.1. Concurrent Overlapping Group views 
The most effective way to use a partitionable system is to use appropriate 
timeouts so that a group of correct and connected processes do not unnecessarily get 
divided into multiple subgroups also called virtual partitions with processes in one 
subgroup suspecting the ones in the other. In the worst situation, when the timeouts 
used turned out to be the most inadequate ones, the group gets split into singleton 
islands, whereby each correct process considers itself as the "sole" surviving process in 
the group. This comes about because a process has to reach agreement on the suspected 
only with the unsuspected ones; if a process suspects every other process then it is 
entitled to decide a view that contains only itself! In this situation, the system can only 
serve selective requests e.g., read only requests. 
In summary, the partitionable system approach restricts asynchrony in the 
following way. 
Timeouts are chosen to be so pessimistically large that false suspicions are 
indeed rare. This is often expressed as: correct processes do not suspect each other 
“capriciously” (see [RB91]). 
When correct processes are rarely eliminated, provisions can be made to permit 
them to rejoin the departed group and participate in protocol execution. However, 
allowing processes to rejoin is itself a non-trivial task and needs divergence in the state 
to be reconciled. This is addressed in [BBD97, ANB+07]. 
Good amount of work has been done based on partitionable service [BDM95, 
BDM97, BBD97, DM96, ADK+92]. [EMS95] presents a crash-tolerant group 
communication protocol named Newtop in the context of multiple, overlapping groups. 
Newtop provides variety of services: symmetric total order, asymmetric total order, 
reliable multicast and partitionable group membership. [MES03] extends this work and 
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converts Newtop into a Byzantine fault-tolerant system, called FS-Newtop. FS-Newtop 
is discussed in a later section.  
2.1.2.2 Non-partitionable System 
In this approach the protocol execution moves through views each containing both 
correct and suspected processes. Hence the membership of the views is static and output 
from suspectors is not used to decide next view’s membership. Instead, suspicions are 
used to decide the role a given process will play in protocol execution as described 
below.  
Most of the proposed solutions in this class tend to be coordinator-based. The 
idea is to go through rounds or views of execution. Each round has a process pre-
defined as the coordinator. Decision value is proposed by the coordinator. This value 
may be among the ones initially proposed by other processes or may even be generated 
by the coordinator itself. Of course, the coordinator may have failed or may fail while 
imposing its decision value. So, each process monitors the reliability of the coordinator 
by using S-oracle. If the coordinator is not suspected, a process accepts the value 
proposed by the former. Once the proposed value is known to be accepted by a majority 
of processes, it is considered as the decided value. Alternatively, suspecting processes 
move on to the next round with a new coordinator and repeat the process. The core 
specification of a Non-partitionable approach is that there should be no concurrent 
rounds and the ith round executed by any correct process should be the same. However, 
implementing this is not trivial. 
[CT91, CT96] introduced the concept of failure detectors for crash fault-model. 
Like, S-oracle, a Failure Detector-oracle (FD-oracle) is a component which the 
associated process can query to find out a list of failed processes. But recall that it is 
impossible to correctly identify a failed process [FLP85]. Hence, these detectors are 
unreliable and can make mistakes. [CT96] present a range of failure detectors classified 
with respect to two properties. 
1. Completeness – It requires the failure detector to eventually suspect every crashed 
process. 
2. Accuracy – It defines the degree to which a failure detector can make mistakes.  
Eight classes of failure detectors have been introduced based on two 
completeness and four accuracy properties. Moreover, the minimal number of processes 
needed to reach consensus for these classes has been studied. Each class has been 
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mapped onto a set of system requirements. The requirement set becomes weaker for 
weaker failure detectors. Failure detectors also use timeouts to suspect failures, and, 
unlike failure suspectors, can unilaterally reverse their suspicions if they see evidence 
for that. 
[CHT96] shows that the class of Eventually Strong Failure Detectors ◊S is the 
weakest class needed to solve consensus. ◊S is characterized by the following two 
properties. 
Strong Completeness - Eventually every crashed process is permanently suspected by 
every correct process. 
Eventual weak Accuracy – There is a time after which some correct process is never 
suspected. 
Reaching consensus becomes possible because the eventual weak accuracy 
property ensures that eventually no correct process suspects at least a correct process 
which can play the role of the coordinator. On the other hand, strong completeness 
ensures that the coordinator chosen by all correct processes is not among the crashed 
ones.  
Due to the two properties of ◊S failure detectors, execution will eventually 
terminate and temporary periods of instability can only have the effects of delaying the 
termination of the protocol execution, and cannot make the execution terminate 
incorrectly nor make it non-terminatable.  
A large body of work in literature has been dedicated to study various classes 
of FD-oracles. Issues like finding equivalence between FDs of different classes in terms 
of their respective power and capability [e.g., CGS00, FMR07], transforming FDs of 
one class into another and designing algorithms using FDs to solve agreement problems 
have been researched. Moreover, a new class of FD, denoted by ◊Sk has been introduced 
by Mostefaoui et. al. [MR99b], which is essentially weaker than ◊S class. ◊Sk has 
limited scope accuracy and requires only at most k processes to not suspect a correct 
process after some time. Transformation of ◊Sk and ◊S has been shown in [AFM+04, 
MRR+06]. Thus, the concept of FD-oracles has been used to develop a large number of 
crash-tolerant consensus protocols [AT96, DFK+96, HN99]. A couple of the earliest 
protocols including the one proposed in [CT 91] are explained in detail in subsection 
2.3. 
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Furthermore, adaptations of FD have been proposed to tackle with Byzantine 
failures. For example, Malkhi and Reiter [MR97] introduced ◊S(bz) class and the notion 
of quiet process, Doudou and Schiper [DS97] proposed an advancement and defined ◊M 
class and Mute process and Baldoni et. al. [BHR+99] further improved on the previous 
work and introduced notion of reliable arbitrary behaviour detection module.  
2.2 Our Proposed Approach 
We aim to circumvent FLP impossibility by avoiding the third factor that makes 
reaching consensus impossible i.e., quiescent failures. We recall that the core difficulty 
behind the impossibility result is the inability to distinguish a slow process from the one 
that has failed quiescently. However, if the failing process is somehow made to 
“announce” its imminent failure, this result will cease to hold. Furthermore, if failures 
are restricted to stopping only, then the decision gets even more simplified. This idea 
was first explored in [MES03]. This work introduces abstract processes that signal on 
failure. This abstraction is called Signal-on-Fail or Fail-Signal. The idea is to construct 
a process that behaves as a single process but consists of multiple redundant processes. 
This internal redundancy helps in circumventing the impossibility by detecting and 
signalling the failures. Although expensive in terms of increased redundancy 
requirement, this approach increases the tolerance level of the system by masking 
Byzantine failures. We show that adhering to the optimal redundancy needs careful 
protocol design.  
The approach to constructing fail-signal processes is similar to that of well-
known fail-stop processes [SS83] and fail-silent processes [BES+96]. A fail-stop 
process itself is made up of several fail-independent, fail-Byzantine, redundant 
processes which operate in parallel, check on each other’s outputs and endorse each 
other’s matching outputs. Only the endorsed outputs are treated as the outputs of the 
(abstract) fail-stop process, and the endorsement is indicated through digital signatures 
that are assumed to be non-forgeable. On detecting a failure of any of their counter-
parts, the redundant processes stop all activities related to fail-stop computation and 
indicate this stopping by outputting verifiably-endorsed fail-signal messages. Thus, a 
fail-stop process, or a collection of processes implementing that abstraction, either 
outputs verifiably-endorsed messages of correct contents or stops functioning after 
signalling its stopping. That is, it exhibits only crash failure semantics and additionally 
 
23 
 
fail-signals its own imminent crash. A fail-silent process also works in a similar fashion 
except that it halts without announcing its failure. Fail-stop process construction 
however requires more redundancy (2φ+1 processes if at most φ can fail 
simultaneously) because it also provides several other desirable properties. For 
example, the state of a fail-stop process at the time of failure is available in a stable 
storage and can be queried anytime after the failure. This is not the case for a fail-silent 
process which is constructed out of (φ+1) processes only.  
A fail-signal process is a mid-way technique which uses signalling feature of 
fail-stop process combined with the lower redundancy of the fail-silent processes. 
Hence, it does not provide stable storage. We refer to the earlier work of [MES03] that 
involves porting fail-signal processes on a crash-tolerant group communication protocol 
to present the proof of concept. To demonstrate the power of this abstraction, we intend 
to explore the design of ordering protocols that are practical in performance and optimal 
in redundancy. Particularly, we focus on deterministic coordinator-based protocols. 
Therefore, to lay foundations and to explain basic concepts, the rest of this chapter is 
devoted to a few canonical protocols that use design strategies similar to ours.  
Figure 2.2 summarizes the three major approaches taken to circumvent FLP 
impossibility; randomization, restricted asynchrony and fail-signal. Restricted 
asynchrony approach among the three is further divided into two categories; 
partitionable and non-partitionable. Canonical protocols in each of these categories are 
also noted each for crash and Byzantine fault models. We note that for the partitionable 
system class, no Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol other than the Total algorithm 
[MMA93] could be found in literature as surveyed by [DSU04]. It is important to point 
that no crash-tolerant protocol is shown in fail-signal category. This is due to the fact 
that fail-signal approach is inherently capable of tolerating arbitrary failures. Crash 
being the most benign class of faults is therefore automatically covered. In fact, 
designing a protocol using fail-signal processes, where faults are restricted to stopping-
only becomes easier. 
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Figure 2.2. A Taxonomy of approaches to circumvent FLP impossibility 
2.3 Non-Partitionable Crash-Tolerant Protocols 
In this section we explain a couple of well-known crash-tolerant total order protocols 
that use non-partitionable system approach; Paxos[Lam98, Lam01] and Chandra-
Toueg[CT91, CT96] algorithms. The original presentations of these algorithms 
demonstrate how the algorithms solve the consensus problem and then provide 
extensions for solving total order broadcast problem. We present the total order versions 
here. Being crash-tolerant, these algorithms assume that majority of the processes are 
correct requiring total number of processes to be n = (2f+1). Moreover, we discuss the 
similarities and differences between the two protocols. Note that some of the notations 
used here are different from the ones found in original texts. This is done to establish 
relevance between these protocols. Moreover, it is assumed that each process pi is 
uniquely identified by process number i. 
2.3.1 Paxos: The Part-Time Parliament 
Paxos is a coordinator- (also called leader) based protocol that uses FD-oracle Ω 
[CHT96]. Ω is associated with every process and determines whether the local process 
should act as leader. Ω selects a new process as leader when the current leader is 
suspected to have crashed. Paxos is designed to tolerate the situation where multiple 
processes consider themselves leaders at the same time. We note here that Ω has been 
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shown to be equivalent to ◊S FD-oracle. That is, any one of these can be transformed 
into the other [CHT96, Chu98, MRR+05]. 
[Lam98] describes the protocol in terms of following three roles that each 
process can play: 
(i) Proposer (leader) – The process which proposes a value to be decided. 
(ii) Acceptor – The process which participates in the decision process.  
(iii) Learner – The process which learns about the decided value. 
The original algorithm can be optimistically broken down into two parts, as 
suggested in [Lam01]. First one is executed by every process in normal failure-free 
situation with one single leader. The second part is executed when leader fails before 
decision is reached and a new leader is selected by Ω. These parts are illustrated in 
figure 2.3, assuming p1 as the leader process. 
Part 1  
(a) The leader proposes an order number o for a request and sends the proposal, called 
accept message, to all processes tagging it with a unique proposal number rnd#. The 
proposal number is to track the re-tries performed by the leader when the first 
proposal fails to reach decision. The proposal number is only assigned in ascending 
order and each leader has its own mutually exclusive pool of infinite proposal 
numbers. 
(b) An acceptor accepts and acknowledges the proposal by sending ACK message if it 
has not acknowledged a higher proposal numbered prepare message of part 2 (see 
below) for the same request. Otherwise, a negative acknowledgement, NACK 
message is sent back. In case of a single leader, this step will always result in 
transmission of ACK. 
(c) If the leader receives ACK messages from a majority of the acceptors, it sends a 
success message to all processes. On the other hand, if it receives even a single 
NACK, it re-starts the process by preparing another proposal. When a process 
receives success message, it decides the proposed value. 
Part 2 
(a) When the new leader gets selected by Ω, it needs to learn about all order numbers 
that have been decided by any process in the system. It therefore chooses a new 
proposal number rnd# from its pool and sends a prepare request to all processes for 
all missing order numbers. rnd# is chosen to be higher than the largest proposal 
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number known to be sent by any predecessor coordinator for all undecided orders. 
The prepare request carries all missing/undecided order numbers and is sent to seek 
the highest proposal number less than rnd# for each of these order numbers that has 
been accepted by any acceptor.   
(b) An acceptor sends ACK message to the new leader if it has accepted a proposal with 
number less than rnd# for any of these order numbers during part 1 execution (with 
any leader). ACK message contains the highest numbered proposals accepted for 
these order numbers and the corresponding requests. With this reply, the acceptor 
restricts itself for not accepting any proposal with number less than rnd#, as 
mentioned in step (b) of Part 1. Alternatively, a NACK message is sent. This NACK 
message can represent two situations: (i) No proposal was accepted for any order 
number, (ii) No proposal less than rnd# was accepted for any order number. In the 
second case, the NACK message can be made to carry the proposal number higher 
than rnd# corresponding to each order number for which an accept message was 
sent. This will guide the new leader which can attempt again with a new large 
enough proposal number. 
(c) After waiting for responses from a majority, the new leader starts execution of part 1 
for all these order numbers. It prepares an accept message for every order number 
by selecting the request corresponding to the highest proposal number reported. In 
case no request is reported for an order number, the new leader fills holes by 
proposing a special “no-op” request for these orders. 
An Example for Part 2 
We quote an example from [Lam01] to elaborate Part 2 execution. Suppose that a leader 
has just failed and a new leader pc has been selected by Ω. Say pc knows about order 
assignments 1-134, 138 and 139. It will therefore execute part 2 for orders 135-137 and 
all orders above 139 to find out if these are accepted by any process. It can use a single 
sufficiently higher proposal number rnd#_1 from its pool to construct a prepare 
message for all these missing orders as mentioned in (a) of Part 2 above. Suppose it 
received ACKs from at least a majority of processes containing requests with order 
numbers 135 and 140 only. Since at least a majority has not accepted orders 136, 137 
and higher than 140, these orders could not have been decided. To fill in the gaps, pc 
proposes 136 and 137 to be assigned to no-op requests. Hence pc can start executing 
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part 1 of the protocol for every new request with 141 to be the first proposed order 
number.  
Another possibility is that pc receives a NACK containing a proposal number 
rnd#′, rnd#′ > rnd#_1. This implies that the sender process has accepted at least one of 
these missing orders for rnd#′. Therefore, pc chooses a proposal number rnd#_2 from its 
pool such that rnd#_2 > rnd#′ and restarts execution of part 2. 
  
(a)       (b) 
Figure 2.3. Paxos Algorithm steps (a) Part 1 (b) Part 2 
Of course, there can be multiple processes considering themselves as leader at 
any given time. The protocol ensures safety by restricting all acceptors to accept only 
proposal numbers higher than the largest numbered prepare message acknowledged. 
Hence, inconsistencies will not arise between leaders as every leader gathers the latest 
accepted messages from a majority before proposing a value. However, these multiple 
leaders can keep on proposing higher numbered proposals (accept requests) too often 
resulting in none of the proposals arriving decision stage. Hence, progress can only be 
guaranteed by assuming some timing bounds on asynchrony, as mentioned in 
subsection 2.1.2. This will make the leaders wait before sending a new proposal for a 
timeout that is sufficient to get some earlier proposal decided.  
More work has been done recently to improve the Paxos algorithm, usually 
called classic Paxos now, in terms of number of communication steps. A variant of 
classic Paxos, named Fast Paxos appears in [Lam06]. In short, Fast Paxos allows the 
decided value to be learnt in two communication steps when there is no collision, i.e., 
multiple values are not proposed concurrently. (The basic idea is same as [BGM+01].) 
However, it needs higher number of replicas and may lead to higher latency in case of 
collisions. [JMM07] and [DMS06] present performance study of the two versions for 
WANs. The latter also propose an algorithm that is claimed to perform better under 
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collisions. (Byzantine fault-tolerant version of Fast Paxos has also been proposed and 
can be found in [MA06].) 
2.3.2 The Chandra and Toueg Algorithm 
Chandra-Toueg algorithm is also a coordinator-based protocol [CT91] that uses FD-
oracle ◊S as described above. An optimized version has been presented in [Sch97].  
For every request, each process pi proposes a value oi as the order number. pi 
also maintains a variable esti as its estimate of the decision value and initializes it to oi. 
The execution goes through a series of sequentially numbered rounds, starting from 
round 1, until a decision is made. Each round rnd# has a pre-determined process pc as 
coordinator. If n is the total number of processes, the relation is expressed as follows. 
c ← (rnd# mod n) +1 
This scheme is also known as rotating coordinator paradigm. Each round is 
divided into following four phases, as illustrated in figure 2.4. (Figure assumes p1 as the 
coordinator process.) 
 
Figure 2.4. Chandra and Toueg’s Algorithm steps 
Phase 1 – Every process sends its current estimate of the decision value esti to its 
current leader along with the latest round number in which the estimate was updated.  
Phase 2 – The coordinator waits to receive estimates from a majority of processes. It 
then selects the latest updated value and proposes it as the new estimate. It sends this 
message to all. 
Phase 3 – Every process waits until it receives either the new proposal from the current 
coordinator or an alert from its FD-oracle suspecting the coordinator. In the first case, it 
updates its estimate to the new proposal and sends an ACK message to the coordinator. 
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In the second case, it sends a NACK message to the coordinator indicating its suspicion 
and moves on to next round. 
Phase 4 – The coordinator waits until it receives either an ACK message from a 
majority of processes or a single NACK message. In the first case, it prepares a decision 
message with the proposed estimate and reliably broadcasts the message to all. A 
process decides when it receives this message. While in the second case, the coordinator 
suspends current round execution and moves to the next round. 
Since every process goes though sequentially numbered rounds responding to 
only one coordinator at a time and the coordinator chooses the latest updated estimate as 
the decision value, the protocol guarantees safety. The algorithm will terminate in first 
round, if the coordinator is considered alive by at least a majority of processes. In case 
of false suspicions, processes may keep moving to next rounds too often without 
reaching decision. Hence, like Paxos, liveness is only guaranteed when the 
communication and processing delays remain stable for sufficiently long duration. 
2.3.3 Paxos vs. Chandra-Toueg Algorithm 
In this subsection, we compare the two protocols and list main similarities and 
differences. Experimental comparison of the two protocols is presented by Urban et. al. 
[UHS+04]. They have proposed a number of optimizations for the two protocols and 
studied latency values in different classes of runs. The results show that although the 
two protocols have comparable performance in normal situations, the Paxos algorithm 
performs significantly better in cases with multiple correlated crashes or frequent false 
suspicions. 
2.3.3.1 Similarities 
1. Both algorithms go through iterative executions to decide a single value. Each 
iteration is associated with a coordinator process. Consecutive iterations are 
represented by proposal numbers in Paxos Algorithm (PA), while they form rounds 
in Chandra-Toueg’s Algorithm (CTA). 
2. Both algorithms facilitate recovery of processes from crashes, given that some state 
variables are retained in a stable storage.  
3. Both algorithms need aid of FD-oracles, Ω in PA and ◊S in CTA, and assume that 
the timing bounds used hold for sufficiently long duration to guarantee liveness. 
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2.3.3.2 Differences 
1. Proposal generation: 
PA - Coordinator proposes the estimate. Hence, it proactively starts an iteration by 
proposing a value. 
CTA - Every process proposes its own estimate and the coordinator chooses one of 
these proposals. Hence, despite being the coordinator of an iteration (round), the 
process has to wait to receive estimates from at least a majority of processes, before 
proposing a value. 
2. Iterative executions 
PA – A process does not necessarily need to go through consecutive iteration 
(proposal) numbers. It responds to the proposals send by various leaders, but only in 
increasing order. 
CTA – A process executes iterations only sequentially. It only moves to next 
iteration once it suspects the current coordinator. 
3. Current coordinator 
PA – A process is not restricted to respond to a single coordinator at a time. It can 
acknowledge accept and prepare requests of two different coordinators subject to 
the restrictions mentioned in Part 1(b) and Part 2(b) of PA (see subsection 2.3.1). 
CTA – A process only responds to messages from the coordinator of the iteration it 
is executing. 
4. Communication steps 
PA – Each iteration consists of three communication steps: Propose, Accept and 
Decide.  
CTA – Each iteration consists of four communication steps: Send estimate, Propose, 
Accept and Decide. 
2.4 Non-Partitionable Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Protocols 
The consensus problem has been given equal importance in the literature for Byzantine 
fault-tolerance. Many attempts have been made to circumvent the impossibility by using 
the above mentioned approaches. However, comparing crash-tolerant protocols with the 
Byzantine fault-tolerant ones, we observe that the foundational design techniques are 
the same. Indeed many algorithms can be seen as Byzantine fault-tolerant extensions of 
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Paxos [CL99, YMV+03, MA06]. This section mainly discusses the work available in 
the literature that is most closely related to the schemes presented in this thesis.  
2.4.1 BFT 
BFT is a Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication algorithm which can 
replicate a deterministic service [CL99]. BFT is an optimistic protocol and is best-
known for its performance in failure-free situations. We describe in much detail how 
BFT totally orders clients’ requests. BFT considers the same system context as taken in 
this thesis (presented in section 1.4). Any additional or different assumptions will be 
explicitly specified. 
BFT provides safety property [Lyn96] given that the total number of faulty 
replicas f does not exceed (n-1)/3 over the life time of the system. Therefore it needs 
total number of replicas, n ≥ (3f+1). However it relies on network synchrony to provide 
liveness property. It assumes that delay(t) does not grow faster than t where delay(t) is 
the time between the moment t when a message is sent for the first time and the moment 
when it is received by its destination. 
2.4.1.1 The Algorithm 
The replicated service consists of a set of n replica processes. For simplicity it is 
assumed that n = 3f+1. Each process is identified by a unique integer i in {0, …, n -1} 
and is denoted as pi. Each process executes service application; maintains service state 
and implements its operations. Clients send requests to execute a service operation to 
the processes. All correct processes execute the requested operations in identical order 
which is computed by executing order protocol. Results are delivered back to clients. 
Clients wait for (f+1) identical replies from different processes. 
BFT uses primary-backup scheme [AD76] and quorum replication techniques 
[Gif79] to enable processes execute client requests in identical order. Processes go 
through succession of configurations called views; which are numbered consecutively. 
In each view, one process is the primary (same as coordinator) and all others are 
backups. Process pc is the primary of view v such that c = v mod n. Note that views of 
BFT should not be confused with membership views of partitionable system. Like 
Paxos algorithm, BFT can be divided into two parts. First one is called Normal-Case 
operation and is executed in failure-free situation. The second part is called the View-
Change operation and is executed when primary is suspected to have failed. Note that 
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BFT implements a non-partitionable system. Each view that the protocols moves 
through, contains all processes in the system i.e., correct as well as suspected. Hence, 
process membership in all views is static. 
In normal-case operation, the primary assigns a unique order number o to each 
request and sends the assignment to backups. Backups agree on the order if it is found 
valid. Validity checks involve verification that the number has not been assigned to any 
other request by the same primary, that the primary is not leaving gaps in order 
numbers, that the primary has not stopped assigning order numbers to new requests etc. 
Each backup accepts the proposal if validity checks are successful. Once the assignment 
is confirmed (confirmation process in the form of three communication phases is 
explained below), service operations are executed in the assigned order and results are 
sent back to clients. Alternatively, if a backup suspects the primary, it triggers view-
change process to select a new primary.  
BFT uses concepts of quorums and certificates to tolerate Byzantine faults. A 
quorum is a set of at least (2f+1) processes with following properties 
Intersection property - Any two quorums have at least one correct process in common. 
Availability property - There is always a quorum available with no faulty process. 
BFT uses certificates to keep a proof of each step of the protocol. Quorum 
certificate is a set of messages with one from each process in a quorum regarding a 
particular information/step of protocol. Weak certificates are sets with messages from at 
least (f+1) different processes. 
2.4.1.2 Communication with Client 
Client clj requests execution of an operation op by sending a 〈REQUEST, op, t, j〉σj 
message to the primary, as shown in figure 2.5 with p0 acting as primary process. BFT 
uses timestamp t to totally order requests of each client i.e. request with greater t value 
will be assigned higher order number. It is also used to ensure exactly-once semantics 
for the execution of requests. Once a request is executed, the result is sent back by each 
process pi to the client in the form of 〈REPLY, v, t, j, i, rt〉σi message, where v is the 
current view number and rt is the result of execution.  
2.4.1.3 Normal-Case Operation 
The three phases of the protocol, which all correct processes execute during fault-free 
situation, are named pre-prepare, prepare and commit, as illustrated in figure 2.5(with c 
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= 0). The primary pc enters pre-prepare phase by assigning a unique order number o to a 
request m from a client. The assignment is sent to all backups in the form of a 〈〈PRE-
PREPARE, v, o, D(m)〉σc, m〉 message, where v is the current view number. A backup 
accepts a pre-prepare message if 
− It is in view v. 
− It can verify the authenticity of the message. 
− o is between a low water mark h and a high water mark H. 
− It has not accepted a pre-prepare message with same v and o but different request 
m′. 
Water marks are defined to prevent a faulty primary from exhausting the space 
of order numbers by selecting a very large one. Details on how values are chosen for h 
and H are given in a later subsection. 
 
Figure 2.5. Normal Case Operation of BFT 
On accepting a pre-prepare message, backup pi enters prepare phase and 
multicasts 〈PREPARE, v, o, D(m), i〉σi to all processes. It also stores both pre-prepare 
and prepare messages in its log. Once process pi collects quorum certificate with a pre-
prepare and 2f matching prepare messages containing same v, o and D(m) from different 
processes, called prepared certificate, it enters commit phase and multicasts a 
〈COMMIT, v, o, D(m), i〉σi message to all processes. Receipt of a quorum certificate 
with (2f+1) matching commit messages containing same v, o and D(m) from different 
processes, called commit certificate, marks the end of commit phase. pi is said to have 
request m committed when it has both the prepared and commit certificate for m. pi then 
executes the operation requested in m after all lower order numbered requests are 
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executed. Result is then sent back to the requesting client in the form of REPLY 
message mentioned before. 
2.4.1.4 Garbage Collection 
Since each process stores prepared and commit certificates for each request, log size can 
increase enormously with time. These certificate messages cannot be discarded even 
after execution until it can be ensured and proved, when needed, that the corresponding 
operation has been executed by at least (f+1) correct processes. Moreover, a non-faulty 
process should also be able to provide the up to date service state with validity proof to 
another process that missed the messages which are discarded by all non-faulty 
processes.  
Each process pi stores service state, also called checkpoint, after executing 
every constant number of requests, defined in the beginning. It multicasts a 
〈CHECKPOINT, o, D(state), i〉σi message, where o is the order number of the last 
executed request and D(state) is the digest of the state. Each process collects a 
certificate with (2f+1) checkpoint messages having same o and D(state) from distinct 
processes. This certificate, called stable certificate, proves correctness of the checkpoint 
and renders it stable. All prepared and commit certificates belonging to requests with 
order numbers below o are then discarded.  
The check point mechanism is used to define water marks mentioned earlier. 
Low-water mark h is equal to the order number of the last stable checkpoint and high 
water mark H = h + k, where k is big enough so that processes do not stall waiting for a 
check point to become stable. 
2.4.1.5 View Changes 
View changes are triggered by suspicions from backups. These suspicions are based on 
timeouts which provide liveness to the system in case primary is suspected not to be 
performing its job in a timely manner. Each process pi maintains a timer to monitor the 
time a request remains unexecuted. It sets the timer when it receives a request which has 
not been executed yet. The timer is reset when the request gets executed but is set again 
if there exists another unexecuted request. In case of a time out, a request to move on to 
next view (v+1) is multicast in the form of a 〈VIEW-CHANGE, v+1, o, CP, PC, i〉σi 
message, as shown in figure 2.6. Here o is the order number and CP is the stable 
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certificate of the latest stable checkpoint, and PC is a set containing prepared certificates 
of each request prepared at pi with order number greater than o. 
 
Figure 2.6. View-Change Protocol 
New primary pc for view (v+1) collects view-change messages for the new 
view from (2f+1) different processes also called new-view certificate VC. pc analyses 
VC to determine the order number of the latest stable checkpoint min-s and the highest 
order number of a pre-prepare message max-s. It then prepares a set O containing pre-
prepare messages for each number o, min-s < o ≤ max-s in the following way.  
− In case pc finds a pre-prepare message for request m with order number o in VC, it 
uses that to produce 〈PRE-PREPARE, v+1, o, D(m)〉σc and adds it in O. Note that the 
latest view pre-prepare message will be chosen for every o if there are multiple 
available in VC.  
− If no pre-prepare was found in VC for o, a new 〈PRE-PREPARE, v+1, o, D(null)〉σc 
message is produced by pc and added in O. Here D(null) is digest of a special null 
request which is used as a place holder during ordering process and is considered a 
no-op while execution of service operations (as in Paxos algorithm).  
pc prepares and multicasts a 〈NEW-VIEW, v+1, VC, O〉σc message to all 
processes. pc updates its log by adding all these pre-prepare messages. It also updates its 
stable checkpoint and/or current state to min-s if min-s has a greater order number than 
the other two. It enters view (v+1) and starts accepting orders in the new view. 
Each process pi checks the validity of the new-view message by computing O 
from VC in the same way and comparing it with the ones sent by pc. If found valid, the 
information in new-view message is then added in the log and stable checkpoint and/or 
current state updated as mentioned for pc. Each process then enters view (v+1) and starts 
executing normal protocol by multicasting a prepare message for each pre-prepare 
included in O. 
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Advanced version of BFT can be found in [CL00, CL02]. These extended 
versions incorporate proactive recovery to recover replicas periodically. This enables 
the system to tolerate any number of faults within the lifetime of the system (subject to 
some restrictions). Other optimizations include usage of symmetric cryptography 
instead of public key cryptography to increase efficiency and reduction of 
communication overhead using various techniques. Another interesting extension of 
BFT has been proposed by Rodrigues et. al. [RKB07] in which the authors have 
modified the design of BFT to suit to large-scale systems that are composed of many 
groups of replicas. The modification allows for arbitrary choice of n and f, n > f. 
However, the price to pay comes in the form of more restrictive liveness requirement. 
2.4.2 Discussion 
We observe that BFT has many features similar to the crash-tolerant protocols discussed 
in section 2.3 i.e. Paxos and Chandra-Toueg’s Algorithms (PA and CTA resp.). For 
example, it also allows recovery of processes from failures and requires some used 
timeouts to hold for sufficiently long duration to guarantee liveness. Also, some of the 
design techniques resemble with one of these two algorithms as mentioned below. 
Recall the differences in the features of PA and CTA given in subsection 2.3.3.2. 
− Proposal generation is by the coordinator like in PA. 
− Iterations are executed sequentially as in CTA. That is, a process moves through 
consecutive views and only changes its view when it suspects the coordinator 
process. 
− A process only responds to messages from the coordinator of its current iteration 
i.e., view, as in CTA. 
− BFT is divided into two parts Normal and View-Change like PA’s Part 1 and 2. 
We intend to re-use many of these features but in combination with the fail-
signal abstraction. Hence, this thesis develops and evaluates the performance of a 
Byzantine fault-tolerant total order protocol that uses fail-signal processes to achieve the 
aims mentioned in section 1.3. 
2.4.3 FS-Newtop 
FS-Newtop [MES03] is a Byzantine fault-tolerant version of the crash-tolerant group 
communication protocol Newtop [EMS95]. FS-Newtop uses fail-signal processes 
instead of normal processes to transform arbitrary failures into announced crashes. 
 
37 
 
Hence, system redundancy is increased in terms of number of processes in such a way 
that the original protocol design remains the same.  
Newtop is based on partitionable system approach and provides total order 
multicast service. The protocol starts execution with a group comprising of all n 
processes in the system, n ≥ (2f+1) to tolerate f crash faults. Each process uses S-oracle 
to detect failures. Failure suspicions by S-oracle of a process triggers a mechanism to 
exclude suspected processes from the group. Hence, execution moves through views 
with changing membership. As mentioned in subsection 2.1.2.1, false suspicions can 
cause system to split in logical or virtual partitions even in case of no failures. 
FS-Newtop introduces redundancy in each participant process. Each process is 
replaced by the fail-signal process. Since fail-signal process multicasts fail-signal to 
announce failure, S-oracle makes use of this feature to detect failures and does not 
suspect processes based on timeouts. This eliminates virtual partitioning. View 
membership is still dynamic but only fail-signalled, and therefore failed, processes are 
eliminated in consecutive views, preserving all correct processes in one group. Hence, 
use of FS process transforms a partionable protocol into a non-partitionable one.  
FS-Newtop demonstrates the effectiveness of the fail-signal approach in 
circumventing FLP impossibility. It also shows that a total-order protocol that uses this 
approach no longer needs to rely on timeouts to hold eventually so that the failure 
suspicions are only correct. Hence, termination is not linked with any liveness 
requirement as is the case for other deterministic protocols. [MES03] also presents a 
performance study to measure cost of FS-Newtop over Newtop due to fail-signalling. 
However, we note that FS-Newtop uses (4f+2) processes to tolerate f Byzantine faults 
which is much more than the optimal (3f+1) needed by the standard Byzantine fault-
tolerant protocols. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter studied the two most common approaches found in literature to reach 
consensus. The first approach is randomization, whereby replica processes are assisted 
by Random-oracles in choosing decision values. The termination of such algorithms is 
guaranteed in probabilistic terms. The second approach assumes some restriction on 
asynchrony of the underlying network. Algorithms in this approach use Suspector-
oracles based on timeouts to assist identification of the failed processes in the system. 
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They can be further divided into two classes. The first class called partitionable system 
assumes that suspectors rarely make mistakes and estimated timeouts on 
communication and processing delays are mostly correct. Hence, the suspicion list 
output by a suspector is used to exclude the suspected processes from the group of 
processes that execute the protocol. Whereas, the second category called non-
partionable system permits frequent mistakes by the suspectors. However, it assumes 
that the suspicions will eventually be correct i.e., the used timeouts will eventually hold. 
Hence, suspected processes keep participating in decision process but are not given the 
most important role of the coordinator.  
Furthermore, some canonical protocols belonging to the non-partitionable 
system class were discussed in detail. These include crash-tolerant protocols named 
Paxos and Chandra-Toueg’s algorithm and Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols named 
BFT and FS-Newtop. We showed that the way of working of all the protocols share 
common basic principles. However, we noted that Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols 
need more redundancy. In particular, BFT comprises of more phases of communication 
as compare to its crash-tolerant counterparts. 
Finally, we introduced fail-signal approach as the third approach to circumvent 
FLP impossibility. This approach includes provisions in the form of increased 
redundancy so that failures are announced whenever they occur. This eliminates the 
need of using timeouts to detect failures. We also referred to FS-Newtop which merges 
the fail-signal approach with a crash-tolerant partitionable group communication 
protocol named Newtop. We take the fail-signal concept to an advanced level and 
design Byzantine fault-tolerant total order protocols that are optimal and efficient. 
 
39 
 
Chapter 3 
Basics on Implementing and Exploiting 
Fail-Signal Processes 
 
This chapter describes the failure semantics of a fail-signal process and then outlines 
how such a process can be built through a careful management of redundant 
computation and output comparison. It is intended to serve two purposes: to revisit 
earlier work [BES+96] on constructing fail-signal abstraction in the presence of 
Byzantine faults; secondly and perhaps more importantly, to observe how a fail-signal 
process, despite internal redundancy, can still give rise to a benign form of two-facing 
behaviour. This factor needs to be taken into consideration while designing the fail-
signal based order protocols.  
An implementation of such a process is then presented in detail and we observe 
that a fail-signal process can be in one of three states: Working, Signalled and Failing. 
While the first two states encompass consistent behaviour of the fail-signal process, 
failing state is the one that covers possible arbitrariness in behaviour due to presence of 
faults. This problematic state is ignored temporarily and based on the reduced two-state 
assumption, a simple total order protocol is presented to demonstrate how the fail-signal 
concept can be used to enable distributed nodes to reach identical decisions. The 
protocol is then examined to highlight problems that arise due to the inclusion of failing 
state. Such analysis leads to some basic design choices for a more sophisticated protocol 
presented in Chapter 4. It also provides basis for construction of FS process with weaker 
assumption and includes a fourth state in the FS process behavioural model. 
3.1 Behaviour of a Fail-Signal Process 
A fail-signal process, FS process for short, executing a computational program P is an 
abstraction maintained by several processes (redundantly) executing P on distinct fail-
independent platforms. These process replicas cooperate with each other so that the 
computational outputs they collectively present to the environment are guaranteed never 
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to be incorrect. If a correct output (correct - as per the specification of P) cannot be 
produced due to faults, then the collective response will be a special signal indicating 
that inability; this signal is called the fail-signal. The collective responses are thus either 
correct computational outputs or fail-signals and they constitute the responses produced 
by the FS process.  
When the inability to produce a correct output is first detected, not only the 
fail-signal is transmitted but also steps are initiated to halt the execution of P and to 
transmit the fail-signal to wherever a computational output is due. If the execution of P 
is halted swiftly enough, no computational output can be transmitted once the fail-signal 
has been transmitted; that is, only the transmission of fail-signal can re-occur after its 
first occurrence.  
Unfortunately, the Byzantine nature of the faults means that it is not possible to 
guarantee that the execution of P can be halted swiftly. This has two implications: A 
fail-signal that is being transmitted cannot be made to indicate the current state of the 
FS process (e.g., the last collective output that was produced correctly). Secondly, the 
transition from producing only correct outputs into producing only fail-signals may not 
be managed to be an instant switch-over but instead can be via a ‘messy’ intermediary 
state. Thus, the FS process can be in one of three states, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, and 
the transition from one state to another can occur at arbitrary instants of time (decided 
only by the adversary). The FS process behaviour in each of the states however is well-
defined and is explained in detail below.  
 
Figure 3.1. Three states of FS process 
Working State:  
When an FS process is free of internal faults, it is said to be in working state. The FS 
process operates as per the specification of the program P executed by its constituent 
process replicas: all outputs expected of it are produced and each output produced is 
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correct.  Thus, an FS process in this state only produces correct outputs and for that 
reason it is also called an operative process. For simplicity, we assume that when an FS 
process is initialised, it is in the working state, i.e., all constituent process replicas are 
correct at the time of initialisation.  
Signalled State:  
When one or more correct constituent processes of an FS process detect that their 
counterpart have become faulty, the FS process is said to be in signalled state. As for 
the behaviour in this state, the FS process halts executing the program P and only sends 
a special message, called the fail-signal, to any destination to which a response is due; 
the fail-signal message is uniquely attributable to the source FS process and cannot be 
undetectably forged by any other process. This state is the terminal state for an FS 
process (unless explicitly mentioned otherwise – see subsection 3.6.2.3).  An FS process 
in this state is referred to as the signalled or halted process. 
Failing State:  
Failing state is defined as the state in which failures of one or more of the constituent 
processes have not been detected by the correct constituent processes. This state can be 
entered only from the working state and can be left only to enter the signalled state. 
Unlike the other two states, it is characterised by an absence of consistency in the 
transmission of responses to destinations. While only correct outputs or only fail-signals 
are transmitted in the working or the signalled states respectively, these responses can 
be mixed randomly when the FS process in the failing state. Specifically, a failing FS 
process computes correct outputs (as if it is still in the working state) but behaves in one 
of the following ways when it comes to what it transmits to a given destination:   
B1. An output is transmitted promptly or after some random delay; 
B2. Fail-Signal is transmitted promptly or after some random delay; or, 
B3. B1 and B2. 
When the environment treats the fail-signal as a message to be acknowledged 
to the source, the failing state is guaranteed to be a transient one: the FS process that 
receives an acknowledgement for its own fail-signal enters the signalled state within 
some finite but unknown amount of time.  
Remark: The failing State and the Uncertainties. Suppose that the specification 
requires outputs O1, O2 and O3 to be transmitted in that order to a destination q1. A 
failing FS process can instead transmit O2 (promptly), fail-signal (instead of O1 but after 
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transmitting O2) and O3 (thereafter). If q1 receives the outputs in the transmitted order 
and decides, on receiving the fail-signal, that the FS process has halted, it will find the 
FS process behaviour not having halted when it receives O3.  
Suppose now that O1, O2 and O3 are also to be transmitted (i.e., multicast) to 
another destination q2. Say, the failing FS process chooses to transmit to q2: O1 
(promptly), fail-signal (instead of O2) and O3. If q2 receives the outputs in the 
transmitted order it will also find the FS process not having halted even after it received 
the fail-signal. However, the last output received prior to receiving fail-signal is 
different: O1 for q2 and O2 for q1. Thus, from the perspective of destinations q1 and q2, 
i.e., the environment of an FS process, the presence of the failing state introduces two 
uncertainties: 
Uncertainty I: A destination that receives a fail-signal cannot know whether the 
signalling FS process is in the failing state or in the signalled state; nor does it know 
how long it should wait for the FS process to make the transition to the signalled state. 
Therefore, it does not know when to stop accepting responses (such as O3) that arrive 
after the fail-signal and start regarding the FS process as halted.  
Uncertainty II: If a destination that receives a fail-signal decides not to accept any more 
responses arriving from the FS process, then, it cannot know which of the multicasts it 
accepted (or it rejected respectively) are rejected (or accepted respectively) by other 
multicast destinations. 
Summary: Referring to Figure 3.1, the possible states and state transitions of an FS 
process are summarised as follows. An FS process is initialised into the working state 
where it only outputs correct responses to all intended destinations. After having been in 
that state for some (unknown) amount of time, it chooses to transit either to the 
signalled state or to the failing state. In the signalled state, the fail-signal that is uniquely 
attributable to the FS process is transmitted to every destination to which an output is 
due. In the failing state, the FS process may transmit to a destination the correct 
response or the fail-signal or both in some order. A destination that receives the fail-
signal does not know whether the FS process is in the signalled or in the failing state, 
and knows only that the transition to signalled state will occur eventually once it 
acknowledges the fail-signal received.  
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3.2 Requirements and Assumptions for Fail-Signal 
Processing 
A fail-signal process should be implemented by (φ+1), φ ≥ 1, replica processes that are 
hosted on distinct, fail-independent nodes connected by a reliable network. This 
distributed system of (φ+1) nodes is referred to as a Fail-Signal (FS) node. All but one 
of these (φ+1) nodes can fail at any time and failures can be authenticated Byzantine 
which is any form of arbitrary behaviour restricted only by (the standard) cryptographic 
assumptions described in section 1.4. In particular, individual nodes can be COTS 
components and are not expected to exhibit any form of fail-signal behaviour when they 
fail. We recall here that a solution without encryption will need an FS node to be 
constructed by more that (φ+1) replicas and may be more efficient. However, for the 
solution proposed in this thesis, one of the prime objectives is to keep the redundancy to 
the optimum. 
 
Figure 3.2. A Fail-Signal Node 
Throughout this thesis, only FS nodes with  φ = 1 will be considered and 
Figure 3.2 depicts one such FS node. The two nodes are connected by a fast, reliable 
network to facilitate efficient communication between them. They host the redundant 
processes p and p′ that execute program P. The FS process constructed out of p and p′ is 
denoted simply as P and sometimes explicitly as (p, p′).  
The mechanisms for constructing an FS process out of spatially replicated 
processes have been detailed in [BES+96]. The central idea is to have the nodes 
independently compare the computational outcomes and the relative timeliness of 
redundant processes. If outcomes are found to be in agreement, then, and only then, they 
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are presented as ‘the computational outputs’ from the FS process; if, on the other hand, 
one node suspects the remote node’s process not to be correct or timely, it emits the pre-
prepared fail-signal – causing the FS process to transit out of the working state. Thus, 
the FS process construction basically addresses the following requirements.  
1. Comparison must result in agreement when there is no fault in the FS node; 
2. It must terminate if a correct node finds its counterpart producing no or 
untimely or incorrect result; and,  
3. Any computational output of the FS process must contain verifiable and non-
forgeable evidence indicating that both the nodes have been in agreement over 
its contents.  
The FS process construction makes the following three assumptions to meet 
the first two requirements and relies on standard public-key cryptographic assumptions 
to meet the third.  Recall that it has already been assumed that all nodes within an FS 
node are initially correct and that at least one does not fail. 
3.2.1 Assumptions  
Assumption 0:  
The computational program P executed by an FS process is deterministic. 
Remarks: 
By this assumption, the replicas p and p′ must produce the same sequence of results 
when they process the same sequence of inputs. In this thesis work, p and p′ implement 
an order protocol, i.e., P is a program for a total order protocol. Assumption 0 therefore 
requires that the order protocol be deterministic and not involve tasks or threads making 
random choices as in randomised consensus protocols [Ben83, EMR01, Rab83, KS01].  
Assumption 1: 
The processing load on, and the message traffic between, the nodes within an FS node 
are carefully engineered to make it feasible to estimate accurate bounds on relative 
processing delays of these nodes and on (absolute) communication delays between 
them.  
Remarks: 
Planned control of processing loads and network traffic and adequate provisioning of 
resources are common means pursued in real-time systems (e.g., MARS system 
[Kop97]) to ensure that relative processing delays and absolute communication delays 
are bounded by known amounts. Assumption 1 regards that similar measures are being 
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enforced within the FS node; it thereby makes it possible to accurately estimate a 
differential delay bound within which a replica process (say, p) that has produced an 
output can expect to receive the same output form its counter-part (p′), provided that 
both the nodes are non-faulty and an output is expected as per the specification of P. 
This accurate estimate allows each replica to correctly assess the timely behaviour of 
the other during mutual checking. Say, p finds p′ not producing the expected output 
within the estimated delay bound. If p ends the mutual checking with the conclusion 
that p′ has failed to produce a timely output, then, by Assumption 1, that conclusion is 
correct if the node of p is non-faulty. Neither p nor p′ will reach such a conclusion if 
both nodes are non-faulty. Thus, Assumption 1 helps meet the requirements 1 and 2 
mentioned above.  
Assumption 2: 
At least one of the nodes within an FS node does not fail.  
Remark: 
This is the reiteration of the foundation assumption made in the design of an FS node 
that all but one of the (φ+1) constituent nodes can fail at any time. Taking into account 
the malicious faults, this assumption essentially represents a system where either the 
strength of the adversary is limited or sufficient preventive measures are in place to 
prevent all nodes from being compromised at the same time. 
3.3 Implementation and Operational Details 
Figure 3.3 below depicts the scheme advocated in [BES+96] for building an FS process 
using p and p′. The sequencer processes of the FS node receive the messages addressed 
to p and p′ and present them in an identical sequence. The processes receive input 
messages from only one source: the local ISIQ – the identically sequenced input queue 
(see Figure 3.3). Instructions such as ‘receive(m)’ and  ‘receive any(m)’ thus naturally 
get interpreted for p and p′ as: ‘receive the first m in the local ISIQ’. Since P is a 
deterministic program, p and p′ must now generate identical outputs.  
The comparator process in each node verifies the sameness and timeliness of 
the remotely computed outputs by comparing the latter with the locally computed ones. 
If the verification leads to no failure detection, the verified output is sent out as the 
output of the FS process P after attesting digital signatures to satisfy the third 
requirement mentioned earlier.  
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Figure 3.3. Operational Architecture of FS Process 
In summary, the sequencer and the comparator process pairs build the FS 
process P out of p and p′. Their design must cope with the variety of ‘fault’ situations 
that may arise within an FS node and these situations can be categorised into three 
types. 
No fault situation: By assumption, this is the initial situation within the FS node and the 
design of sequencer and comparator should ensure that the FS process remains in the 
working state so long as this situation prevails. 
Faulty node within the FS node exhibits its failure directly to the correct node: The 
failure must be detected and the FS process taken to the signalled state.  If failures of 
the faulty node are exhibited only to the correct node, then the transition to the signalled 
state will be directly from the working state; otherwise, it can be via the failing state. 
Faulty node does not exhibit its failures directly to the correct node: Once the reports of 
failure are verified to be true, the FS process is taken to the signalled state (possibly 
from the failing state). 
We will briefly describe the workings of the sequencer and the comparator 
processes by considering three cases: FS process (i) in the working state, (ii) transiting 
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to signalled state due to detection of directly exhibiting failures and (iii) transiting to 
signalled state from failing state.  
3.3.1 Working State 
The sequencer protocol advocated in [BES+96] is one of simple Leader-Follower 
scheme. Say, p is assigned the role of the leader and p′ the follower. This means that the 
sequencer process in the host node of p (the leader sequencer) dictates the sequence in 
which the inputs need to be entered into ISIQ and thus processed.  The sequencer 
process of p′ (the follower sequencer) simply enforces the sequence dictated to it. In 
addition, it forwards to the leader sequencer any input destined for p′ which has not 
been sequenced yet and observes if the leader sequences every forwarded input before 
some generously estimated timeout expires. The leader sequences every new input that 
it encounters and lets the follower know the sequence.  
The comparator protocol also takes up the leader-follower approach and the 
steps are depicted in Fig 3.4. For every output produced by p, the local comparator 
process (the leader comparator) signs the output and forwards the signed message to its 
counterpart (the follower) in the host node of p′ (shown as the dotted arrow in Fig 3.4). 
If the follower comparator finds that an identical output is locally produced, then it 
endorses the received 1-signed message by over-signing it and sending the doubly-
signed result to the intended destination(s) and also to the leader comparator. When the 
latter receives an authentic, doubly-signed message containing its original 1-signed 
message, it forwards the received to the intended destination(s) and also to the follower 
comparator.   
 
Figure 3.4. Output Checking and Endorsement  
Note that the presence of two signatures in the output message of the FS node 
indicates that the message contents have been endorsed by both nodes; since both nodes 
cannot be faulty, the contents of a doubly-signed message must be correct. Note also 
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that each node independently transmits a double-signed output – leading to redundant 
output transmissions capable of tolerating transmission failure by one node.   
3.3.1.1 Use of Comparator Timers 
The comparator processes also monitor each other for timely behaviour using liberally 
estimated timeouts. Three types of timeouts are used: (i) for every output produced by 
p′, the follower comparator expects to receive from the leader a 1-signed message 
containing the same output before the timer expires; (ii) for every 1-signed message 
received from the leader, there is a matching output produced by p′ before the timer 
expires; and (iii), for every 1-signed output sent to the follower, the leader comparator 
expects to have received a doubly-signed equivalent from the follower before the timer 
expires.  Since timeout durations are estimated accurately (Assumption 1), timeouts do 
not expire pre-maturely and their expiry cannot be a false-positive. 
3.3.2 Direct failure detection 
At the time of initialisation, each node in the FS node is supplied with a fail-signal 
message signed by the other node. Whenever the sequencer (or the comparator) process 
of a node first detects a failure of the other node, the local comparator (or the local 
sequencer) process is informed of this detection; the 1-signed fail-signal is over-signed 
with the local node’s signature and the resulting double-signed fail-signal is used to 
indicate the transition from the working state. This transition is accomplished by 
executing the halting procedure: the sequencer process stops sequencing input 
messages (thus letting ISIQ become empty eventually) and sends the 2-signed fail-
signal to the source of every input message received; the comparator process stops 
comparing and sends the 2-signed fail-signal to destination(s) for whom an output has 
been produced locally. Two important remarks are now in order. 
It is possible that the comparator/sequencer of a correct node receives from its 
counter-part a doubly-signed fail-signal containing the local node’s signature. This can 
occur when the comparator/sequencer of the faulty node detects a failure and initiates 
the halting procedure. When this happens, the halting procedure is initiated locally.  
Note that each node possesses the ability to transmit the 2-signed fail-signal 
without the cooperation of its counter-part. Because of this ability, correct node can 
generate and transmit the 2-signed fail-signal even if its faulty counter-part refuses to 
cooperate (simply because of a crash).  But possessing this ability has two implications: 
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1-signed fail-signal needs to have been formed at the time of system initialisation and 
cannot therefore contain any information about the process state at the time of fail-
signalling (e.g., the first input for which the correct output could not be computed); so, 
the fail-signal only indicates that a failure has been observed within the FS node. 
Secondly, a maliciously faulty node can transmit a 2-signed fail-signal unbeknown to its 
correct counter part and the impact of such behaviour is discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
3.3.2.1 Scenarios leading to failure detection  
Following are the scenarios in which a sequencer process concludes a failure of its 
counterpart. 
(i) Timeout occurs (at the follower sequencer) before the sequence for a 
forwarded input can be known; 
(ii) A forwarded/sequenced input is found to be syntactically incorrect; and, 
(iii) The fail-signal received is found to contain the local node’s signature. 
Following are the scenarios in which a comparator process concludes a failure. 
(i) Timeout occurs at the follower while a 1-signed output that matches a 
locally computed output has not been received from the leader; timeout 
occurs at the follower while an output that matches a 1-signed output 
received from the leader has not been computed locally; timeout occurs at 
the leader while a 2-signed output expected from the follower has not been 
received (see also subsection 3.3.1.1); 
(ii) What is received is found to be syntactically incorrect; 
(iii) The fail-signal received is found to contain the local node’s signature. 
3.3.3 From Failing to Signalled State 
With no loss of generality, let us suppose that the host node of p′ (the follower node) is 
faulty. Consider the scenario that the follower node does not fail towards the leader, and 
fails only towards the environment by omitting to send some of the (double-signed) 
output messages or sending the output messages in some corrupted form. Since output 
messages are also emitted by the leader node as well (see Fig 3.4), the FS process 
appears to be in the working state if destinations choose to discard any corrupt output 
messages they possibly receive. However, the following malicious failure modes will 
cause the FS process to transit to the failing state.   
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3.3.3.1 Malicious Behaviours Leading to Failing State 
Suppose that the faulty follower node deliberately avoids sending the 2-signed output 
message(s) to the leader. Before its timeout expires (see case 3 in subsection 3.3.1.1), 
the leader could have entrusted β 1-signed messages, β  ≥ 1, with the faulty follower. 
(In any comparator protocol, at least one comparator process must entrust the other with 
at least one 1-signed output message; otherwise, output comparison cannot make 
progress in the absence of faults; so, β  ≥ 1.) The faulty follower, being solely in 
possession of β double-signed, valid messages, can choose not to send some of them or 
send them only to some subsets of destinations possibly after some arbitrary delays. The 
destinations that get sent a double-signed message will experience the failing state 
behaviour of B3 (see Subsection 3.1) for that output, while those that do not get sent 
any double-signed message experience B2 by receiving fail-signal from the timed-out 
correct node.   
Another form of malicious behaviour that leads to failing state is as follows. 
Suppose that the faulty follower prepares the 2-signed fail-signal without detecting any 
failure and transmits it selectively to some destinations, while maintaining correct 
behaviour to its counterpart. The net effect is that all destinations get sent (by the correct 
node) double-signed, output messages, while some (chosen by the faulty node) 
additionally get sent fail-signal messages and  thereby experience the failing state 
behaviour of B3. When a destination echoes or acknowledges the fail-signal to both the 
nodes of the FS process, the correct leader node will realise that the fail-signal has 
already been sent out and initiate the halting procedure. Note that when the correct node 
executes the halting procedure, the faulty follower may be in sole possession of β 
double-signed, valid messages, as explained earlier. So, it is only safe to state that after 
some unknown but finite amount of time, the FS process will output only fail-signal and 
thus enter the signalled state. 
3.4 Protocol-0: The Basic Protocol 
This section develops an order protocol by making a few simplifying assumptions on 
the nature and the number of FS processes employed. Specifically, we assume that no 
FS process ever enters the failing state. That is, when a constituent process fails, it is 
directly detected by the counterpart (failure always enables direct failure detection as 
explained in subsection 3.3.2). Moreover, it is assumed that at least one FS process 
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never leaves the working state. The protocol is therefore aptly referred to as the basic 
protocol or simply Protocol-0 in the rest of the thesis. The correctness arguments and 
the subsequent observations lay the foundations for developing more sophisticated 
protocols whose performance will be studied in detail. Protocol-0 is developed in the 
following system context.  
3.4.1 System Context 
Protocol-0 retains the basic replicated service system structure sketched in Chapter 1: a 
set of (2f+1), f ≥ 1, service processes running on asynchronously distributed nodes. To 
assist replicas in executing client requests in identical order, each replica node Ni is 
additionally installed with an order process, pi, executing Protocol-0. To build FS 
processes, (f+1) of these nodes will be paired with shadow nodes, as shown in Figure 
3.5. Each shadow node N′i, 1≤ i ≤ f+1, hosts the shadow order process, p′i, which also 
executes Protocol-0. The process pair pi and p′i implement the FS process Pi with the 
former acting as the leader and the latter as the shadow.  
 
Figure 3.5. System Architecture 
We list below the notations for various sets of order processes which are of 
interest to protocol description. The notations will follow this convention: Greek letters 
are used for denoting process sets, upper case Roman letters for items related to fail-
signal processes (e.g., P1), lower case Roman letters for those related to normal 
processes (e.g., p1), and ‘′’ for distinguishing those related to shadows (e.g., p′1). 
Π =  Set of all FS processes = {P1, P2, …, Pf+1}; 
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FSi =  2-signed fail-signal from Pi; 
π  =  Set of all order processes co-located with service processes = {p1, p2, …, p2f+1}; 
π′ =  Set of all shadow order processes (not co-located with service processes) 
 = {p′1, p′2, …, p′f+1}. 
The set (π∪π′) of 3f+2 order processes form the middleware for supporting 
Byzantine fault-tolerant service replication. Client requests are first received by this 
middleware layer i.e. requests are sent to all 3f+2 order processes. These distributed 
order processes coordinate with each other to irreversibly assign a unique sequence 
number, called the order number and denoted as o, to each given request r. Following the 
terminology of BFT, we term this act of irreversibly assigning o to request r as committing 
o (to r). 
The order processes in π forward the requests to local service processes for 
processing as per the order numbers committed. It is worth mentioning here that the 
total number of nodes used by Protocol-0 is 3f+2 which is one more than that needed in 
BFT (i.e., 3f+1).  
3.4.2 Protocol Design  
Since the protocol design is to exploit the aspects of FS processes, two design choices 
are readily made. Since the protocol has to be deterministic (see Assumption 0 in 
Subsection 3.2.1), we choose it to be coordinator based, which is the most common 
class of deterministic protocols. Secondly, since an FS process never generates an 
incorrect output (i.e., an incorrect order), it is best qualified to carry out the coordinator 
role: the order number o which it chooses for a given client request r can be simply 
trusted by every order process p in π∪π′.  
When the FS process acting as the coordinator transmits a fail-signal, one of 
the operative FS processes can take over the role; since there are (f+1) FS processes and 
only at most f nodes can fail, there will always be at least one operative FS process in 
the system. The protocol design thus basically needs to address two questions: which FS 
process should take over the coordinator role when the coordinator fail-signals and how 
the taking-over should be accomplished.  
3.4.2.1 Who Becomes the New Coordinator? 
This question is answered simply by publicly ranking all (f+1) FS processes and 
defining thereby the sequence in which they are to take up the coordinator role. Let this 
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ranking be P1, P2, …, Pf+1 and be known to all p∈π∪π′.  Thus, P1 becomes the first 
coordinator when the protocol is initialised. 
 
Figure 3.6. Possible role transitions during protocol execution 
Figure 3.6 shows how the role of a given FS process can change during 
protocol execution. An operative FS process that is acting or not acting as the 
coordinator is in the coordinator or non-coordinator state, respectively. When it emits a 
fail-signal, it enters the terminal, signalled state. (The intermediary, failing state is never 
entered – see Figure 3.1.) All FS processes are assumed to be initially in the non-
coordinator state at the start of the protocol and P1 (the first ranked FS process) instantly 
makes the transition (shown as 2 in Figure 3.6) to coordinator state.  
Note that at most one FS process can be acting as the coordinator at any given 
moment during protocol execution. Let Pc be the current coordinator.  When Pc detects 
that it can no longer transmit correct ordering of outputs, it enters the terminal state of 
signalled as shown by transition 3 in Figure 3.6.  When Pi, i ≠ c, learns of fail-signalling 
by Pc, it decides to become the coordinator (decides to make transition 2) if i = c+1 or if 
it had received a fail-signal from each Pk, c+1 ≤ k ≤ i-1. If Pi, i > c+1 becomes the next 
coordinator after Pc has fail-signalled, then each Pk, c+1 ≤ k ≤ i-1 must have already 
made transition 1.  
3.4.2.2 How to Become the New Coordinator? 
The taking-over of the coordinator role by Pi from Pc is accomplished through Pi 
executing the install procedure and must satisfy the following condition: Pi must be 
seen by every correct process p ∈ π∪π′ to be maintaining continuity in assigning order 
numbers to new client requests. More precisely, let max_committedp be the largest order 
number committed by any correct process p ∈ π∪π′ before p decides that Pc is no 
longer the coordinator. The starting order number start_o used by Pi for ordering new 
client requests must be:  
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start_o = 1 + maximum{max_committedp | ∀ correct p ∈ π∪π′}. 
Obviously, Pi cannot compute start_o by directly contacting each p of π∪π′ for 
max_committedp, since it cannot know which p is correct and which is not. So, the 
protocol imposes the following two rules for committing order numbers to requests. 
• A correct p commits o only after it knows that every operative FS process P ∈ Π 
has acknowledged the coordinator’s proposal of o for r.  
• Each operative non-coordinator FS process Pj multicasts its acknowledgement to the 
proposal of o for r, so long as (i) it knows that the proposing coordinator has not 
fail-signalled and (ii) it has acknowledged the proposal for (o -1).  
The install procedure now becomes like a 2-phase commit protocol: 
o Pi transmits an INVITE message to all FS processes; the message contains (i) the 
fail-signal of each Pk, 1 ≤ k ≤ i-1, as evidence for Pi’s eligibility to install itself as 
the coordinator and (ii) Ai  which is the largest order number Pi has acknowledged 
so far. 
o An operative FS process Pj, on receiving INVITE from Pi, replies with its own Aj - 
the largest order number Pj has acknowledged so far. The reply message is called 
the STATUS message which also contains the list of acknowledged proposals for all 
o in [Ai + 1, Aj] if Aj > Ai.  
o Pi waits to receive the STATUS message from each operative FS process. This 
waiting must terminate since any FS process which Pi regards to be operative must 
transmit either the STATUS message or a fail-signal. Pi computes start_o:  
start_o = 1 + maximum of {Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ Π - Signalledi}, where  
Signalledi is the set of FS processes from which Pi has received a fail-signal. 
Remark: 
It may appear that start_o can be computed as 1 + minimum of {Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ Π - 
Signalledi}: there is at least one FS process, say Pmn, which sent STATUS message to Pi 
with Amn = minimum{Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ Π - Signalledi}; Pmn has not so far acknowledged any 
proposal with order number larger than Amn and will not acknowledge any proposal 
from Pc which is now known to have fail-signalled;  so, it would appear that no correct 
p ∈ π∪π′ could have committed an order number larger than Amn while Pi computes 
start_o. Such a conclusion can be incorrect as the following scenario explains. 
Let Pmn be the only FS process in (Π - Signalledi) to have sent Amn, i.e., all 
other Pj had sent Aj > Amn. Suppose also that Pmn, soon after sending its STATUS to Pi, 
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enters the signalled state and sends fail-signal to all processes in (π∪π′). Let the fail-
signal from Pmn take some arbitrarily long time to reach all processes except for one 
correct p which receives the fail-signal in zero time. Finally, assume that the fail-signal 
from Pc and any message that indicates fail-signalling of Pc (e.g., the INVITE from Pi) 
take some arbitrarily long time to reach p. All this means is that for a period of time 
only p knows the fail-signalling of Pmn and it also remains unaware of the coordinator 
change from Pc to Pi; during this period, p can commit proposals without awaiting 
acknowledgements from Pmn and commit up to minimum of {Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ Π - Signalledi 
– {Pmn}} which is larger than Amn. That is, o_maxp > Amn.  On the other hand, 
maximum{Aj|∀ Pj ∈ Π - Signalledi} ≥ maximum{Aj|∀ Pj ∈ Π - Signalledi – {Pk}} for 
any Pk ∈ (Π - Signalledi). That is, start_o computed as presented above is guaranteed to 
be larger than o_maxp for any correct p.  
The scenario constructed above comes about primarily due to two reasons 
which are explored in detail later (see subsection 3.6.1) and are briefly mentioned below 
for now. The nature of communication outside FS nodes is asynchronous and this 
means that a multicast message, even when transmitted correctly, may take unknown 
amount of time to reach different individual destinations; in the extreme, zero to some 
and some (finitely) large periods to others – e.g., the fail-signal from Pmn reaching p in 
zero time and others after some arbitrarily long time. Secondly, a fail-signal does not, 
and cannot be made to, indicate the process state prior to fail-signalling; for example, 
the fail-signal from Pmn cannot indicate that the transmission of STATUS to Pi has just 
preceded its transmission. Had it been the case, p would have become aware of the on-
going coordinator change and ceased committing proposals from Pc and the scenario 
would not have been possible. 
3.4.3 Data Structures  
The types of messages used reflect the protocol structure: coordinator proposes an order 
number o for a request r, and a proposal needs to be acknowledged by all operative FS 
processes before it can be committed by any order process in (π∪π′). Disseminating 
proposals, acknowledgements and commits are done using messages of types ORDER, 
ACK and COMMIT respectively. The protocol structure also implies that order 
processes that do not construct FS processes, viz. pf+2, pf+3, …, p2f+1, play no significant 
part in ordering requests but simply learn the committed order numbers. 
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3.4.3.1 Messages Used 
ORDER(o): This is the short-hand notation for an Order message by which coordinator 
Pc proposes order number o for request r. (Where needed, we would explicitly indicate r 
in the form ORDER(o, r)). The message has four fields and its structure can be 
expressed as: 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉, where D(r) is the digest of r generated (by Pc) using 
a one-way, collision-resistant hash function. (See assumptions in section 1.4) 
ACKi(o): This is a short form for an Ack message by which the FS process Pi 
acknowledges ORDER(o) which contains o and  D(r) of ORDER(o). The full message 
structure is: 〈ACK, o, D(r), i〉. 
COMMITi(o): This is a short form for a Commit message that indicates that Pi has 
committed order number o to some request r. (Where needed, we would explicitly 
indicate r in the form COMMIT(o, r)). The message structure is: 〈COMMIT, o, D(r), i〉. 
Any process that receives COMMITi(o) = 〈COMMIT, o, Dig, i〉 learns that o has been 
irreversibly assigned universally to the request r that satisfies D(r) = Dig. 
The protocol additionally deals with fail-signal, INVITE and STATUS 
messages. It restricts that all messages be generated only by an FS process; therefore, 
they are all double-signed and may be redundantly transmitted by the replicated 
processes implementing the corresponding FS process. We assume that the 
communication subsystem delivers only authentic, double-signed messages from FS 
processes as ‘received’ messages to protocol execution and also filters out duplicates.  
3.4.3.2 Variables and Functions Used 
Processes pi and p′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1), maintain the following variables. 
c holds the rank of the co-ordinator (initially 1); 
A is the largest order number for which an ACK has been sent (initially 0); 
Signalledi: Set of FS processes known by pi to have fail-signalled (initially empty); 
Order_Pool: set of ORDER messages sent/received (initially empty); 
Ack_Pool: set of ACK messages sent/received (initially empty). 
Processes pi and p′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1), also have following constant sets. 
Π =  Set of all FS processes = {P1, P2, …, Pf+1}; 
π  =  {p1, p2, …, p2f+1}; 
π′  =  {p′1, p′2, …, p′f+1}. 
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The predicate committable(o) is true for a given o > 0 if (i) ORDER(o, r) ∈ 
Order_Pool and (ii) 〈ACK, o, D(r), j〉 ∈ Ack_Pool for every Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledi). 
The function eligible() returns the smallest j such that Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledi). 
When c ≠ i, Pi is a non-coordinator FS process; when c ≠ i and i = eligible(), Pi 
becomes eligible to act as the coordinator and therefore pi and p′i execute the install 
procedure. The protocol is presented next. 
3.4.4 Algorithm   
The protocol is executed by all processes in (π∪π′). The processes pi and p′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 
(f+1), which implement FS process Pi  play a very significant role compared to those 
that do not construct FS processes, viz. pf+2, pf+3, …, p2f+1. Therefore, protocol 
description will focus only on the activities of the former; the activities performed by 
the latter are specifically identified.   
The protocol for pi and p′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1), consists of three parts. The first part is 
the main programme and is executed continuously irrespective of whether Pi is the 
coordinator (c = i) or not (c ≠ i). The other two parts are executed only when c and 
eligible() satisfy certain conditions. The second part is executed when c ≠ i and i = 
eligible() and is initiated from the first part. The execution completes the install 
procedure (i.e., completes the transition 2 in Fig 3.6) and uses the third part to make pi 
and p′i start acting as the coordinator FS process Pi.  
In describing the protocol, when we say that pi or p′i ‘receives’ or ‘transmits’ a 
message, we mean that the message is being picked up from the head of the ISIQ 
maintained by the local sequencer process or being transmitted through the local 
comparator process, respectively (see figure 3.3). To simplify description, we would 
allow a process to send a message to itself, in particular while the message is a 
multicast. This style is in common with the description of consensus protocols in the 
literature. Note that when a message is transmitted to itself, it is treated like any other 
message – i.e., transmitted through the local comparator process and received through 
the local sequencer process. 
The main part consists of four tasks each of which is activated whenever a 
message of distinct type is received. The message types are: ORDER, ACK, Fail-Signal, 
and INVITE. The activities of these concurrent tasks are illustrated in Fig 3.7 and are 
then described in detail. 
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main() 
while (Pi ∉ Signalledi) do → 
{       /Task 1 
(ORDER(o) received from Pc and o > A) →  
{  
1.1 enter received ORDER(o) into Order_Pool; 
1.2 while (ORDER(A+1)∈ Order_Pool) do → 
 { 
1.3  multicast ACK(A+1) to all P ∈ Π; 
1.4  enter ACK(A+1)into Ack_Pool; 
1.5  A = A+1; 
} 
} 
||       /Task 2 
(ACK(o) received) →  
{  
2.1 enter received ACK(o) into Ack_Pool; 
2.2 while (∃ o : committable(o) = true) do → 
 { 
2.3 multicast COMMIT(o) to all p ∈ π∪π′; 
2.4 Ack_Pool = Ack_Pool\{ACK(o)}; 
} 
} 
||       /Task 3 
(FSj received and Pj ∉ Signalledi) → 
{ 
3.1 enter Pj into Signalledi; 
3.2 multicast the received FSj to all P ∈ Π; 
3.3 if (c = j) →  
3.4 { c = -1; Order_Pool = Order_Pool\{ORDER(o>A)}; 
3.5 if (i = eligible()) →  
3.6  multicast <INVITE, A, Signalledi> to all P∈Π;} 
} 
||       /Task 4 
(<INVITE, Aj, Signalledj> received from Pj) → 
{ 
4.1 Signalledi = Signalledi ∪ Signalledj; 
4.2 if (j=eligible()) → 
4.3 { unicast <STATUS, i, A, {ORDER(Aj+1),…, ORDER(A)}> to Pj; 
4.4    if (i = j) → install() else c = j; 
 } 
} 
} // end while (Pi ∉ Signalledi) 
while (true) do → 
{     / Task 5, performed by all p ∈ π∪π′ 
(COMMIT(o,r) received) →   
{ 
record o for r; 
if (not shadow) →  
{Deliver r to local service process as per increasing o;} 
} 
} // end while (true) 
} // end main() 
Figure 3.7. Tasks executed by an operative FS process 
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3.4.4.1 Description – Main Part 
Task 1 is executed whenever a new ORDER(o) is received from the current coordinator 
and  a received ORDER(o) is regarded to be new if no ACK(o) has been transmitted. 
The task enters the received into the Order_Pool and ensures that each Order_Pool 
entry is acknowledged in-sequence, i.e., as per its order number o. Note that an ACK(o) 
is sent to all pi and p′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1) which includes the sending process as well. 
Task 2 deals with ACK messages received: it enters them into the Ack_Pool and 
explores if an uncommitted ORDER(o) can now be committed due to the new entry. If 
committable(o) is true, then COMMIT(o) is multicast to all p ∈ π∪π′ and all ACK 
messages related to ORDER(o) are purged from the Ack_Pool.  The latter is indicated 
using the operator ‘\’. 
Task 3 updates the set Signalledi in response to receiving fail-signals from FS processes 
not in that set; it also multicasts the received fail-signal to all FS processes. If the 
signalling process turns out to be the coordinator (line 3.3), three actions are carried out 
(in lines 3.4-3.6):  c is set to -1 to ensure that Task 1 no longer accepts any Order 
message from the signalled coordinator; the Order_pool is purged off any 
unacknowledged ORDER messages; finally, an INVITE message is multicast if Pi is 
found eligible to become the next coordinator. Note that the INVITE message contains 
the set Signalledi – informing any recipient of the reason for coordinator change in case 
the fail-signal from the coordinator has not yet been received.  
Task 4 deals with any INVITE message received. Recall that multicast messages may 
be arbitrarily delayed to different destinations. This has two implications for Task 4: (i) 
pi or p′i may not yet be aware of the fail-signalling by the current coordinator and (ii) the 
received INVITE message may be so delayed that its sender, say, Pj has fail-signalled 
while the INVITE is in transit and pi or p′i is already in possession of Pj’s fail-signal. So, 
processing of INVITE message from Pj begins with verifying the eligibility of Pj based 
on local Signalledi set and also on Signalledj sent by Pj (lines 4.1 and 4.2).  If Pj is found 
eligible, a STATUS message is sent containing all ORDER messages which the local 
process has acknowledged but the same has not been done by Pj. (The list would be 
empty if A ≤ Aj.) Of course, the sender of INVITE message can be the local process 
itself; in that case, install() procedure is invoked; otherwise, c is set to j in expectation 
of Pj installing itself as the coordinator. Contrary to this expectation, if Pj fail-signals, 
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then Task 3 will re-set c to -1 until another eligible FS process comes forward. Thus, 
‘telescopic’ failures during coordinator change are handled. 
Task 5 executed by all order processes in the system including the unpaired ones. On 
receiving a COMMIT(o, r) message, each process records o as committed for r. 
Furthermore, an order process pi that is co-located with service process si, delivers r to si 
once all requests with smaller order numbers are delivered. Here we assume that each 
request is delivered only once i.e., duplicate COMMIT(o, r) messages are discarded.  
3.4.4.2 Description – Install Procedure 
Processes pi and p′i, for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1), which find Pi eligible to take the 
coordinator role execute this procedure after having multicast an INVITE message. The 
pseudo-code is presented in Figure 3.8 and the aim is to compute start_o (defined in 
subsection 3.4.2.2) and a list of ORDER messages that are not a common knowledge 
among the operative FS processes called TransferHistory. Therefore the new 
coordinator should re-issue these ORDER messages before starting to propose order 
numbers on its own right. This computation begins after STATUS message has been 
received from all Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledi), as shown in line I1 in Figure 3.8. Recall that the 
STATUS message from a given Pj is unicast in response to INVITE multicast by pi and 
p′i and contains Aj and a list containing all ORDER(o), Ai+1≤ o≤Aj.  
install() 
{ 
I1 wait until <STATUS, j, Aj, {*}> received from all Pj ∈ (Π - 
Signalled); 
I2 Amn = minimum{Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ (Π - Signalled) };  
I3 Amx = maximum{Aj | ∀ Pj ∈ (Π - Signalled) }; 
I4 TransferHistory = {ORDER(Amn+1),…, ORDER(Amx)}; 
I5 coordinator(TransferHistory, Amx+1);  } 
Figure 3.8. Install Procedure 
TransferHistory is computed in line I4 as the list of all ORDER(o) in the range 
[Amn+1, Amx] where Amn and Amx are respectively the minimum and maximum values of 
A reported in the STATUS messages received (lines I2 and I3). It consists of an ORDER 
message that some Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledi) does not have in its Order_Pool and some other 
Pj’ ∈ (Π - Signalledi) has multicast an ACK message for. The computed TransferHistory 
and (Amx+1) are passed as parameters to initialise a parallel task coordinator() which 
enables Pi to act as the coordinator. 
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We note that if two or more STATUS messages contain an ORDER(o) for a 
given o, then all these ORDER(o) will have the same D(r) and possibly different values 
of c. (This is shown as Lemma 1 later.) When ORDER(o) messages for a given o have 
different values of c, any one of them can be chosen to construct the TransferHistory.  
3.4.4.3 Description – Coordinator Task 
This task, as its code in Figure 3.9 depicts, has two parts: dealing with TransferHistory 
and then proposing new order numbers for requests.  
coordinator(List TransferHistory, int start_o) 
{ 
C1 if (TransferHistory not empty) → 
C2 { for every <ORDER, *, o, D(r)> in TransferHistory do → 
C3  { form <ORDER, i, o, D(r)> and multicast to all P ∈ Π;} 
 } 
C4 int o = start_o; 
C5 while (c = i) do → 
C6 { receive(r); // pick-up unordered r; 
C7  form <ORDER, i, o, D(r)> and multicast to all P ∈ Π; 
C8  o = o + 1; 
 } 
} 
Figure 3.9. Coordinator Task 
3.5 Correctness Arguments 
The protocol is correct if it satisfies liveness and safety requirements stated below. 
Liveness: Every client request is eventually ordered.  
More precisely, for every request r, there is a COMMIT(o, r) transmitted by a 
correct order process for some o.  
Safety: A client request that is ordered is uniquely ordered: if COMMIT(o, r) is 
transmitted, then neither COMMIT(o, r′), r ≠ r′, nor COMMIT(o′, r), o ≠ o′, will be 
transmitted. 
Two assumptions are central to the correctness arguments. Since only a 
maximum f processes can fail and both constituent processes of an FS process cannot 
fail, there is at least one FS process which never fail-signals during any execution of the 
protocol. We term these FS processes as perfect FS processes. Secondly, no FS process 
ever enters the failing state when exiting the working state; any FS process that 
transmits a fail-signal is already in the terminal, halted state.  
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Lemma 1: The STATUS messages received by a correct pi that is executing install() 
cannot contain ORDER messages that have the same o but different D(r).  
Proof: Assume to the contrary that pi receives a STATUS message from Pj containing 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 and another from Pj’ containing 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, r ≠ r′. 
Since FS processes do not generate incorrect outputs and r ≠ r′, we have j ≠ j′ and c ≠ c′.  
With no loss of generality, let us suppose that c < c′. When Pc’ installed itself 
as the coordinator, the TransferHistory it used could not have had 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉; 
otherwise, Pc’ could not have re-used o for r′ and proposed 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉 (lines 
C2 and C3 in Fig 3.9).   
Note that Pj must have acknowledged 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 before it receives 
fail-signal from Pc;  otherwise, 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 would have been purged from the 
Order_Pool (see line 3.4 in Fig 3.7) and would not have been included in the STATUS 
message sent during the install attempt being made later by pi, i > c. Therefore, for Pc’ 
to have ignored Pj during its install, it must have had Pj in its Signalled; that is, Pj has 
fail-signalled and entered the terminal, halted state by the time Pc’ became the 
coordinator.  
The correct pi executing install() is clearly a later event compared to Pc’ 
becoming the coordinator. This is indicated by the causal chain of events expressed 
using Lamport’s “happened before relation” denoted simply as “→” [Lam78] as below.   
Pj fail-signals (sends FSj) → Pc′ receives FSj → Pc′ becomes coordinator (ignoring Pj) 
→ Pc′ sends FSc′ → pi receives FSc′ → pi sends INVITE (executes install()). 
∴ Pj fail-signals → pi sends INVITE. 
Since there is no failing state for an FS process, the fail-signalled and halted Pj 
could not be sending a STATUS message containing 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 to pi, as 
assumed. Lemma is thus proved by contradiction.  
Lemma 2: Let Pi be a perfect FS process. Say, pi or p′i multicasts an ACK(o) for 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉. At the time of this multicast, if a correct pk implementing FS 
process Pk, k ≠ i, has 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, r ≠ r′, in its Order_Pool, then Pk has fail-
signalled.  
Proof: Since pi and p′i are both correct, with no loss of generality, we will focus only on 
pi whose output behaviour is similar to that of p′i. Let Signalledi denote the set Signalled 
maintained by pi. pi acknowledging an order from Pc implies that Pc ∉ Signalledi. 
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Let us first note that the FS process Pc could not have sent 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 to pi and 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r′)〉 to pk.  Therefore c′ ≠ c. There are two possibilities: 〈ORDER, c′, o, 
D(r′)〉 in the Order_Pool of pk must have arrived from a coordinator that either  
(i) Precedes Pc, i.e., c′ < c or  
(ii) Succeeds Pc, i.e., c′ > c.  
In the first case, since Pc is re-using o for r ≠ r′, it would not have received 
〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉 in any of the STATUS messages received from Pj ∈ (Π - 
Signalledc) when it was installing itself as the coordinator. Therefore if a correct pk has 
〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, in its Order_Pool, then Pk ∈ Signalledc when it was installing 
itself as the coordinator i.e. Pk has fail-signalled before Pc multicast 〈ORDER, c, o, 
D(r)〉.  
Let us now consider the second case of c′ > c. That is, Pc′ is a successor 
coordinator to Pc. We would show that Pc′ could not have become coordinator while pi 
is acknowledging 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉. For Pc′ to have become coordinator, Pc′ would 
have received STATUS message from all Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledc′). Since as per the 
hypothesis, Pi is a perfect process, it will never belong to Signalledc′ or Pi ∈ (Π - 
Signalledc′). Pi unicasts STATUS message only if it finds Pc′ eligible() (see line 4.2 and 
4.3 in fig 3.7). But it cannot find Pc′ as eligible() when Pc ∈ (Π - Signalledi), c < c′. 
Therefore a correct pk cannot have 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, c < c′, in its Order_Pool while 
ACK(o) for 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 is being sent by pi.  
Lemma 3: Let Pi be a perfect FS process. Say, pi or p′i multicasts an ACK(o) for 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉. If a correct pk or correct pk′ implementing FS process Pk, k ≠ i, 
does not have any 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, r ≠ r′, in its Order_Pool at the time ACK(o) is 
being sent, then it is never going to have one.  
Proof: As in lemma 2, since Pi is a perfect FS process, we will use pi to represent the 
behaviour of Pi. With no loss of generality, consider only pk which is correct. Let T1 be 
the real time (not observable by any process) when pi sends ACK(o) and T2 be the 
instance when pk emits a fail-signal, if at all. (T2 = ∞ if Pk is a perfect FS process.) The 
lemma is obviously true if T2 ≤ T1. So, we will suppose that T2 > T1.  
Since FS processes do not generate incorrect messages, c′ ≠ c. Let us first 
consider the case of c > c′. Pc was installed as coordinator after Pc′ has fail-signalled 
which must be before T1 and hence before T2. So, Pk was operational when Pc was 
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installed. That is, the installation of Pc could not have been completed without Pk 
unicasting STATUS message. Therefore, pk is aware of fail-signalling by Pc′ before T1. 
So, pk will not accept any order from Pc′ after T1.  
For the second case i.e. c′ > c, let us assume to the contrary that 〈ORDER, c′, o, 
D(r′)〉 is multicast by Pc′ and exists in the Order_Pool of pk. Since Pc′ is re-using o for r′ 
≠ r, it would not have received 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 in any of STATUS messages from 
any Pj ∈ (Π - Signalledc′). But Pi is a perfect process and therefore Pi ∈ (Π - 
Signalledc′). This means that Pc′ must wait for STATUS message from Pi before it could 
install itself as coordinator. There are two possibilities regarding Ac′ at the time of 
installation of Pc′.  
(i) Ac′ < o. Pi will include 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 in its STATUS message. By lemma 1, 
no contradictory 〈ORDER, c′, o, D(r′)〉, r ≠ r′ can exist in a STATUS set. 〈ORDER, 
c, o, D(r)〉 will be considered by Pc′ and hence o cannot be re-used for r′ ≠ r as 
assumed. 
(ii) Ac′ ≥ o. So, Pc′ has some ORDER(o) in its Order_Pool. If this entry is ORDER(o, 
r), then pk could not receive ORDER(o, r′) from Pc′. Let us suppose that Pc′ has 
〈ORDER, s, o, D(r′)〉 in its Order_Pool. This means that Pc′ has received 
ORDER(o) from Ps, s < c′, and acknowledged it.  
Let Ps′ be the first coordinator to assign o to r′ and multicasts 〈ORDER, s′, 
o, D(r′)〉. Obviously s′≤ s. By the first case discussed above (c > c′), it is not 
possible to have s′ < c; also s′ ≠ c. So, c < s′ < c′. Since Ps′ was the first 
coordinator to assign o to r′, it must have had As′ < o when it was installed. By the 
sub-case (i) discussed above, Ps′ could not be multicasting 〈ORDER, s′, o, D(r′)〉. 
So, it is not possible to have Ac′ ≥ o and 〈ORDER, s, o, D(r′)〉 ∈ Order_Pool of Pc′. 
Lemma 4: Let Pi be a perfect FS process. If pi or p′i multicasts an ACK(o) for 〈ORDER, 
c, o, D(r)〉 then (i)  pi and p′i will eventually multicast COMMIT(o, r) and (ii) no correct 
pk will ever multicast COMMIT(o, r′), r ≠ r′.  
Proof: With no loss of generality, we will consider only pi since all arguments provided 
for pi apply equally to p′i as well. Let us start with the first part of the lemma. Consider 
the case where Pc does not fail-signal until the end of execution. So, Pc must send 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 to all Pj ∈ Π. It will eventually receive ACK(o) from all Pk ∈ (Π - 
Signalledc) and will multicast COMMIT(o, r).  
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On the other hand, let us assume that Pc fail-signals during the execution. No 
correct pk can have ORDER(o, r′) in its Order_Pool, r ≠ r′ (Lemma 3). Therefore no 
later coordinator Pc′, c′ > c, can ever transmit ORDER(o, r′), r ≠ r′. In other words a 
successor coordinator either transmits ORDER(o, r) or fail-signals before transmitting 
an ORDER(o, r′), r ≠ r′.  In the later case, a time must come when Pi will finally 
become the coordinator and will transmit ORDER(o, r). Hence Pi will eventually 
receive ACK(o) from all Pk ∈ (Π - Signalledi) and will multicast COMMIT(o, r) in both 
cases.  
The second part of this lemma can be proved using lemmas 2 and 3. We note 
that for an ORDER(o, r′) to be committable at any correct process pk, it needs to be in 
the Order_Pool of pk (See definition of committable(o) in sub-section 3.4.3.2).  But 
Lemma 2 and 3 state that if ORDER(o, r) is in the Order_Pool of Pi, ORDER(o, r′) 
cannot exist in the Order_Pool of any correct pk. Hence COMMIT(o, r′) can never be 
multicast by any correct process pk. 
Theorem 1 (Safety) – If ORDER(o, r) is committed i.e. COMMIT(o, r) is multicast by 
some correct process pj, then neither COMMIT(o, r′), r ≠ r′, nor COMMIT(o′, r), o ≠ o′, 
will ever be transmitted. 
Proof: Let Pi be a perfect FS process. Since both pi and p′i are correct and will behave 
identically, with no loss of generality, we will only focus on behaviour of pi. pj can only 
transmit COMMIT(o, r) when committable(o) is true (lines 2.2 and 2.3 in Fig 3.7). Since 
Pi ∈ (Π - Signalledj), commitable(o) cannot be true at pj without receiving ACK(o, r) 
from Pi (see definition of commitable(o) in subsection 3.4.3.2). This means that pi has 
multicast ACK(o, r). Since a correct pi produces ACK for an o only once (line 1.5 and 
the condition o > A activating Task 1 in Fig 3.7), pi will never produce ACK(o, r′), r′≠ r. 
Hence commitable(o) cannot be true for ORDER(o, r′), r′ ≠ r and COMMIT(o, r′) 
cannot be transmitted by any FS process.  
Theorem 2 (Liveness) – For every request r sent by a client to all processes, a 
COMMIT(o, r) will be multicast by some correct order process pj for some o. 
Proof: We prove the theorem by contradiction. Let us assume to the contrary that 
request r was sent by a client and that a COMMIT(o, r) is never multicast by any correct 
order process. This implies that no perfect process produced ACK(o) (Lemma 4). This 
means that none of the coordinator FS processes generated ORDER(o, r), otherwise it 
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would have been ACKed by at least a perfect process.  Further on, for a coordinator Pc 
that found r not committed, there can be two lines of actions. 
(i) Pc chooses not to produce an ORDER(o, r), or 
(ii) Pc fail-signals before producing an ORDER(o, r), 
Recall that there is at least one perfect FS process Pi that will eventually take 
up the coordinator role and will never fail-signal. Hence the above situation implies that 
there is at least one coordinator which never fail-signals but chooses not to order request 
r forever. This is not possible. Hence the assumption can not be true.  
3.6 Critical Analysis 
The protocol explained above is designed to solve the consensus problem using Fail-
signal approach; but with the reduced two-state assumption. In this section, we consider 
the extended three-state FS process model containing failing state and comment on the 
problems this extension has to address. Furthermore, we lay the foundations for an 
advanced protocol by proposing design techniques that can resolve the upcoming issues. 
Finally, some optimizations are discussed to lead to a better design solution.  
3.6.1 Discussion 
We start our discussion by recalling the remark given in subsection 3.4.2.2. The 
scenario laid down there is a classical situation that highlights a subtle problem caused 
by asynchrony of the communication system. To re-cap, the asynchronous nature of the 
network can cause messages to arrive at various destinations in any order with unknown 
delays. With fail-signal being one of these messages, the processes may find out about 
signalled processes at relatively different times and more importantly, may have a 
different view about the set of messages that the signalled process is regarded to have 
been sent before fail-signalling. For example, if Px multicast messages m1 and m2 and 
then transit to signalled state multicasting fail-signal, a process Py may receive 
messages in the order m1, fail-signal, m2 while Pz may receive m1, m2, fail-signal. 
Noting this remark, we also recall that this is exactly how the behaviour of Px can be 
described if it was in the failing state (see remark failing state and the uncertainties in 
section 3.1). That is, being in the failing state, Px will transmit messages to Py and Pz in 
different order to cause inconsistency. Assuming that network delivered messages in the 
sent order, Py and Pz receiving messages in different order can only be attributed to Px 
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deliberately sending multicasts in different order to different destinations. Hence, our 
first observation is as follows. 
Observation 1:  An asynchronous network can make a two-state FS process appear as if 
it is a three-state FS process. 
Now let us consider the three-state FS process. Failing state is a transient state. 
That is, the failing FS process will eventually move to signalled state, given that the 
fail-signal is echoed back by the environment to the sender. Let Twf be the instant when 
an FS process Px moves from working to failing state and Tfs be the time when it moves 
from failing to signalled state. Let us assume the worst case of Px exhibiting behaviour 
B3 (section 3.1) between these time instants and transmitting both computed outputs 
and fail-signals simultaneously. Finally, suppose that all fail-signals transmitted by Px 
are delayed beyond Tfs. Hence, Px may be sending some output messages to selected 
processes and fail-signals to others but the latter will be delayed. This scenario mimics 
what could happen in a system of crash processes: a crash process, say pi, crashes while 
multicasting some messages in parallel and as a consequence some destinations receive 
these messages and others do not. For pi, (Tfs - Twf) is the duration in which it carries out 
a few parallel partial multicasts and causes inconsistency. After Tfs, it stops 
permanently. Whereas, Px makes several partial multicasts at different instances during 
(Tfs - Twf) and stops functioning permanently albeit after fail-signalling. However any 
attempt to resolve any inconsistency cause by partial multicasts in both situations will 
require same effort. Hence our second observation is: 
Observation 2:  An asynchronous network can make a three-state FS process appear as 
if it is a crash process making partial multicasts during some bounded but unknown 
amount of time interval. 
3.6.2 Using 3-state FS process model to solve consensus 
We know that solving consensus for crash processes in asynchronous network requires 
at least (2f+1) processes [DLS88]. Whereas Protocol-0 only uses (f+1) FS processes. 
These processes when working in 3-state model may behave as crash processes in 
special situations (as described for observation 2). Hence reaching consensus in such 
situations, for example, between Twf and Tfs, with this redundancy may not be a 
straightforward task. However since an FS process multicasts fail-signal messages 
which are expected to arrive at their destinations eventually, an FS process cannot be 
called equivalent to a crash process beyond Tfs. Hence, we cannot say for sure if a 
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solution with (f+1) FS processes is impossible. We leave exploration of the minimal 
bound on redundancy for solving consensus using FS processes as a future work. 
However, a simple solution to the redundancy issue is to increase the number of FS 
processes to (2f+1) and apply a crash-tolerant solution as done by [MES03]. This 
increases the actual redundancy to 2×(2f+1) = (4f+2). But we know that minimal 
redundancy needed to solve consensus in asynchronous network for Byzantine faults is 
(3f+1). Hence we avoid to increase the total number of processes used in Protocol-0 
from (3f+2) to (4f+2) but rather aim to reduce it to the optimal number (3f+1).  
We propose a hybrid approach to design a consensus solution that combines 
the traditionally used concept of quorums with our fail-signal process abstraction. 
Quorums have also been used by BFT, which is the closest to our design. To achieve 
the targeted aim, we do not increase the number of processes to create quorums but 
make the following design choices: 
(i) Include the unpaired processes, viz. pf+2, pf+3, …, p2f+1, also to execute the protocol 
like paired ones and play significant part in ordering requests.  
(ii) Only allow an operative FS process to play the role of coordinator, as long as there 
is one in the system, due to its special, well-defined failure characteristics. 
These choices lead to two open questions: 
1. Given that (i) permits unpaired, Byzantine-prone, processes to take part in the 
protocol execution, how should the component processes of FS processes not 
acting as the coordinator behave: as single autonomous processes or still maintain 
the FS abstraction generating 2-signed outputs? 
2. Does the last (f+1)th coordinator strictly have to be an FS process? 
These questions are addressed below. 
3.6.2.1 Reduced coupling within FS processes 
Since unpaired processes are now allowed to participate as non-coordinators and will be 
sending single-signed output messages, we propose that the FS processes while working 
as non-coordinators may have their component processes loosened in coupling so that 
they can work independent of each other and produce single-signed messages. But since 
we want to retain the FS process abstraction to play the coordinator role, we adopt a 
mixed approach that keeps FS processes working in two modes of operation; Active and 
Passive. FS processes working in these modes are called active and passive FS 
processes respectively. Active mode maintains the tight coupling and an active FS 
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process works in the same way as an FS process has been originally defined to work. 
Whereas passive mode permits loose coupling between the paired processes requiring 
them not to generate double-signed outputs but use output verification only for failure 
detection. We now describe in detail the two proposed modes below. 
A. Active mode 
The FS processes used in Protocol-0 are now being named as Active FS processes. To 
summarise, while working in active mode, an FS process produces double signed 
responses; computed output or fail-signal or both as described by the three states (figure 
3.1). Each process within the pair has sequencer and comparator modules to monitor the 
working of its counter part process using defined timeout values. Failures are 
announced by these modules in the form of fail-signal when faults are detected within 
the FS process. Once the correct process in the pair becomes aware of the fault, the FS 
process stops functioning and is said to move to Signalled state generating only fail-
signals.  
B. Passive mode 
Passive mode is introduced to enable each process in the pair work independently and 
yet remain part of the FS process so that the mode can be switched to active at any time. 
Each of the constituent processes can now generate responses that reflect its own state 
along with those that represent the state of the whole passive FS process. The idea of 
generation of single-signed outputs then comes directly from the notion of working 
independently. However, the core concept of mutual checking needs to be retained 
keeping failure detection alive within the FS process to ensure safety property. Hence, 
the facility of generation of fail-signal is still required. Hence, two types of responses 
can be expected from a passive FS process; single-signed computed output and double-
signed fail-signal. Since single-signed outputs are sent without waiting for the checking 
process to be completed, we say that the checking is done passively, hence the name 
passive mode. We also note here that outputs can no longer be guaranteed to be always 
correct due to being single-signed only. 
The three-state model remains the same for a passive FS process as defined in 
section 3.1. However, the behaviour of a passive FS process in each of these states is as 
follows. 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Working State:  
Each constituent process produces only correct outputs (single-signed) as per the 
specifications of the computational program P (Recall section 3.1). This is assumed to 
be the initial state of all passive FS processes. 
Signalled State:  
A passive FS process transits to this state when a fault is detected by a correct 
constituent process. This detecting process thereon produces only fail-signals (double-
signed). However, the faulty constituent process is capable of producing both single-
signed output and double-signed fail-signal randomly as in failing state (see below). 
Failing State:  
This is a transient state just like it is for an active FS process. In this state, one of the 
constituent processes has become faulty but the fault has not been detected by the 
correct counterpart yet. Since, in passive mode, the two paired processes work 
autonomously, the correct process amongst the pair, keeps sending correct 1-signed 
outputs in failing state. Whereas a faulty constituent process can behave in a Byzantine 
manner. 
Analysing the behaviour of a passive FS process in signalled and failing states, 
we find that a faulty constituent process can behave randomly in both the states. This 
behaviour combined with asynchrony may suppress all fail-signals with only incorrect 
outputs reaching the destinations. Hence the correct constituent process sends fail-
signals in signalled state just to ensure that the destinations are informed about the 
failure eventually. Fail-signal in this case is to announce the fact that this passive FS 
process can no longer switch to active mode, if and when needed. This is obvious 
because active mode needs computation of double-signed outputs by the FS process 
which is no longer achievable. Note that the correct constituent process in the failing 
passive FS process can be made to continue producing outputs along with fail-signals, if 
needed. This leads us to the following design optimization. 
3.6.2.2 The last coordinator 
We first recall the reason behind using (f+1) FS processes in the system model for 
Protocol-0. Since the system allows at most f failures, it was necessary to have a spare 
FS process that can continue acting as the coordinator even after all failures occurred. 
When unpaired processes are also allowed to execute the protocol, the (f+1)th 
coordinator need not have to be an FS process. We recall that each fail-signal is 
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attributed to a fault within the sender FS process (Assumption 1 subsection 3.2.1). 
Hence after the occurrence of all f failures, it is safe to delegate the coordinator role to 
an unpaired process. Hence we propose a reduction in the number of FS processes to f. 
Note that the number of primary order processes collocated with service processes 
remain the same i.e., (2f+1). Therefore the total number of processes reduces to the 
minimal (3f+1).  
3.6.2.3 Relaxing Assumption 2 (failure pattern assumption) 
We know that once a fail-signal is received from an FS process, be active or passive, it 
can no longer be trusted to take up coordinator role. We propose that such an FS process 
should not only not be given the role of a coordinator but also be logically isolated and 
be forbidden from participation in ordering of requests. Hence we point to the following 
design implications: 
a. There is only one active FS process and that is acting as the coordinator. 
b. Once a fail-signal is received from any FS process (active or passive), the signalled 
FS process is considered logically isolated from the rest of the system at an 
appropriate instant. 
c. Once a fail-signal is received from the coordinator FS process, coordinator change 
should be triggered eventually; this could also be the appropriate moment to isolate 
the component processes of other fail-signalling FS processes. 
d. Once the failure of an FS process is made well-known within the system, both 
constituent processes of the signalled FS process may fail. 
Last point indeed relaxes assumption 2 (subsection 3.2.1) by allowing second 
failure in an FS process but only after the failure has been made “well-known”. This is 
the time needed for at least a majority of processes to learn of the fail-signal and 
exchange some information about their state at the time of this recognition. This is 
important to maintain safety. Let us assume Px is the FS process within which a 
constituent process say px has failed and this failure has been detected by p′x at time tx. 
It appears that if D is the unknown (but finite) bound on message communication delays 
over an asynchronous network between two correct processes then the second failure in 
Px can occur at least after 2D time has elapsed subsequent to tx. More details on 
computation of this bound will be given in the next chapter. We state the relaxed 
assumption 2 as assumption 2A below.  
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Assumption 2A: 
The processes p and p′ within any given FS process do not fail 
‘simultaneously’: if one of them, say, p fails then the other process p′ does not fail at 
least until it observes p’s failure and an interval of 2D time elapses subsequent to the 
observation, where D is the unknown (but finite) bound on the communication delays 
over the asynchronous network. 
Assumption 2A leads to a new characteristic in the behaviour of FS process. 
Since both the processes in a pair can fail, a situation where the two malicious processes 
collude and generate doubly-signed undetectably invalid messages may arise. Hence an 
FS process does no longer maintain crash semantics but can behave in an arbitrary 
manner once the 2D time has elapsed after the first failure in the pair has been detected. 
We represent this malicious behaviour by adding a state called Byzantine state in the 3-
state model (figure 3.10). 
 
Figure 3.10. 4-State model of an FS Process with Assumption 2A 
Byzantine state is the new terminal state of the 4-state FS process model. As 
mentioned earlier, transition 4 is allowed to occur only after the FS process has been in 
signalled state for at least 2D time. As the name suggests, behaviour of an FS process in 
Byzantine state is completely arbitrary and cannot be defined with certainty. Hence the 
protocols using this extended model need to take measures so that the double-signed 
output messages from an FS process in working state can be distinguished from the 
corrupted double-signed output messages sent by the same FS process in Byzantine 
state. 
Assumption 2A is weaker than assumption 2. However, additional measures 
are needed to ensure that the 2D time limit holds between the two failures within the FS 
process. In other words, the second failure must be assured not to occur at least within 
2D time of the first failure. This is similar to measures underlying the classical f-out-of-
n assumption in which (f+1)th failure is assured not to occur within the system life time. 
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Hence, the known measures taken for failure independence and isolation to contain 
number of failures to f during the mission time would also be needed to realize 
assumption 2A.  
We note here that guaranteeing failure isolation in the presence of malicious 
attacks is a challenging task. A recent paper [CL00] proposes proactive recovery 
mechanism to deal with this problem. This mechanism involves periodic and 
comprehensive rejuvenation of every node in the system: restarting the node with the 
fresh installation of OS and application software accessed from a secure, read-only 
memory. [RL04] additionally store a fingerprint of the software in a special register of 
the secure coprocessor which helps in detecting the corrupted code copy. A proactive 
recovery mechanism must deal with two related problems. Periodic rejuvenation must 
proceed without stopping the on-going order process. Hence, only a sub-set of nodes 
need to be rejuvenated at any given time and they cannot participate in the ordering 
activities until their rejuvenation is complete. Secondly, with no reliance on accurate 
failure detection, the nodes being rejuvenated at a given time can all be correct ones; 
therefore, the ordering process should be managed with reduced resilience capability 
during the time periods when rejuvenation is proceeding concurrently. 
More recently, Sousa et. al. [SNV07] have analysed several significant works 
in asynchronous proactive recovery solutions including that of [CL00]. They argue that 
successful proactive recovery is not theoretically possible in classical asynchronous 
environments [SNL+06, SNV05]. The basis of their argument is that the periodic 
rejuvenation process must be guaranteed to have bounded completion time for it to be 
effective and this guarantee is not obtainable in asynchronous environments which are 
notionally time-free. The authors of [SLV07] then go on to advocate that some form of 
timing assumption is essential to guarantee successful proactive recovery and observe 
that the existing works on proactive recovery make such assumption but fail to 
formulate them explicitly. We believe that the advocacy in [SNV07] vindicates the 
presence of our 2D assumption since fail-signalling lays foundations for efficient 
proactive recovery in identifying only those nodes that warrant temporary isolation, 
concurrent rejuvenation and finally integration. 
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3.7 Summary 
This chapter has studied conceptual and implementation details of fail-signal process. 
Benefit of using FS process to solve consensus problem is two-fold. Firstly it makes 
Byzantine fault appear as crash to the environment by deploying redundancy internally. 
Hence, a crash-tolerant protocol design would suffice. Secondly, it circumvents the FLP 
impossibility by signalling its failure; hence, the name fail-signal. However, its use has 
a couple of implications. Fail-signal sent by an FS process does not indicate the state of 
the process before signalling. Secondly, when the FS process fails, it may not stop 
producing computational outputs immediately and rather pass through a transient state 
with a benign two-facing behaviour. Therefore, a protocol that uses FS process to reach 
consensus needs to be capable of resolving any inconsistencies caused by these 
implications. 
In this chapter we have taken a simple approach to avoid the problematic 
transient state i.e., failing state, temporarily and design a crash-tolerant protocol named 
Protocol-0 that uses FS processes to solve consensus for Byzantine faults. The design 
manages to keep the redundancy close to minimal for a Byzantine-tolerant protocol by 
using (3f+2) processes which includes (f+1) FS processes.  
The design process and protocol’s analysis brings out the intricacies involved 
in seeking consensus using FS processes. A further discussion on using 3-state FS 
process to achieve the same shows that the problem is similar to solving consensus for 
crash processes and can easily be solved by using (2f+1) FS processes. Aiming to use 
optimal redundancy, some ideas are floated for design of an advanced protocol. The 
proposal involves use of quorums with FS processes and aims to develop a hybrid 
system comprising of both paired and unpaired processes. 
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Chapter 4  
Protocol I - Normal part 
 
This chapter follows on from the design choices proposed in chapter 3 for consensus 
protocols using 4-state FS process. It presents algorithmic and implementation details of 
a coordinator-based Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol, named Protocol-I, that realizes 
these choices and caters for all implications. Furthermore, a comprehensive 
performance study is presented to evaluate the costs and benefits of using FS process 
abstraction, in its totality, to solve consensus. 
Protocol-I comprises of two parts. First one is called Normal Part, which is 
executed by all processes to assign identical order numbers to each client request in 
failure-free situation. Second part is called Install Part. This part defines the sequence 
of steps to be executed in case a failure is signalled by the coordinator FS process. This 
chapter includes details of Normal part only whereas Install part is described in chapter 
5. 
The chapter starts by re-stating the assumption set with the relaxed version of 
assumption 2, presented as 2A in chapter 3. Then we present the new system 
architecture in which redundancy is reduced to the optimal (3f+1). Protocol-I is then 
introduced in section 4.3, starting with the newly added concepts of operative processes 
and quorum. Algorithm steps of Normal part are described in section 4.4 with details on 
the messages used for communication. 
Finally, Protocol-I is compared both qualitatively and quantitatively with BFT, 
a Byzantine fault-tolerant total order protocol, well-known for its practicality. Two 
performance studies are presented with results from two sets of experiments. First study 
includes results from experimentation on a LAN cluster. Latencies of Protocol-I, BFT 
and a simple crash-tolerant protocol (derived from Protocol-I) are compared for various 
system sizes, workload and encryption techniques. Second study comprises of 
experiments performed in emulated WAN settings with similar parameters. Results 
show Protocol-I to be a feasible choice, specially in slower network settings. 
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4.1 Background 
Protocol-I is a total order protocol that efficiently exploits fail-signal facility to tolerate 
Byzantine faults. Its design makes the following assumptions about the construction of 
FS process. Note that this assumption set combines assumption 2A proposed in 
subsection 3.6.2.3 with assumption 1 of subsection 3.2.1. For the sake of continuity, this 
new assumption set is restated below. Assumption 1 is renamed as 1A for uniformity.  
IA. The delay estimates used for judging the timeliness of an order process are 
accurate and a non-faulty process never judges its non-faulty counter-part to be 
untimely.   
2A. The processes p and p′ within any given process pair do not fail 
‘simultaneously’: if one of them, say, p fails then the other process p′ does not 
fail at least until it observes p’s failure and an interval of 2D time elapses 
subsequent to the observation, where D is the unknown (but finite) bound on the 
communication delays over the asynchronous network. 
2A leads to a new characteristic in the behaviour of FS process, as explained in 
subsection 3.6.2.3. This is illustrated in figure 3.10 by introduction of Byzantine state to 
form the 4-state FS process model. In short, since 2A lets both the processes in a pair 
fail, it allows a situation where the two malicious processes collude and generate 
doubly-signed undetectably invalid messages. Hence an FS process no more has crash 
semantics but can behave in an arbitrary manner once the 2D time has elapsed after the 
first failure has been detected among the pair. Protocol-I uses this extended 4-state FS 
process to solve consensus optimally in the presence of Byzantine faults. The following 
section outlines the system model used in Protocol-I design. 
4.2 System Model 
The system architecture will be the same as Protocol-0 except that the number of FS 
processes is reduced to f and only one among them will be working in active mode at a 
time.  
The system is considered to have at least (2f+1), f ≥ 1, service processes si, 1≤ i 
≤ (2f+1), executing on distinct processors as before. The service processes are co-
located with order processes pi, 1≤ i ≤ (2f+1). Protocol-I uses f more nodes, each hosting 
a shadow process p′i to form an FS process Pi (upper case P) with pi, 1≤ i ≤ f. Since 
number of shadow nodes used here is one less than that used in Protocol-0, the total 
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number of replicas is 3f+1, which is the standard lower bound on a f-Byzantine tolerant 
deterministic solution to consensus problem in asynchronous environment. System 
architecture produced below as fig 4.1 reflects this change. Like Protocol-0, Protocol-I 
is also a deterministic coordinator based protocol. Therefore every order process is a 
deterministic state machine. The system can be represented as the following sets of 
order processes. 
Π  = Set of all FS Processes = {P1, P2, …, Pf} 
π  = Set of all order processes co-located with service processes = {p1, p2, …, p2f+1}; 
π′ = Set of all shadow order processes (not co-located with service processes)  
= {p′1, p′2, …, p′f}. 
 
Figure 4.1. System Architecture used by Protocol-I 
4.3 Protocol-I 
The protocol sequentially ranks all f FS processes, denoted by {Pi: 1 ≤ i ≤ f} and Rank(Pi) 
= i. This ranking is known to all processes in the system and defines the order in which 
coordinator role will be taken up by a pair with P1 being the first coordinator. While the 
coordinator FS process works in active mode, all other FS processes work in passive 
mode. The protocol regards the system to be moving through a series of at most (f+1) 
configurations which are distinguished by the process that is currently acting as the 
coordinator. For instance, Σ1 is the initial system configuration with P1 acting as 
coordinator. When P1 fail-signals after working for a while, if eligible() = 2 (see sub-
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section 3.4.3.2) then the system is regarded to move on to the second configuration Σ2. 
These two configurations are represented below.  
Σ1 = {P1, p2, …, p2f+1, p′2, p′3, …, p′f} 
Σ2 = {p1, P2, …, p2f+1, p′1, p′3, …, p′f} 
Note that in Σ1, p1 and p1′ are represented as P1 while in Σ2, P2 represents p2 
and p2′ together. This change of coordinator goes on until all f FS Processes have fail-
signalled, which is when any unpaired order process from the set {pf+1, pf+2, …, p2f+1} 
can be randomly chosen to take over as the (f+1)th coordinator in Σf+1. (This unpaired 
order process is fixed to be pf+1.) Since there can only be at most f failures in the system 
(see assumptions in section 1.4), the (f+1)th coordinator, which is the only unpaired 
coordinator ever to take over, is guaranteed to be non-faulty and will be the last 
coordinator. Thus the f th and (f+1)th system configuration will be: 
Σf = {p1, p2, …, Pf, pf+1, ..., p2f+1, p′1, p′2, …, p′f-1} 
Σf+1 = {p1, p2, …, p2f+1, p′1, p′2, …, p′f} = π ∪ π′ 
We note that in a given execution of the protocol, the system need not transit 
through every configuration defined here. For example, if in Σ2, p3 or p′3 (implementing 
passive FS process P3) fail-signals, then the system will not enter Σ3 at all when P2 fail-
signals in Σ2. This issue will be considered in detail while we discuss the part of 
protocol that deals with change of configuration in chapter 5. 
4.3.1 Operative processes and quorum 
Following the terminology of Paxos [Lam98], the term acceptor is used to denote an 
order process that is allowed to participate in an order assignment. A set of all acceptors 
in configuration Σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ (f+1), is denoted by Acceptorsi. For example, at system start  
Acceptors1 = π∪π′ = {P1, p2, …, p2f+1, p′2, p′3, …, p′f}. 
Following the fail-signalling by P1, if the system moves to Σ2, then Acceptors2 
becomes:  
Acceptors2 = π∪π′ \ {P1} = {P2, p3, …, p2f+1, p′3, …, p′f } 
Generalizing, Acceptorsi, 1 ≤ i ≤ f, in Σi will be: 
Acceptorsi = π∪π′ \ {P1, P2, …, Pi-1} = {Pi, pi+1, …, p2f+1, p′i+1, …, p′f }; 
After all f FS processes have fail-signalled, Acceptorsf+1 will contain all 
unpaired order processes with one of them behaving as coordinator i.e.  
Acceptorsf+1 = π∪π′ \ Π = {pf+1, pf+2, …, p2f+1} 
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Any process pi or p′i ∉ Acceptorsj is called a learner in Σj. A learner is not 
actually involved in order assignment but simply learns of each decision made by 
acceptors so that it can convey the decision to the locally hosted service process, if any. 
A quorum is defined as any subset of Acceptors that satisfies the following two 
properties. 
Intersection property - Any two quorums have at least one correct process in common. 
Availability property - There is always a quorum containing no faulty process. 
The protocol is designed to make progress only after a quorum agrees on a 
decision. To make sure processes in any two quorums decide consistently (hence 
correctly), intersection property is necessary. On the other hand, availability property is 
needed to ensure that liveness is achieved. 
Size of a quorum in configuration Σi, 1 ≤ i ≤  f+1, is denoted as VQi and called 
Valid Quorum Size. VQi can be any integer that satisfies both the intersection and 
availability properties. 
Calculating the range of VQi:  
If  ni = | Acceptorsi | = Number of acceptors in Σi = n – 2(i - 1). 
fi = f – (i - 1) = Maximum number of processes that can fail in Acceptorsi. 
1. To satisfy the Availability property, 
VQi ≤ (ni – fi)      (4.1) 
2. To satisfy the Intersection property, at least one correct process is required to be 
common in any two quorums. In other words, the smallest number of correct 
processes that can be in a quorum should be more than half of the smallest number 
of correct processes in the system i.e. (VQi – fi) > (ni – fi)/2 or 
VQi > ( ni + fi ) / 2     (4.2) 
Intuitive Explanation: Consider two quorums A and B in Σi. When relation 4.2 is 
satisfied  
|A| > ( ni + fi ) / 2,   |B| > ( ni + fi ) / 2 
Consider the worst case when all fi failed processes are members of both A and B 
i.e. number of correct processes in A and B is (|A| – fi) and (|B| – fi) respectively. We 
have 
( |A| – fi ) + ( |B| – fi ) > (ni – fi) 
Since there can only be at most (ni – fi) correct processes in Acceptorsi, A and B 
must have one common correct process in them. 
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3. Analysing relations 4.1 and 4.2 above, we find that for a value of VQi to satisfy both 
the conditions, ( ni + fi ) / 2 is required to be less than (ni – fi) for all values of i. A 
proof to show that this requirement is always satisfied for all values of i is given in 
figure 4.2.  
To Prove: ( ni + fi ) / 2 < (ni – fi) , 1 ≤ i ≤  f+1 
Proof by induction: 
Step 1. Base case - for i = 1, ni = n = 3f+1 and fi = f 
( ni + fi ) / 2 < (ni – fi)  
⇒ (3f + 1 + f) / 2 < (3f + 1 – f) 
⇒ 2f + 0.5 < 2f +1  
Hence the relation is proved for base case. 
Step 2. Hypothesis - Let us assume that the given relation is true for i = k i.e.  
( nk + fk ) / 2 < (nk – fk)  
Step 3. To prove - The relation is also true for i = k+1 i.e. 
( nk+1 + fk+1 ) / 2 < (nk+1 – fk+1)  
From the definition of ni and fi given above 
ni+1 = ni - 2 and 
fi+1 = fi - 1 
The given relation for i = k+1 can be written as 
( nk + fk - 3 ) / 2 < (nk – fk - 1)  
⇒ ( nk + fk ) / 2 - 1.5 < (nk – fk) -1 
⇒ ( nk + fk ) / 2 < (nk – fk) + 0.5  
Hence, by induction, the relation is proved to be true for all i ≥ 1. 
Figure 4.2. Proof for the bounds on Quorum size 
Hence, a valid quorum size VQi for configuration Σi can be given as  
( ni + fi ) / 2 < VQi ≤ (ni – fi)     (4.3) 
Let Qi be the smallest value of VQi i.e. 
Qi = ⎣ ( ni + fi ) / 2 ⎦ + 1 
Although any value in the range given by 4.3 can be chosen, keeping efficiency 
considerations in mind, we choose Qi to be the size of quorum in Σi throughout the 
description of Protocol-I. 
As mentioned earlier, when a fail-signal is received from the current 
coordinator Pc, i.e., when system moves from current configuration Σc to the next, say 
Σc+1, Pc is discarded from Acceptorsc+1. At the same time nc, fc and Qc are also updated 
respectively to nc+1, fc+1 and Qc+1. Consider the special case where Pc+1 has already fail-
signalled while Pc fail-signals and eligible() = c′, c′ > c+1 (see subsection 3.4.3.2 for 
definition of eligible()). So the system has to move from Σc to Σc′. In this situation, nc 
and fc are updated to nc′ = |Acceptorsc′| = n – 2(c′-1) and fc′ = f – (c′ -1) respectively. In 
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this way, the suffix used with Acceptors, Q and Σ remains same and identifies the 
coordinator number.  
Note: In the above scenario with Pc′ being eligible(), there may be a process Pk′, k′ > c′, 
which has already fail-signalled i.e., Pk′ ∈ Signalledc′ (see subsection 3.4.2 for 
Signalledj). However, despite this fail-signal, Pk′ ∈ Acceptorsc′. Hence, update of nc and 
fc to nc′ and fc′ respectively only incorporates fail-signals sent by each FS process Pk, c < 
k < c′. 
After introducing the concept of acceptor and configuration, we redefine the 
two parts of Protocol-I as follows. Normal Part is executed by all acceptor processes to 
assign identical order numbers to each client request when working within a 
configuration. Whereas, Install part defines the sequence of steps to be executed in case 
a failure is signalled by the coordinator FS process. This part covers the steps involved 
in a configuration change and also ensures that any order committed in one 
configuration is recognised in subsequent configurations. Description of Normal part is 
given in the following section. 
4.4 Description of Normal Part 
The normal part of the protocol is a two-step operation and is depicted in figure 4.3(a) 
with P1 acting as the coordinator (i.e. configuration Σ1). The first step, called “Send 
Endorsed Order”, involves processing of a client request by coordinator Pc, which 
includes deciding on assignment of a unique sequential order number to the request and 
multicasting the doubly-signed order decision to all processes in the system. When an 
acceptor receives an order message, it sends acknowledgement to all processes 
including the coordinator. This constitutes the second step, called “Commit”, which 
ends at a process when it receives acknowledgements from a quorum. This renders the 
order committed i.e. irreversibly assigned to the request. While collecting responses 
from a quorum, order message itself is considered as a sort of acknowledgement from 
the two processes forming the coordinator FS process. 
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(a) High-level illustration 
 
(b) Detailed illustration 
Figure 4.3. High-level and Detailed illustration of Normal Part Operation 
First step of Normal part can be further broken down into two sub-steps each 
pertaining to a message communication between the two processes in the coordinator 
FS process, illustrated in figure 4.3(b). First sub-step is for the order process to assign a 
unique order number to the request and send it to its counter part. Second sub-step is for 
the shadow process to check and endorse the received order and multicast to all. 
Therefore, the three steps altogether make Protocol-I a three phase communication 
protocol, shown in fig 4.3(b). 
4.4.1 Message Formats 
All processes use the following message structures during protocol execution.  
ORDERc(o): Order message is prepared by a coordinator Pc and is of the form 
〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉, where o is the unique order number assigned to request r. Recall 
that the clients are correct and direct their requests to all nodes; hence, every process in 
π∪π′ receives r and the ORDER for r does not have to contain r itself. Suffix is dropped 
from ORDERc(o) in this thesis where distinction of sender is not important. 
ACKi(o): ACK message is prepared by any non-faulty process pi in Acceptorsc in 
response to receiving and accepting ORDERc(o) and is of the form 〈ACK, c, o, 
D(ORDERc(o)), i〉. Note that ACK of Protocol-I contains digest of ORDERc(o) instead 
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of that of r, which was the case in Protocol-0. Also ACK here additionally contains 
coordinator number c. 
4.4.2 Algorithm Steps 
This subsection describes each step of Normal part in detail. It is assumed in the text 
below that all the messages received are correct and authentic. In other words, a 
message is considered a received message only after it has been delivered by the 
underlying communication system and it has passed all syntactic and semantic checks 
e.g. it has been authenticated, its structure is according to the specifications, its sender is 
in Acceptorsc etc. Hence a message is only considered by any process pi for further 
processing once it has passed these initial checks. 
For a client request message r, the coordinator Pc assigns a unique sequential 
order-number o if all earlier messages from that source have been assigned a (lower) 
order number. It then sends an ORDERc(o) message to all order processes in π∪π′. We 
describe the last phase of the normal part with the help of following four actions: 
Accept, Acknowledge, Commit and Deliver. These actions are depicted in figure 4.4 below 
indicating the sequence in which they are performed. The third action i.e., Commit marks the 
end of COMMIT phase and initiates the fourth action. 
 
Figure 4.4. Sequence of actions performed in COMMIT Phase 
1. Accept: An acceptor pi accepts the ORDERc(o) only after one of the following 
conditions is satisfied   
(i) If Pc ∉ Signalledi, ORDERc(o) is received by pi, or 
(ii) If Pc ∈ Signalledi, ORDERc(o) has been received by pi from at least (fc+1) 
acceptors in Σc. 
2. Acknowledge: Receipt of ORDERc(o) by any non-coordinator acceptor pi, does not 
give any guarantee to pi that all other order processes have received a copy of that 
Un-committed Un-delivered 
Delivered Acknowledged Committed 
Discarded Un-acknowledged
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ORDERc(o). To ensure diffusion of this order decision, an accepted ORDERc(o) is 
acknowledged by pi, by multicasting ACKi(o) to all order processes (including itself) 
and ACKi(o) essentially contains pi’s signature for D(ORDERc(o)). Any acceptor pi 
acknowledges the ORDERc(o), after the following 5 conditions are met: pi has 
(i) accepted ORDERc(o),  
(ii) received r from the client whose digest is the same as D(r) in ORDERc(o), 
(iii) acknowledged an ORDER message for all earlier requests (if any) from the client 
of r, 
(iv) acknowledged all earlier ORDER messages (with order number smaller than o), 
and  
(v) not accepted any ORDER message with the same o but for different r. 
Conditions (iii) and (v) are trivially satisfied so long as the coordinator has not 
fail-signalled – this exception is ignored for the time being. We denote the largest o 
ACKed by pi as Ai. 
3. Commit: An ORDER(o) is said to be committed i.e. the predicate committable(o) is 
true at any pi if the following conditions are true 
1. ORDER(o) is acknowledged by pi. 
2. ORDER(o′), o′≥o, is known to have been acknowledged by a quorum in Σc. This 
knowledge is deduced by receiving ORDER(o′) from coordinator process or 
authentic ACKj(o′) from a non-coordinator acceptor pj. This knowledge is 
necessary to ensure that no non-faulty process ever commits request r for a 
different ô or commits a different request r′ for the same o. 
The set of messages that lead to committing ORDER(o) will be referred to as 
the proof_of_commitment for o and will be retained until ORDER(o′), o′ > o, is 
committed. The largest o′ committed by pi will be referred to as max_committedi. 
Commitment of ORDER(o) renders every ORDER(o′′), o′′ < o committed. This 
is because of the in-sequence acknowledgement process (condition (iii) above). 
Possession of proof_of_commitment for ORDER(o) and condition (iii) guarantee that 
ACKk(o′′) have already been sent by at least every non-faulty acceptor pk in a quorum. 
Some of these ACKk(o′′) may not have arrived at their destinations yet but according to 
the properties of asynchronous network considered, they will reach their destinations 
eventually. 
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4. Deliver: pi delivers r for processing after it has committed ORDER(o) and, if o > 1, 
after it has delivered the request with order-number (o-1). 
4.5 Qualitative comparison with Normal Part of BFT 
To compare Normal part of Protocol-I with that of BFT side-by-side, we present the 
three phases which BFT executes to commit an ORDER in figure 4.5(b). (p0 is acting as 
the BFT coordinator.) Note that the three phases of BFT involve: 1 to n (coordinator to 
all), n to n, and again n to n message transmission. The purpose of the prepare phase is 
to verify if the coordinator can be trusted in what it sent during the pre-prepare phase. 
When a process-pair (with signal-on-fail semantics) is acting as the coordinator, n to n 
transmissions of the prepare phase is obviously not needed and the 3-phase exchanges 
become: 1 to 1 (for endorsement), 2 to n (endorsed output to all), and n to n. Since n 
decreases for Protocol-I as more failures are signalled, the number of messages, being 
exchanged in a phase of n to n communication, and hence quorum size also decreases. 
Whereas n and hence quorum size remains constant for BFT. The last phase in both the 
protocols is to make sure that a quorum is in a position to commit a certain order. This 
helps smooth transition from one configuration to the next, in case of a failure (in 
Protocol-I) or a suspicion of failure (in BFT), without any loss of already committed 
orders. More details are presented in chapter 5 where this transition mechanism is 
actually revealed. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Fail-Free 3-phase Operation of the two protocols. 
(a) Protocol-I 
(b) BFT 
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4.6 Implementation 
This section explains the implementation details of the two protocols and compares the 
performance of the two protocols under various load conditions and network settings. 
There are two reasons of implementing BFT from scratch and not using the library 
which is made available by the authors of BFT. First is that this study focuses on 
performance comparison of the two protocols on the foundation level. Due to difference 
in basic way of working of the two in the three phases described in section 4.5, it was 
found important to compare the two in bare essentials. Hence any sophisticated 
optimizations need to be avoided and the concepts implemented in a simplistic way. 
Secondly a fair comparison is only possible when the two entities to be compared are 
built with same techniques and technology. Hence the two implementations should use 
same programming language (Java here) and tools to keep things on same level. 
A third protocol was also implemented using same technology. This was a 
crash-tolerant version of Protocol-I (denoted as CT) and was included in the 
performance study so that the extent of slow-down in BFT and Protocol-I due to type of 
faults tolerated being Byzantine, instead of crash, can be evaluated. Protocol-I was 
amended to exclude shadow processes from the system, hence no pairing is used. 
Therefore system only has set of π processes (π′ = ∅) with n = 2f+1, which is the known 
lower bound on solving consensus problem with crash tolerance in asynchronous 
network. Assuming that there is no adversary present in the system which can tamper 
with messages while on transmission line, cryptographic techniques are not needed for 
CT (all processes are crash-prone). Like protocol-I, CT is also coordinator-based and 
the coordinator process directly sends its order message to all other processes. Since CT 
does not take into consideration Byzantine faults, there is no reason for any non-
coordinator process not to believe the coordinator on whatever order messages it 
transmits. Hence the third phase of Protocol-I becomes phase two for CT and an order 
message is committed after receiving (Q-1) acknowledgement messages. 
Diagrammatically the two phases of CT will be exactly same as the two phases of 
Protocol-I shown in figure 4.3(a), except that coordinator and the remaining paired 
processes of Protocol-I will be unpaired ones in CT. The two phases in CT therefore 
involve 1 to n (for sending order) and n to n transmissions (for commitment). 
Coordinator change is triggered by suspicions by acceptors. Like BFT, suspicions can 
be false. Hence configuration change does not change Acceptors and Q which are fixed 
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to π and (f+1) respectively. (In general for n > 2f, Q = n-f.) However, configuration 
change is not considered in this study. 
4.7 Experimental Setup 
Order latency and throughput of the three order protocols are measured and compared in 
fault-free scenarios in various network configurations. These are precisely defined 
below. 
Latency: It is the time interval between the instance the request is batched by the 
coordinator and the instance a given process commits an order number (o) for that 
request. That is, latency does not include the time it takes to execute the 4th action in 
figure 4.4. 
Throughput: Throughput is measured as the number of messages committed by an 
order process per second.  
The parameters that were varied to see performance dependency are described 
below. 
1. Batching interval: For all three protocols, the coordinator process does not issue 
order for a request straight away but batches order messages over a period of time 
called the batching_interval. At the end of this interval, accumulated orders are 
transmitted together as a single message; the size of this message is called the 
batch_size. Similarly, all non-coordinator processes transmit their 
acknowledgements for a batch of order messages. Note that the larger this interval, 
the longer a given client request has to wait to be batched; so, the batching_interval 
should ideally be chosen as small as possible. Latency measured for this thesis does 
not include the time duration a received request spends waiting to be batched. 
2. Cryptographic techniques: Three distinct combinations of message digest and 
signature schemes used are:  
− MD5 for computing message digests together with RSA scheme, key size 1024 
− MD5 with RSA scheme for key size 1536 and 
− SHA1 with DSA for key size of 1024. 
3. The fault-tolerance parameter (f) takes the value of 1, 2 and 3. 
4. Network configuration: Performance of the three protocols is measured on various 
network settings like LAN and WAN with replica processes assumed to be located 
at various distances apart. The three settings considered in this study are: 
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(a) Local Area Network (LAN) 
(b) Inter-city Wide Area Network (Fast WAN) 
(c) Inter-continental Wide Area Network (Slow WAN) 
Experiments performed are divided into two categories. First set of 
experiments were run over an on-campus cluster of PCs i.e. a real LAN with parameters 
1 to 3 being varied. Second set was conducted on the real LAN plus a fast WAN and 
slow WAN configuration emulated by a WAN Emulator with parameters 1 and 3 being 
varied. Both sets were run in configuration Σ1 with P1 acting as coordinator in Protocol-
I. Similarly, p1 plays the coordinator role in both BFT and CT. The two sets are 
described as two performance studies in sections 4.8 and 4.9 below. More details on 
these configurations are explained in the corresponding sections. 
4.7.1 Strategies for varying workload of the system 
System load can be increased in two ways. First is to have a fixed number of clients, 
each sending requests with increasing frequency. The other is to increase the number of 
clients, each sending requests at a constant rate. Both scenarios can be simulated by 
varying batching interval and batch size. For example, if batch size is fixed to a 
constant, decreasing batching interval can represent fast arriving requests. Alternatively, 
with a fixed batching interval, increasing batch size depicts the same situation. This 
thesis adopts the first method to measure performance i.e. decreasing batching interval 
to depict increasing system load. Although it is expected that both methods will have 
similar effect, second method may be used in future work to see the differences. One 
client is used in both sets of experiments to send requests to all replica processes. 
4.7.2 Presentation of Results 
Various network settings and traffic conditions may cause processes to take different 
amount of time to commit an order for a client request. Although this difference is not 
expected to be drastically big, it will only be fair to present statistics with corresponding 
process number. For presentation purposes, two processes are carefully chosen from all 
4, 7 and 10 processes for f = 1, 2 and 3 respectively, such that their performance figures 
truly represent the whole set of processes. For instance in case of Protocol-I, one 
process from an FS process and one from a non-FS one is selected. Although all 
processes in BFT and CT are unpaired, latency values for the same processes are 
presented for these protocols as well to maintain consistency.  
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Note that the numbering schemes used in the two protocols to identify each 
process are different. For example, processes in Protocol-I are numbered as p1, p′1, p2, 
p′2, etc. while in BFT as p1, p2, p3, etc. Hence, for the purpose of presentation of 
experiment results, we propose a general numbering scheme that represents equivalent 
processes of the two protocols with same numbers. This scheme is given in Table 4.0. 
Reader is referred to figure 4.11 for graphical illustration of the equivalent processes. 
  
Protocol-I 
f = 1 f = 2 f = 3 
BFT General identification scheme 
p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 
p′1 p′1 p′1 p2 p2 
p2 p2 p2 p3 p3 
p3 p′2 p′2 p4 p4 
 p3 p3 p5 p5 
 p4 p′3 p6 p6 
 p5 p4 p7 p7 
  p5 p8 p8 
  p6 p9 p9 
  p7 p10 p10 
 
Table 4.0. General Representation Scheme for Processes in BFT and Protocol-I 
Both performance study results show data for the following processes  
− p2 and p4 (actually p′1 and p3 of Protocol-I) when f = 1,  
− p3 and p7 (p2 and p5 of Protocol-I) when f=2 and  
− p4 and p10 (p′2 and p7 of Protocol-I) when f=3. 
4.8 Performance Study I 
The three protocols are implemented in Java using JDK 1.5 as a multi threaded 
application. These applications use TCP/IP sockets for any communication between 
processes. Protocol-I uses RMI instead of sockets for communication between paired 
processes only, to distinguish this communication from that between the unpaired ones.  
The three protocol implementations were deployed on a cluster of 24 Linux 
machines (Fedora Core 4) connected by a 100 Mb Ethernet LAN. Each machine has a 
2.80 GHz Pentium IV processor and 2GB RAM. 7 and 10 machines were used for f = 2 
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and 3 respectively plus one machine for client. The batching_interval is varied from 40 
milliseconds (msec) to 500 msec, and the batch_size is fixed at 1 KB. 
The results of this performance study are presented in the following manner. 
Figure 4.6 depicts order latency vs. batching interval for all three protocols with all 
three cryptographic techniques and f fixed at 2.  Figure 4.7 depicts the same with f fixed 
at 3 but omitting MD5 with RSA key size 1536.  Figure 4.8 shows throughput vs. 
batching interval for all three protocols with f fixed at 2 and the cryptographic 
techniques being DSA and RSA with key size 1024. Each point in a graph is an average 
over 100 experimental results. 
4.8.1 Order Latency 
Figure 4.6 plots order latency observed at p3 against batching interval for all three 
protocols. It can be seen that the order latencies stay nearly constant for large values of 
batching intervals, indicating that the system operates in steady-state (i.e., not in 
saturation region). They stay constant at 26 (and 23) msec for p3 (and p7) of CT, but 
increase drastically for BFT and Protocol-I when the batching interval decreases below 
a threshold, pushing the system operation into a ‘saturation’ region. (Note that latencies 
are represented in log scale along y-axis.) Further, the threshold for BFT is larger than 
that for Protocol-I. This indicates that BFT has a tendency to push the system into 
saturation earlier due to the large number of messages it places in the system and the 
cryptographic operations performed on each message.  For the same reason, the steady-
state latency for BFT is always more than that for Protocol-I.  
As f (and hence n) is increased in figure 4.7, which shows order latency 
measured at p4, it is observed that the saturation thresholds are encountered at larger 
batching_intervals, and the order latencies in the steady state increase. For example, 
comparing figure 4.6(c) with figure 4.7(b), it is observed that the steady-state latencies 
for Protocol-I shift from 160msec (168msec) for p3 (p7) and f=2 to 191msec (207msec) 
for p4 (p10) and f=3 and that for BFT increases from 171msec (174msec) to 236msec 
(243msec). It is interesting to see that the differences in steady-state latencies of 
Protocol-I and BFT increase considerably when crypto-technique is changed from RSA 
(Figures 4.7(a)) to DSA schemes (Figure 4.7(b)) and number of processes in the system 
is higher. For example, RSA with key size 1024 gives a difference of 19msec (19msec) 
between steady-state latencies of p4 (p10) for Protocol-I and BFT while the difference is 
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46msec (36msec) for p4 (p10) when DSA scheme is used for authentication. The 
explanation is as follows.  
In both the schemes the time taken to sign a given message is similar; however, 
signature verification is much faster in the RSA scheme compared to DSA.  
Furthermore, in a typical n to n message exchange, each process signs one message 
while it needs to verify at least (n-f) messages. This suggests that DSA is generally not 
suited for Byzantine order protocols.  
Similarly, the system starts saturating for Protocol-I when batching interval 
further decreases from the threshold value of 100msec for f=2 while the same reaches 
threshold point at 150msec for f=3. For BFT, the threshold value reaches even earlier at 
300msec for f=3 as compared to 150msec for f=2. These observations can be attributed 
to the fact that as n increases, each individual process receives more messages which 
need to be authenticated and processed. 
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Figure 4.6. Order latency at p3 for f = 2 using various crypto techniques.
(a) MD5 with RSA key 
size 1024 
(b) MD5 with RSA key 
size 1536 
(c) SHA1 with DSA key 
size 1024 
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(a) MD5 with RSA key size 1024 
 
(b) SHA1 with DSA key size 1024 
Figure 4.7. Order latency at p4 for f = 3 using various crypto techniques  
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Two important performance comparison parameters were found to be a) 
latency in steady state and b) threshold point from where system starts saturating. Hence 
to summarize the results and to present them in easily comparable format, order 
latencies of the selected processes in steady state region (average of all values acquired 
by running experiment with batching intervals in steady state region) and the value of 
the highest interval for which a protocol was found in saturation region is given below 
in tabular form (Table 4.1 and 4.2) for all different configurations. 
Steady State Order latency for p3 
  Protocol-I  BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 52.1 80.7 25.9 
MD5RSA1536 137.6 144.5 25.9 
SHA1DSA1024 160.0 170.7 25.9 
  
Steady State Order latency for p7 
  Protocol-I BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 70.2 77.9 21.7 
MD5RSA1536 142.0 147.4 21.7 
SHA1DSA1024 168.4 174.4 21.7 
  
Threshold Batching Intervals for all processes 
  Protocol-I BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 20 40 < 20 
MD5RSA1536 80 100 < 20 
f =
 2
 
SHA1DSA1024 100 150 < 20 
Table 4.1. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 2. 
Steady State Order latency for p4 
  Protocol-I BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 70.0 89.1 20.4 
SHA1DSA1024 190.6 236.0 20.4 
  
Steady State Order latency for p10 
  Protocol-I BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 79.1 98.2 31.0 
SHA1DSA1024 206.9 242.8 31.0 
  
Threshold Batching Intervals for all processes 
  Protocol-I BFT CT 
MD5RSA1024 40 60 < 40 
f =
 3
 
SHA1DSA1024 150 300 < 40 
Table 4.2. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 3. 
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4.8.2 Throughput 
Throughput was observed to be low for larger batching intervals for all the three crypto-
techniques. Figure 4.8 shows that with decreasing batching intervals, throughput 
increases until the system reaches the saturation point after which it starts dropping 
down. This behaviour was observed for both Protocol-I and BFT whereas the drop 
could not be observed for CT for the range of batching intervals used. 
Observing the behaviour of the three protocols for any of the crypto-
techniques, the conclusion drawn about BFT above is confirmed that it causes system 
saturation earlier than the other two and throughput starts dropping immediately after 
entering saturation point which is found to stay stable for a while in case of Protocol-I. 
Moreover, getting to the saturation point earlier when DSA is used as compare to 
smaller thresholds for RSA depicts the expensive nature of DSA for these protocols. For 
example, for f = 2,  RSA causes BFT to drop throughput when batching interval is 
reduced below 60msec and Protocol-I below 40msec whereas with DSA the same 
points are reached at 200msec for BFT and 150msec for Protocol-I.  
 
96 
 
     
     
    
  
Figure 4.8. Throughput at p3 for f = 2 using various crypto techniques. 
(a) MD5 with RSA key 
size 1024 
(b) MD5 with RSA key 
size 1536 
(c) SHA1 with DSA key 
size 1024 
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Following similar pattern, drop in throughput occurs early when number of 
processes is increased to 10 i.e. f = 3. Table 4.3 and 4.4 show varying trends of 
throughput for all three protocols in tabular form for p3 when f = 2 and for p4 when f = 3 
respectively. 
Throughput (requests committed per second) 
MD5withRSA1024 MD5withRSA1536 SHA1withDSA1024 
Batching 
Interval 
(msec) Protocol-I BFT CT Protocol-I BFT CT Protocol-I BFT CT 
500 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
400 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
300 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
200 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.9
150 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.4 4.2 6.5
100 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 5.0 9.7 6.6 4.1 9.7
80 12.1 12.2 12.0 11.3 3.4 12.0     
60 15.7 15.7 15.9 11.4 3.3 15.9     
40 22.5 4.6 23.5         
20 23.0 3.6 43.4         
Table 4.3. Throughput for p3 with various batching intervals when f = 2. 
Throughput (requests committed per second) 
MD5withRSA1024 SHA1withDSA1024 
Batching 
Interval 
(msec) Protocol-I BFT CT Protocol-I BFT CT 
500 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
400 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
300 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.4 3.3 
200 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 3.2 4.9 
150 6.5 6.5 6.5 4.2     
100 9.7 9.6 9.6 4.1     
80 12.1 12.1 12.1       
60 15.8 4.5 15.8       
40 7.8           
Table 4.4. Throughput for p4 with various batching intervals when f = 3. 
4.8.3 Summary of Observations for Study I 
Following are the general observations made from all the results presented above. 
− DSA algorithm is not suited to consensus protocols where messages are mostly 
multicast 
− BFT tends to saturate the system faster than Protocol-I as load increases. CT is the 
slowest saturating protocol 
− As number of processes in the system increase, performance degradation in BFT is 
more than that in Protocol-I 
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− Increasing tolerance level from Crash to Byzantine has a substantial cost in terms of 
both quantity and quality. Performance degradation was observed to be quite high 
from CT to BFT/Protocol-I even in LAN. 
4.9 Performance Study II 
After the extensive experimentation over LAN, taking into consideration the 
observations of Study I, RSA key size 1024 was found the most suitable and practical 
crypto algorithm for Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols and was chosen to be used for 
second set of experiments instead of all three techniques. Also, the consistent behaviour 
of CT was sufficient to observe the least effect it has of increasing f value; it gave an 
idea of how much a service can be affected if the tolerance level is increased from crash 
to Byzantine. Hence CT was dropped from the second set, which focuses only on 
comparing performances of the two Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols in a variety of 
network setups. Also fault-tolerance parameter (f) takes value of 1 and 2 for 
Performance Study II. The batching_interval is varied from 50 msec to 2500 msec, and 
the batch_size is fixed at 32 bytes. 
Using the Internet to test performance of distributed applications on 
asynchronous network with various load and bandwidth settings is not a very feasible 
option. This is due to the very obvious reason of lack of control over the dynamics of 
the network. There are too many factors involved which could affect network 
performance, all of which are not under our control. Being able to maintain uniform 
environment is specially important when the tests are performed for comparison 
purposes. Moreover, the cost of setting up the hosting distributed environment in 
various configurations can be very high. Using an emulator is therefore considered a 
feasible option to avoid the above mentioned issues. The emulator is required to be able 
to emulate network traffic on a typical asynchronous network as precisely as possible, 
yet letting various parameters like network topology, bandwidth of each link, traffic 
load etc to be varied by the user to emulate certain setups.  
The emulator built within the School, simply called WAN Emulator [AS07], 
was chosen to be used as the testing tool for Performance Study II. WAN Emulator was 
found best suited to the requirements. It requires no modifications to the underlying 
operating system, networking libraries etc. It provides a user-friendly GUI to set 
numerous parameters to desired values. This can even be done on-the-fly i.e. while the 
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emulation is being performed. Moreover WAN Emulator is capable of emulating 
network faults (loss, delay, corruption, reordering etc) and provides application-level 
software-implemented fault injection. This feature is highly relevant to our work and is 
planned to be used in future work. Also easy access of the source code and assistance 
from the locally available inventor are added advantages. The only hindrance in porting 
the implemented protocols directly to the WAN Emulator was that the latter is 
programmed for CORBA applications. Since CORBA communication model is more 
generic than RMI/sockets, it was considered worthy to amend the implementations to 
use CORBA for communication. Hence the implementation of the two protocols used in 
Study II replaces RMI and sockets with CORBA objects. Experiments in this study 
were conducted on the following settings 
− Real LAN 
− Emulated fast WAN  
− Emulated slow WAN 
For the sake of continuity, the following subsection briefly describes how the 
WAN Emulator works. Most of the text in this part is taken from [AS07, AS04]. 
Furthermore some of the parameters - only those relevant to this study, that the WAN 
Emulator allows to be changed, are listed with their corresponding values used for this 
experiment set. 
4.9.1 WAN Emulator Service 
The Wide Area Network Emulator for CORBA Applications is a system that attaches 
itself to an ORB: CORBA’s Object Request Broker. All CORBA applications using the 
ORB’s services can therefore be tested. The emulation is configurable and the emulator 
gives the ability to control every property of the network to be emulated.  
A physical node of the emulated network is represented virtually by an instance 
of each of the following three together. (Shown in Fig 4.9.) 
1. CORBA-based application to be tested, 
2. WAN Emulator, and 
3. Interceptor 
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Figure 4.9: The WAN Emulator Architecture 
Interceptor attaches itself to the application’s ORB running on the host to 
capture CORBA traffic going through the ORB. These intercepted packets experience 
delays as if they are being transmitted over a WAN. This is done by the WAN Emulator. 
Specifically, each WAN Emulator generates the background traffic in the context of 
which the intercepted packets will be transmitted. Thereby, the later will be subjected to 
experiencing queuing and transmission delays and transmission losses even though the 
actual transmission will be over a LAN or even an inter-process communication (IPC) 
channel. 
The three modules act together as a virtual host that emulate the node and its 
networking resources. Multiple virtual hosts can be run on the same physical machine 
or on machines distributed over a LAN.  
A single system-wide WAN Coordinator facilitates interaction between WAN 
Emulators which are immediate neighbours in the network topology. The Coordinator is 
a CORBA service that can be run on any physical node in the system. It starts by 
loading the topology of the network to be emulated from a topology file and then waits 
for each WAN Emulator to register itself. It then acts as a controller of the emulation by 
issuing Start and Stop commands to the registered WAN Emulators. The Coordinator 
provides directory-like services to Emulators. More precisely, it provides the locations 
of CORBA objects and other Emulators.  
A WAN Emulator Service is therefore composed of a WAN coordinator and a 
set of WAN Emulators plus corresponding interceptor components. The design of the 
emulator service assumes that the wide area networks to be emulated are large enough 
Interceptor Interceptor 
WAN Coordinator 
WAN Emulator WAN Emulator 
ORB Client Server ORB 
 
Virtual Host A Virtual Host B
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that the overhead of the emulation is negligible compared to the actual communication 
delays. 
4.9.2 Components of the WAN Emulator 
A WAN emulator is composed of three components; emulation engine, trace file reader 
and traffic generator. Each emulator starts by registering with the Coordinator and then 
initializing a trace file reader, a traffic generator and the emulation engine (Fig 4.10), 
each described below. A WAN Emulator (emulation engine) provides emulation 
decisions to the interceptors and to other neighbouring emulation engines.  
 
Figure 4.10. Three components of a WAN Emulator 
Trace File Reader: It uses already captured traffic arrival count traces stored in the 
form of trace files. These traffic traces can be generated by using Trace File Generator 
facility provided by the emulator service, which supports both Poisson arrival and Self-
Similar traffic patterns. Alternatively, traces can be captured from real networks or 
created manually. Trace file reader is probed after every (configurable) unit time by the 
emulation engine to provide arrival count for that unit time. 
Traffic Generator: It is initialized by the emulation engine and generates network 
arrival events during a unit time based on the arrival count provided by the emulation 
engine for that unit time. Any arrival distribution policy can be used to distribute 
arrivals within a unit time and packet length distribution to generate packet arrival 
events of various sizes. For our work, self-similar arrival patterns were used with packet 
size traces captured from an IP backbone. 
Emulation Engine: The emulation engine is at the core of the entire system. It co-
ordinates the operations of the trace file reader and the traffic generator. It also 
maintains various buffers and counters to store various properties of all links connected 
to a node in the emulated network. These properties include error rate, packet drop rate, 
propagation delay, bandwidth, number of packets to be sent and their sizes etc. For each 
Emulation Engine Traffic Generator Trace File Reader 
Interceptor
Arrival Counts
Counts requests
Arrival Counts
Arrival Events
CORBA Arrival Events Emulation Decisions 
WAN Emulator
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unit time, it receives the arrival count from the trace file reader and invokes the traffic 
generator to get arrival pattern of packets and their sizes for that unit time and updates 
its buffers and counters based on the properties of each link. This counts for the 
background traffic generated to emulate WAN for a node. When the emulation engine 
receives a CORBA packet from Interceptor, it makes an emulation decision based on 
the emulated traffic load. This decision can also be to inject error in the packet or drop 
the packet. Since in this study we do not inject any errors and do not drop any packets, 
the decision only indicates the delay which this packet should suffer.  
We describe below two parameters that are used in this study to create various 
emulation settings. These parameters along with many others are defined for every link 
between two nodes of the emulated network and can be set to required values in a 
topology file.  
Propagation Delay - The propagation delay is the time (in milliseconds) that a bit takes 
to travel from one end of the network to the other end. This parameter can be set to 
values acquired straight from Ping or any other such tools.  
Bandwidth – This refers to the maximum capacity of the link between any given two 
nodes of the emulated network, expressed as the number of bits the link can transmit per 
unit time. If there is a multi-link path between two ends, then the capacity of the 
bottleneck link should be considered. 
Each Emulator (figure 4.10) communicates only with its immediate neighbours 
and the Coordinator to reach an emulation decision. An immediate neighbour is an 
emulator that emulates a node directly linked (via physical network link) to the node in 
the emulated network defined in topology file. The CORBA arrival events triggered by 
an interceptor could be handled immediately if the target object is hosted locally. If not, 
the emulation engine finds its location and following the route to the node hosting that 
object asks its neighbour to emulate the rest of the network for this request. Each 
emulator registers all CORBA objects it hosts with the Coordinator. In return, it 
receives configuration and commands from the Coordinator. It can also obtain the 
locations of CORBA objects that it does not host. 
Role of Interceptor: Interceptor is the part of WAN emulator service that actually 
realizes the emulation decision made by corresponding Emulator. When a CORBA 
application sends a message, the ORB serving the application notifies the installed 
interceptor before transferring the message to its destination. The interceptor in turn 
contacts the emulator with which it is registered asking what to do with the packet. This 
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is shown as (a CORBA) arrival event in figure 4.10. After receiving emulation decision 
from the emulation engine it is responsible for delaying the messages. 
4.9.3 Emulated Network Configurations  
There are many ways to place the processes in a WAN and test each protocol’s 
performance. When f = 2, for example, there are 7 processes in all, a process can be 
placed in a far away location and the other 6 processes in another location (connected 
via much faster links). This creates an imbalance in the delays and will affect the 
performance of the protocol. Similarly, 5 processes can be connected with fast links and 
the other two with much slower links, etc. To maintain continuity with Study I and to 
see what are the relative performance figures for similar asynchronous setups, this thesis 
only addresses homogeneous networks links. The two protocols are tested for two 
extreme cases: either all processes are linked via fast links or all processes are 
connected via slow links. Figure 4.11 shows the chosen configurations for both f = 1 
and f = 2. 
 
Figure 4.11. Emulated WAN Configurations 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the role which the speed of 
asynchronous links plays when communication time between the paired processes is 
fixed to a small but constant value. Recall that the assumption made by Protocol-I that 
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paired processes are meant to be connected via fast Ethernet links. All paired processes 
were located on the same virtual host as if these were two processes running on one 
physical node in the emulated network. This has the same affect as being on a fast 
Ethernet as it is assumed that transmission over these links is almost instantaneous. 
While emulating these fast links, no delays were injected by the Emulator. Hence 
communication time between the paired processes is the time it takes for the emulator to 
intercept and inspect the packet. For fairness and uniformity, the respective processes in 
BFT were also hosted together even though they were not paired. 
The circles in figure 4.11 represent the sites where the processes, pi, (and their 
shadows, p′i, in the case of Protocol-I) are located. The solid lines represent identical 
fast links whereas the dotted ones represent identical slow links. The same cluster, as 
used in Study I, was used to run this set of experiments except that each machine has 
Fedora Core 5 installed on it. For every circle in figure 4.11 a Linux machine in the 
cluster is used to host a WAN emulator service of section 4.9.1 and the process(es) 
assigned to that virtual host. WAN coordinator and client were run on separate 
machines. 
For both of the network configurations following parameters were fixed to 
given values also mentioned below. 
− Unit time was fixed to 1 second.  
− Packet size distribution followed measurements taken from Sprint IP Backbone 
[FM03]. 
− Arrival events were evenly distributed over a unit time.  
− Arrival count(s) was(were) generated by using self-similar traffic model as studies 
of network traffic show that it is self-similar in nature [CB97]. The mean packet rate 
was fixed to 30 packets/second on each link and self-similarity (or hurst) value to 
0.8. 
Following are details of the two network configurations that were emulated  
Fast WAN Configuration. 
This configuration represents a network with nodes spread across a country. The 
propagation delays are fixed to 2msec which is typical of inter-city links within the UK 
(e.g. between Newcastle and London). The bandwidth of each link is 1Mb/s. The 
average utilization of each link given this bandwidth and the traffic generated from the 
traces mentioned earlier ranges between 10% and 20%. 
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Slow WAN configuration.  
This configuration represents the other extreme: all processes are located in far apart 
geographical locations and linked by slow links i.e. over an intercontinental network. 
The propagation delays are fixed to 50msec which is typical of far apart locations and 
links that span the oceans (e.g. between Newcastle, England and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). 
The bandwidth of each link is 512Kb/s. The average utilization of each link given this 
bandwidth and the traffic generated from the traces mentioned earlier ranges between 
20% and 40%. 
4.9.4 Experiment Results 
This section presents the results from the experiments performed by running Protocol-I 
and BFT over the two emulated network settings described above. These will show the 
difference in performance of the two protocols when the network connections between 
some processes is faster than the others. For example, for Protocol-I, link between the 
constituent processes of an FS process is faster than that between two FS processes. In 
addition to comparative analysis of the two protocols over only one type of network, it 
was found interesting to be able to compare the performance of a protocol over different 
types of networks i.e. (real) LAN and (emulated) WAN. Although Study I captures the 
results from protocol runs over a real LAN but since the implementations here were 
modified to use CORBA communication model for Study II, it was important to redo 
some of the experiments with the new CORBA-compliant code. Hence LAN of the 
cluster described earlier was used without introducing other sources of traffic to 
measure the performance of the two protocols i.e. no emulation was used. For each case, 
f = 1 and f = 2, a single process is loaded on a machine utilizing 4 and 7 machines 
respectively. The client issuing the requests was loaded on another machine by itself. 
Each point in a graph is an average over 500 experimental results. 
4.9.4.1 Order Latency 
Order latency was observed to follow the same trend as found in study I. The values of 
the two protocols were found to be very close to each other with a difference of about 3 
to 7 msec both with f = 1 and 2 using LAN setup. However it was interesting to see how 
the difference grows bigger as the network delays get longer. It was expected that 
Protocol-I will achieve major performance benefits over BFT in slower network settings 
because it makes use of the synchronous fast link within FS process. This makes 
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Protocol-I to transmit messages on slower links less number of times as compare to 
BFT. Whereas despite presence of similar fast links between processes of BFT, the 
difference in the performance of the two protocols was still expected to be substantial 
because BFT was not designed to make use of such a setup and hence involves more 
phases of communication over slower links. These predictions were found to be true 
and were confirmed by experiment results. The difference between the two protocol 
latency values grows to about 120 (100) msec for p2 (p4), f = 1 and 265 (240) msec for 
p3 (p7), f = 2 when fast WAN is used, with Protocol-I performing better in both cases 
(see Table 4.5 and 4.6). This difference grows to 486 (339) msec for p2 (p4), f = 1 and 
1042 (869) msec for p3 (p7), f = 2 when slow WAN is used. As for the saturation point, 
BFT reaches saturation much earlier than Protocol-I as a slower network is used. For 
instance, as depicted by fig 4.12 which plots order latency observed at p3 for f =2, BFT 
reaches saturation close to a batching interval of 500 msec whereas Protocol-I works in 
steady state until 150 msec for fast WAN configuration. For slow WAN setup, the 
difference becomes more pronounced with BFT saturating at 1750 msec as compare to 
800 msec for Protocol-I.  
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Figure 4.12. Order latency at p3 for f = 2 using various network configurations.
(a) LAN 
 
(b) Fast (Inter-city) 
WAN 
(c) Slow (Inter-continental) 
WAN 
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Steady state latency values along with saturation threshold batching interval 
values are summarized in Table 4.5 and 4.6 below. 
Steady State Order latency for p2 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN 48.2 51.6
Fast WAN 155.3 273.3
Slow WAN 411.5 897.2
  
Steady State Order latency for p4 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN 40.7 45.2
Fast WAN 137.5 237.9
Slow WAN 350.8 689.5
  
Threshold Batching Interval for all 
processes 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN < 50 50
Fast WAN 100 150
f =
 1
 
Slow WAN 300 800
Table 4.5. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 1. 
Steady State Order latency for p3 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN 61.0 67.2
Fast WAN 300.7 565.2
Slow WAN 917.8 1959.4
  
Steady State Order latency for p7 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN 65.7 72.8
Fast WAN 351.0 588.7
Slow WAN 1089.4 1958.4
  
Threshold Batching Interval for all 
processes 
  Protocol-I BFT 
LAN < 50 50
Fast WAN 150 500
f =
 2
 
Slow WAN 800 1750
Table 4.6. Steady-state order latency and Threshold Batching Intervals for f = 2. 
4.9.4.2 Throughput 
Throughput also follows the same trend as observed in Study I. Performance decreases 
early i.e. at high batching intervals as slower network configurations are used. For 
instance, as can be seen from fig 4.13, when f = 1, throughput reached the highest value 
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of 17.4 and 12.9 requests per second for Protocol-I and BFT respectively in LAN 
setting for the batching interval values used, while the highest values for the same were 
found to be 8.5 and 3.0 in fast WAN and 2.8 and 0.8 in slow WAN. Fig 4.13(a) shows 
that only the beginning of the performance slow down for BFT could be observed for 
LAN in the tested set of runs where the trend is still increasing for both protocols. Fast 
WAN plot (Fig 4.13(b)) depicts the throughput value at which BFT stabilizes (in 
saturation region) while Protocol-I showed increasing trend. Slow WAN readings show 
the stable values for both Protocol-I and BFT (Fig 4.13(c)).  
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Figure 4.13. Throughput at p2 for f = 1 using various network configurations.
(a) LAN 
 
(b) Fast (Inter-city) 
WAN 
(c) Slow (Inter-
continental) WAN 
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Exact slowing down trend can be seen in the Table below where throughput 
values are listed for each batching interval value for f = 1 and 2 in Table 4.7 and 4.8 
respectively. Comparing highest achieved throughput values for the two WAN 
configurations, earlier observations are confirmed by the pronounced decrease in 
performance of the two protocols when number of processes increases - f changes from 
1 to 2. 
Throughput (Orders committed per second) 
LAN Fast WAN Slow WAN 
Batching 
Interval 
(msec) Protocol-I BFT Protocol-I BFT Protocol-I BFT 
50 17.4 12.9 8.5 3.0 2.8 0.8 
100 9.4 9.3 6.2 3.3 2.9 0.9 
150 6.2 6.2 4.7 3.2 2.9 0.9 
300 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.9 
500 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.0 
650 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 
800 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 
1000 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
1250 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1500 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1750     0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
2000     0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2500     0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Table 4.7. Throughput at p2 for various batching intervals for f = 1. 
Throughput (Orders committed per second) 
LAN Fast WAN Slow WAN 
Batching 
Interval 
(msec) Protocol-I BFT Protocol-I BFT Protocol-I BFT 
50 17.1 14.2 3.2 1.5 0.9 0.4 
100 9.6 9.6 3.2 1.5 1.0 0.4 
150 6.4 6.4 3.2 1.6 1.0 0.4 
300 3.3 3.2 2.8 1.7 1.0 0.4 
500 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.0 0.4 
650 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.4 
800 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.5 
1000 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 
1250 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 
1500 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
1750     0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
2000     0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2500     0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Table 4.8. Throughput at p3 for various batching intervals for f = 2. 
4.9.5 Summary of Observations for Study II 
General observations from the results of Study II can be summarized as below. 
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− Observation made in Study I about BFT saturating the system at lighter load as 
compared to Protocol-I was confirmed in Study II. 
− BFT performance degrades more than that of Protocol-I as number of processes in 
the system increases. 
− Tremendous increase in the performance gap between BFT and Protocol-I was 
observed as network configuration was changed from LAN to inter-continental 
WAN i.e. when slower asynchronous links were used. Protocol-I was found to 
perform at least 45% better than BFT (in terms of latency) in the inter-continental 
WAN setup. 
4.10 Sources of Random Delays  
While inspecting the detailed logs of measured values during experiment runs, spikes of 
anomalous values were sometimes observed in various sets of readings. Although the 
effect of these randomly appearing high values becomes negligible when average is 
taken over hundreds of readings, this subsection investigates the possible causes of 
these anomalous additional delays. 
There are two types of random delays involved in all the experiments 
conducted. The first one is the one which is present inherently in all runs and the second 
one, which is only present in emulated network experiments, is either injected 
deliberately or is inherent in the tools/techniques used for emulation.  
Type 1: There can be two sources of this randomness 
1. Java Thread Scheduling: Since each of the three protocols was programmed as a 
multithreaded application, each program run was using Java scheduler in the 
background to allocate processor time to all the running threads. Since all the 
threads were meant to work in parallel, they all were given same priority. With this 
setting in place, switching between threads is highly dependent on the algorithm 
implemented by the scheduler. Most of the JVM use time slicing algorithms. For an 
application like the ones tested in this thesis where almost every message needs to 
be multicast, it can never be said with certainty how long a message (ready to be 
multicast) will have to wait due to thread scheduling before and during the multicast 
operation.  
2. Traffic load on the underlying LAN: Since the cluster used for all the experiments 
was not a dedicated LAN but instead a normal campus cluster, experiments 
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conducted at various times could have faced different network conditions like heavy 
traffic load due to a close coursework deadline or end of term time (exam time), 
light/no traffic load due to vacation time, random surge of traffic due to a student 
downloading some data using the cluster etc. To make sure all runs encounter 
almost similar conditions, if not exactly same, all experiments were run at late 
night/early morning time when traffic load was less likely to be high. Also it was 
made sure that at least the machines used for the experiments were not used by any 
other user. Despite these efforts, network conditions during all experiment runs can 
not be guaranteed to be exactly same. 
Type 2: This type of randomness comes with the emulator and can be because of two 
factors 
1. Java Thread Scheduling for emulator threads: Emulator is also programmed in java 
as a multithreaded application so the factor mentioned in source 1 of the first type of 
randomness applies to emulator as well. 
2.  Traffic load injected by emulator: This is the random delay injected to emulate 
random delays that are present in an asynchronous network like the Internet due to 
ever changing traffic. This is produced by injecting synthetic traffic by the emulator 
and depends upon arrival count and arrival packet size, taken from trace file in each 
unit time. Since these two parameters do not hold a constant value but follow the 
distributions used, the number of bits of synthetic traffic, waiting in sender’s buffer 
to be placed on transmission line before the first bit of an application packet, is not 
constant. Hence each packet will suffer some random delay before its first bit is 
placed on the line. 
To summarize, we denote the above mentioned factors as follows:  
Ed = Time it takes for the emulator to make an emulation decision (almost constant and 
can be assumed negligible). 
Jd = Waiting time as a ready thread for Java thread scheduler (Source 1, Type 1 and 2).  
Bd = Waiting time in the buffer because of synthetic traffic (Source 2, Type 2 above). 
Pd = Propagation delay of the emulated link involved (constant). 
Td = Transmission delay for the emulated link involved (constant, depending upon 
packet size and bandwidth). 
Ld = Delay due to background traffic on the underlying LAN (Source 2, Type 1). 
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For emulated network configurations, the total delay a packet will experience 
from the point it is ready to be sent from application’s (protocol’s) perspective and the 
time it actually reaches the destination can be given by the following equation.  
Total Delay = Ed + Jd + Bd + Pd + Td + Ld   
Whereas for simple LAN experiments it can be given as 
Total Delay = Jd + Ld   
Delays involved at receiving end are not considered here but it is assumed that 
once a packet arrives at receiver, it would only incur Java thread scheduling delay 
before it can be processed by the application. 
4.11 Summary 
This chapter presented the design and analysis of Normal part of Protocol-I. Protocol-I 
is an advanced total order protocol in the sense that it does not only accommodate the 
effects of failing state of FS process but also uses relatively less restricted set of 
assumptions. Here, the construction of FS process assumes the timing bounds to be 
accurate as before but allows both constituent processes to fail one after another. 
However, the two failures are assumed to be at least 2D time apart from each other, 
where D is the finite (but unknown) bound on communication delays between any two 
correct processes over the asynchronous network. 
We showed that Normal part of Protocol-I is a three phase communication 
algorithm. Message communication in the first phase is only performed between the 
paired processes of the coordinator FS process. Qualitatively comparing it with the three 
phases of BFT, we showed that this first phase is the major difference between the two 
protocols which keeps the total number of messages communicated in Protocol-I at the 
lower end.  
Normal parts of the two protocols were also compared quantitatively. We 
presented two performance studies based on results form two sets of experiments. First 
study also considers a simple crash-tolerant protocol, derived from Protocol-I, to 
evaluate the overhead in performance of the other two Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols 
due to higher tolerance level. We executed the three protocols on a LAN cluster and 
compared the latency values by varying parameters like batching interval, cryptographic 
techniques and fault-tolerance degree f. The results confirmed the qualitative analysis 
and showed that Protocol-I performs better than BFT. Also, it was noted that use of 
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encryption in Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols is the major bottleneck in performance, 
absence of which in crash-tolerant protocols lets the latter perform much better.  
Second performance study demonstrates performance gains of Protocol-I in 
emulated WAN settings. WAN emulator of [AS07] was used to emulate two WAN 
configurations; inter-city WAN referred to as fast WAN and inter-continental WAN 
referred to as slow WAN. Performance of Protocol-I was found to be substantially 
better than BFT in slow WAN settings.   
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Chapter 5  
Protocol-I: Install Part 
 
This chapter presents Install part of Protocol-I. Every process in the system executes 
Install when it receives fail-signal from the coordinator. Hence, the system moves into 
the next configuration. Install is the most complicated part of Protocol-I as it deals with 
the possible Byzantine behaviour of the signalled FS processes. The aim is to transfer 
the system from current configuration to the next appropriate one in a live and safe 
manner.  
The chapter starts by listing the objectives of Install. Then it highlights the 
problems that need to be overcome to achieve the objectives. The discussion illustrates 
that a faulty 4-state FS process may not just behave in a benign two-facing manner but 
is also capable of exhibiting malicious behaviour. The initial discussion also touches 
briefly the possible solution strategies. 
Algorithm steps are covered in detail in sections 5.4 - 5.10. These sections 
include the description of message structures used and discussion on the rational behind 
each step of the algorithm. Section 5.11 presents the performance study. We first 
compare Install of Protocol-I with that of BFT in a qualitative manner. The comparison 
shows that Protocol-I is more expensive in terms of number of communication steps. 
This is mainly attributed to the inclusion of Byzantine state in the FS process model. 
Results from experiments conducted on two emulated WAN configurations are then 
presented which confirm the qualitative analysis. 
Finally an optimized version of Install named Install-II is proposed. A 
discussion on comparison of Install-II with Install is also presented at the end.   
5.1 Introduction 
Any correct process running Normal part of Protocol-I switches the execution to Install 
part on receiving fail-signal from the current coordinator. Install part will ensure that the 
next eligible process is installed as the new coordinator. Once installation is complete, 
execution is switched back to Normal part. In short, Install part of the protocol is 
responsible for transition from one configuration to the next appropriate configuration. 
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Notations Pc and Pc+ are used throughout this chapter to denote signalling coordinator 
process and the next eligible coordinator, respectively; for brevity, the next eligible 
coordinator is considered to be an FS process throughout this chapter and the case for a 
non-FS eligible process is separately discussed. Also Pc- is used to represent the 
predecessor coordinator of Pc. 
5.1.1 The Big Picture 
Install part is more complex than Normal part. This is true for both Protocol-0 and 
Protocol-I. However, Install of Protocol-I is particularly sophisticated due to its 
handling of four-state FS processes with failing and Byzantine states (subsection 
3.6.2.3). Its principles can be understood rather easily by imagining for the time being a 
special client who is continuously observing the system. We call this special client 
observer client and we will suppose that it can observe every event occurring in the 
system (like an omniscient observer), except that it may not know with certainty of the 
orders committed by correct processes immediately after the coordinator Pc has fail-
signalled.  
Suppose that when coordinator Pc fail-signals, the observer client prepares a 
signed message called START and multicasts it to all processes in the system. Note that 
when a message is signed by a client, it cannot be undetectably corrupted by the 
adversary. START comprises of a list called TransferHistory which contains all ORDER 
messages that were issued by Pc in his regime and have order numbers in the range 
[CCmx, PCmx], where CCmx and PCmx are two integers defined in the following way. 
CCmx is the largest o that the observer client knows to be certainly committed by some 
correct process. 
PCmx is the largest o that the observer client knows to be possibly committed by some 
correct process. That is, it is known with certainty that the order number (PCmx+1) or 
above is certainly not committed by any correct process. 
The eligible coordinator Pc+ treats this START message as a client request and 
orders it with one restriction that the order number o assigned to START must be 
PCmx+1 = start_o (say). Note that this restriction allows any process to issue an ORDER 
message for START since start_o is fixed and is only a function of the unforgeable 
contents of START. Install part allows (initially) only the eligible Pc+ to multicast 
ORDER(start_o) for START. Once a correct process commits ORDERc+(start_o), it 
starts executing Normal part with Pc+ as the (new) coordinator. That is, Pc+ is installed 
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by that correct process and Install part completes successfully once all correct ones have 
installed Pc+.  
Of course, Pc+ may fail before any or all of the correct process can commit 
ORDERc+(start_o). The observer client is assumed to know this and does not issue a 
new START but leaves it to the next eligible process to figure this out. That is, the next 
eligible needs to figure out whether to re-use the existing START or to expect a new, 
tailor-made START from the observer client. This problem is addressed as “Identifying 
Source Number” in section 5.8. 
In reality, there is no observer client observing the system activities. 
Preparation of START needs to be done by the eligible coordinator itself. Furthermore, 
in the presence of assumption 2A (section 4.1), START needs to be made incorruptible 
like the client request. For this purpose, the eligible coordinator has the double-signed 
START it prepares additionally signed by (fc – 1) processes.  
The major challenge is for the constituent processes of the eligible coordinator 
FS process to compute TransferHistory, have it agreed-upon between themselves and 
generate double-signed START. This is discussed at length in section 5.7. 
The over all algorithm for Install part is outlined in section 5.4 and details 
given in section 5.6. Next, we state the objectives that Install aims to achieve and the 
challenges that the eligible process faces in achieving these. 
5.2 Objectives 
Suppose that current coordinator Pc has fail-signalled and eligible() = c+. The overall 
objective for the next coordinator Pc+ is to compute a starting order-number, termed as 
start_oc+, with which it can begin its ordering regime. start_oc+ will have the following 
two properties.  
1. It will be larger than any o of ORDER(o) which has become committed at some 
correct process, and  
2. It will also be small enough to ensure that order-numbers assigned to client requests 
tend to be sequential as if coordinator change never occurred.  
First property helps the protocol satisfy safety requirement i.e., it ensures that 
Pc+ does not re-use any o of ORDER(o, r) that has been committed at some correct 
process, while the second attempts at providing continuity in order numbers issued by 
each successive coordinator. 
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Install part achieves the objective by helping Pc+ to  
a) Identify CCmx and PCmx (as described above). 
b) Construct TransferHistory containing all ORDER(o), CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx.  
The starting order number, start_oc+ is simply computed to be one more than 
the largest o in TransferHistory.  
Computation of TransferHistory by Pc+ is not as easy as it may appear. In the 
next section, we present the problems that Pc+ faces in achieving its objective. 
5.3 Problems  
We present below a list of problems that are encountered by Pc+ and the way each of 
them is resolved. 
5.3.1 Consultation with other processes 
Pc+ cannot compute TransferHistory on its own as it can never be sure that it has 
received all messages ever multicast by Pc to any correct process in the system. This is 
because Pc+ cannot know whether Pc was in failing state when it received fail-signal 
from Pc and if so, for how long. Also, due to the communication system being 
asynchronous, there is no known finite amount of time until which Pc+ could wait to 
ascertain it has received all messages ever sent to it (see uncertainties 1 and 2 in 
subsection 3.1).  
Pc+ therefore seeks information related to TransferHistory by requesting the 
history of acknowledged order messages from every acceptor pi in the system. We 
denote this history of acknowledged messages as AckHistoryi which is sent as a part of 
STATUSi message similar to the way OrderHistoryi is sent in Protocol-0 (chapter 3, sub-
section 3.4.4). For reasons of liveness, Pc+ should only be made to wait to receive 
responses from a quorum of Qc processes (Qc = ⎣( nc + fc ) / 2 ⎦ + 1), unless it can 
ascertain that all those responded so far cannot be correct. It therefore waits for at least 
Qc responses and compute TransferHistory from the information gathered. 
5.3.2 Dealing with Incomplete AckHistory 
One major difference between the solicitation process of Protocol-0 and Protocol-I is 
that in the latter, all non-coordinator FS processes work in passive mode and hence the 
constituent processes produce AckHistory independently. Therefore, when AckHistoryi 
is sent by pi to Pc+, it has not been verified by the counterpart process p′i within the FS 
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process Pi. In this scenario, if pi is faulty, like any other unpaired faulty process, it can 
conceal the fact that it had acknowledged an ORDER message sent by Pc during the 
normal run and hence can undetectably present an incomplete message history to Pc+ in 
Install part.  
Intersection property of quorums comes handy to Pc+ to resolve this issue. Let 
q1 be a quorum which participated in commitment of ORDER(o) at a correct process. 
Let q2 be the quorum which sent AckHistorys to Pc+. Even if, in the worst case, q1 and 
q2 have fc faulty processes in common which are masking ORDER(o) from Pc+, the 
intersection property of quorums guarantees that there will be at least one common 
correct process in the two quorums which will send ORDER(o) to Pc+. But this brings 
with it the following caveat: 
Caveat: The presence of even a single AckHistoryi (amongst all Qc STATUS messages) 
containing a given ORDER(o) must be taken as an indication that ORDER(o) might 
have become committed at some correct replica. 
5.3.3 Dealing with Planted AckHistory 
Assumption 2A (Section 4.1) allows the fail-signalled Pc to become Byzantine faulty 
with the passage of time. If that happens, Pc cannot be ruled out from ‘planting’ 
seemingly-correct ORDER messages and thereby attempting to, say, redundantly order a 
given (probably garbage-collected) client request. A planted ORDER message can 
introduce the following additional problem: while Pc+ is waiting for Qc AckHistorys, a 
Byzantine faulty process pi can include the planted ORDER in AckHistoryi it sends to 
Pc+ as if it had acknowledged such plant while Pc was still acting as the coordinator. In 
this way, the faulty process is not only capable of providing an incomplete but also a 
misleading AckHistoryi to Pc+. 
Plants can be one of two types depending upon which field of an ORDER(o, r) 
is being re-used by the faulty coordinator. Suppose that ORDER(o, r) was planted by 
Byzantine faulty Pc and included by a faulty process pi in its AckHistoryi.  
1. ORDER(o, r) is called a spurious plant if there exists an ORDER(o′, r), o′ < o. (r is re-
used),  
2. ORDER(o, r) is called a conflicting plant if there exists an ORDER(o, r′), r′ ≠ r (o is 
re-used). 
All spurious plants need to be identified and discarded by Pc+. Discarding a 
spurious plant is always safe as a spurious plant cannot have been committed at any 
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correct process. This is due to the 2D time restriction in assumption 2A: consider that 
ORDER(o, r) sent by Pc is a spurious plant, which means both pc and p′c have failed and, 
by assumption 2A, at least 2D time has elapsed subsequent to the first of these failures 
has been observed by the second to fail. The first D of this 2D time is enough for the 
fail-signal, multicast by the first correct process after observing the failure, to reach all 
correct processes. (The significance of the second D will become obvious later). This 
means that at least every correct process knows about Pc’s failure before Pc gets the 
ability to produce ORDER(o, r). Hence, no correct process will acknowledge this plant. 
However, only at most fc faulty processes can send ACK(o, r). But since this is not 
sufficient for commitment, ORDER(o, r) can never get committed at any correct 
process.  
For the case of a conflicting plant, we note that by definition, if ORDER(o, r) is 
a conflicting plant against ORDER(o, r′), the same can be said for ORDER(o, r′) against 
ORDER(o, r). Hence, Pc+ needs to carefully inspect all ORDERs that conflict against 
each other. Pc+’s objective is to make sure that it identifies and retains that order 
message, if any, which has been committed at some correct replica among conflicting 
plants. 
Pc+ uses the following fact to filter the planted messages discussed above. 
Since there can only be at most fc faulty replicas in the system at any given moment, the 
planted ORDER(o, r) cannot appear more than fc times in any set of AckHistorys from a 
quorum. This implies that any ORDER(o, r) that appears less than (fc+1) times in a set of 
Qc AckHistorys, needs to be treated carefully; on the other hand, if an ORDER(o, r) is 
found to have been included in more than fc AckHistorys, then it certainly cannot be a 
plant.  
A. Conflicting plants 
A conflicting plant can find itself in one of two situations. 
1. Against a committed ORDER: Let us assume the presence of a plant 〈ORDER, c, o, 
D(r)〉, and also of the committed 〈ORDER, c-, o, D(r′)〉, r ≠ r′ in a set of Qc AckHistorys 
received by Pc+. Let us consider the situation where c = c-.  Since both order messages 
are doubly-signed and authentic, then both pc and p′c have failed and, by assumption 2A, 
at least 2D time has elapsed subsequent to the first of these failures has been observed. 
First D has already been described. Second D is the time needed for a correct process to 
receive AckHistorys sent by other correct processes. So, in the above scenario, if, 
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〈ORDER, c, o, D(r′)〉, is committed by some process, then before receiving a plant, a 
correct pc+ will already have AckHistorys from all correct processes with at least (fc+1) 
of them having included 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r′)〉. However, only at most fc faulty 
processes could include 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r)〉 in their AckHistorys. In this way pc+ 
manages to achieve the objective by choosing 〈ORDER, c, o, D(r′)〉. As for the other 
situation where c ≠ c-, the install part of the protocol is designed in such a way that this 
situation does not occur, i.e. it is ensured that each upcoming coordinator has to deal 
with order messages produced by only one of the preceding coordinators. Details of 
how this is done are given in subsection 5.10.1.  
2. Against an uncommitted ORDER: Here the uncommitted ORDER(o) is not 
guaranteed to be present in more than fc AckHistorys, which makes it difficult to identify 
the plant. In such a situation, picking either of the two to be included in TransferHistory 
is safe as neither of them could have been committed at any correct process. Hence 
install part lets Pc+ do the selection randomly (random selection is enforced by pc+ and 
followed by p′c+ within the FS process).  
Summarizing the conflict handling mechanism, presented below is the precise 
procedure followed by Pc+ when a conflict is encountered; ORDER(o, r) and ORDER(o, r′) 
are found in a set of Qc AckHistorys. 
1. If one of the conflicting ORDERs, say ORDER(o, r), is present in more than fc 
AckHistorys, choose ORDER(o, r). Note that ORDER(o, r) is chosen on the grounds 
that it is not a plant. Although it may not have been committed at any correct 
process, due to safety reasons, it is considered as potentially committed. 
2. If none of the conflicting ORDERs is present in more than fc AckHistorys, choose 
any, say ORDER(o, r). 
ORDER(o, r) is referred to as the conflict-resolved order in both cases above. 
B. Spurious plants 
The clients’ sequence-numbering of their requests is used by Pc+ to identify spurious 
plants. As mentioned in section 1.4 (chapter 1), every client cli sequentially numbers its 
requests and tags each request message with the assigned sequence number ri. 
Moreover, every request message is signed by the client and clients are assumed to be 
non-faulty. Therefore, this sequence-numbering issued by a client cannot be 
undetectably modified and is used to detect spurious plants. Recall that order number 
assignment and order acknowledgment is performed in-sequence by all processes. This 
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in-sequence acknowledgement is with respect to both order number o and request 
number ri (see conditions iii and iv of Acknowledge process in subsection 4.4.2). 
Hence, for two order messages ORDER(o, r) and ORDER(o′, r′), if r and r′ are from same 
client cli with request numbers ri and r′i respectively then o′ < o iff r′i < ri. This ensures that 
for a spurious plant ORDER(o, r), if there exists an ORDER(o′, r), o′ < o, Pc+ could know 
about the re-use of r. To identify spurious plants, every process pj in the system maintains a 
vector commit_count, where commit_count[i] = the largest sequence number of request 
from client cli that has been committed at any given moment. By definition of 
commit_count[i], it is clear that this count can only be incremented and is updated once 
a higher request is committed. commit_count[i] is initialized to 0. 
The next section presents an overview of the way Install part uses these 
approaches to achieve the objective. 
5.4 Outline of Install Part 
We present the Install protocol in terms of the macro steps involved in its execution. 
Install is divided into five phases of communication as shown in figure 5.1. The figure 
assumes Pc = P1 and eligible() = 2. Hence it represents configuration switch from Σ1 to 
Σ2. However, description below is given in generic terms.  
Phase I – Send STATUSi: First phase begins at process pi ∈ π∪π′ when pi receives a 
fail-signal from an FS process Pj. Multicast of fail-signal is shown as phase 0 in figure 
5.1. Receipt of this fail-signal triggers Install part at pi. pi multicasts a STATUSi message 
in response to each fail-signal it receives. When the fail-signal is from a non-coordinator 
FS process i.e., j ≠ c, phase I is the only phase executed at pi after which the execution is 
transferred back to Normal part. On the other hand, when j = c, Install execution 
continues to get the next coordinator, generically referred to as the eligible() or Pc+, 
installed at pi. Hence, the description of the remaining four phases below assume j = c.  
Phase II – Send STARTc+: The eligible() process Pc+ collects valid STATUS messages 
from a quorum, prepares and multicasts a 2-signed STARTc+ message to all processes. 
This is the message which Pc+ uses to multicast TransferHistory which is necessary to 
change configuration. Preparation of STARTc+ is a complex process and is shown as part 
A of phase II in figure 5.1 and will be described in detail shortly.  
Phase III – Sign STARTc+: pi receives STARTc+, signs it to form STARTc+,i (suffixes 
show signatories) and sends it back to Pc+.  
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Phase IV – Send (f+1)-STARTc+ and ORDERc+(start_oc+): After receiving (fc-1) 
messages from phase III, Pc+ prepares an (f+1)-STARTc+ message, which is nothing but  
STARTc+ plus (fc-1) signatures. (f+1)-STARTc+ is then multicast to all processes. This 
message will be treated as a sort of client request by destinations and Pc+ prepares and 
multicasts ORDERc+(start_oc+) for this (f+1)-STARTc+. The order number assigned to 
(f+1)-STARTc+, start_oc+, is one more than the largest o in the TransferHistory inside 
STARTc+ (see section 5.2). 
Phase V – Commit ORDERc+(start_oc+): This is similar to the COMMIT phase of 
Normal part of the protocol wherein ORDERc+(start_oc+) is committed. Each pi 
multicasts ACKi(start_oc+) and waits to receive ACKi(start_oc+) from a quorum.  
At the end of phase V when ORDERc+(start_oc+) becomes committed, 
installation of Pc+ as coordinator is completed; system moves to configuration Σc+ and 
execution is switched back to Normal part.  
 
Figure 5.1. All 5 phases of Install part of Protocol-I 
Following sections present the detailed structure of the messages mentioned 
above and also the description of each protocol step. 
5.5 Data Structures 
5.5.1 Messages  
The contents of the messages used by Install part are given below. We first introduce 
the notation m_ci(j) and Ai(j). Recall that max_committedi refers to the largest o 
committed by pi at any given moment (defined in subsection 4.4.2). Let 
max_committedi(j) be the largest o for which an ORDERj(o) is committed by pi only 
amongst those ORDERs sent by Pj. We use m_ci(j) as a short form for 
 
125 
 
max_committedi(j). m_ci(j) is initialized to 0 for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ (f+1). Similarly, Ai is the 
largest o for which an ACKi(o) is produced by pi (subsection 4.4.2). We use Ai(j) to 
denote largest o for which an ORDERj(o) is acknowledged by pi only amongst those 
ORDERs sent by Pj. 
5.5.1.1 STATUSi(j) 
STATUSi(j) message is multicast by process pi in response to receiving a fail-signal 
from Pj, j ≥ c, where c is the rank of current coordinator at pi. The purpose of this 
message is to provide the next coordinator with the history of order messages (if any) 
that were sent by Pj and ACKed by pi. Note that once pi knows that Pj has fail-signalled, 
it stops acknowledging any order message from Pj. 
STATUSi(j) has following three components, as shown in figure 5.2(a). 
(a) FSj: The received fail-signal message from Pj,  
(b) HistoryProof: proof_of_commitment for ORDER(m_ci(j)).  
(c) AckHistoryi: List of 〈ACK(o), ORDER(o)〉 pairs for every ORDERj(o) message sent 
by Pj which pi acknowledged with o > m_ci(j). Note that o = Ai(j) will be the largest 
o in the list.  
Notes: 
− HistoryProof will be null if pi never installed Pj as coordinator or in other words, 
m_ci(j) = 0. Note that installation of Pj can only be done by committing 
ORDERj(start_oj). Moreover, if Pj was installed but no other ORDERj(o) was 
committed after the installation then m_ci(j) = start_oj. Hence, lower bound on 
m_ci(j) is start_oj. 
− When m_ci(j) = 0, AckHistoryi will contain either of the following.  
(i) If pi had acknowledged ORDERj(start_oj) i.e., Pj fail-signalled while executing 
Install as eligible() = j and managed to execute at least the first four phases 
successfully (see figure 5.1), AckHistoryi will consist of singleton pair 〈ACK(o), 
ORDER(o)〉, where o = start_oj, Or 
(ii) AckHistoryi will be empty, in all other cases, except when c = 1. 
5.5.1.2 STARTc+(c)   
This message is multicast by the new coordinator Pc+. It also contains three fields. 
Figure 5.2(b) illustrates the structure of STARTc+(c). 
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(a) Signalledc+: The set of all received fail-signal messages by Pc+. This justifies Pc+’s 
attempt to execute Install as eligible().  
(b) c: Last installed coordinator number. 
(c) TransferHistory: List of all ORDER messages which must be committed by at 
least a quorum prior to installation of Pc+. It contains ORDER(o) messages with o 
in [CCmx, PCmx]. The details of how TransferHistory is constructed are given in 
section 5.7.  
5.5.1.3 STARTc+,i(c)   
This message is constructed by pi in response to STARTc+(c). It shows pi’s agreement 
over contents of STARTc+(c) and is constructed by signing STARTc+(c). Every process pi 
signs the doubly signed STARTc+(c) to form STARTc+,i(c) and sends it back to Pc+. 
    
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.2. Structure of (a) STATUSi(j) and (b) STARTc+(c) messages 
5.5.2 Variables and other data structures 
Processes pi and p′i maintain variables c, Signalledi, Order_Pool, Ack_Pool, and function 
eligible() – all of which having same meaning as in Protocol-0 (subsection 3.4.3.2). 
Additionally variables Ai, max_committedi, n, f, data structure proof_of_commitment and 
predicate committable(o) are maintained as defined in subsection 4.4.2 and 4.3.1. Also, 
nk , fk and Acceptorsk, 1 ≤ k ≤ f+1, are maintained as constants for each configuration Σk 
as defined in subsection 4.3.1. Furthermore the following are also maintained: 
commit_count = vector containing the largest committed request number for every client 
(initially commit_count[k] = 0 for every clk); 
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Status_Pool(j): set of STATUS(j) messages sent/received (initially empty); 
Start_Pool: set of STARTi,j(k) messages received from pj (initially empty); 
5.6 Algorithm Steps 
This section discusses the actions performed during Install. These steps are shown in 
figure 5.3. They are expressed as 6 concurrent tasks. The first five of these correspond 
to five phases of Install described in section 5.4 (figure 5.1). Whereas the sixth task 
represents the terminal activities executed at the end of phase V.  
Referring to figure 5.1, it can be noted that the various phases have processes 
acting on certain events. For example, the process that satisfies eligible() acts in phase II 
and IV, every process acts in phase I and V and every process excluding eligible() 
behave as actors in phase III. We present the execution steps of Install in generic terms 
with respect to a process pi ∈ π∪π′. In the presentation below pi receives messages from 
other process pj and pk and acts on them only if it needs to act in the respective phase. 
For example, pi will produce STARTi(j) and ORDERi(start_oi) only when i = eligible().   
while (true) do → 
{       /Task 1 
(FSj received or STATUSk(j) received) → 
{ 
I1.1 if (Pj ∉ Signalledi) → 
 { 
I1.2  enter Pj into Signalledi; // record fail-signalling by Pj 
I1.3  prepare & multicast STATUSi(j) to all p ∈ π∪π′; 
I1.4  if (c = j) →  
  { 
I1.5   s = c; 
I1.6   c = -1; // Install part execution continues 
I1.7   Order_Pool = Order_Pool\{ORDER(o>A)}; 
} 
} 
I1.8 if (STATUSk(j) received) → 
{ 
I1.9  if (pk ∈ Acceptorsj) → 
I1.10   enter STATUSk(j) into Status_Pool(j);  
} 
} 
||       /Task 2 
if (i = eligible() and STARTi(s) not sent) →  
{  
I2.1  prepare STARTi(s)= construct_Start(); //Phase IIA 
I2.2  multicast STARTi(s) to all p ∈ π∪π′; // Phase IIB 
}              contd… 
Figure 5.3 Algorithm for Install Part 
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||       /Task 3 
(STARTk(j) received) → 
{ 
I3.1 if (k = eligible() and i ≠ k) →  
I3.2  send STARTk,i(j) to pk and p′k; 
} 
||       /Task 4 
(STARTi,k(j) received) → 
{ 
I4.1 if (pk ∈ Acceptorsj and i = eligible() ) →  
 { 
I4.2  enter STARTi,k(j) into Start_Pool; 
I4.3  if ( |Start_Pool| = (fj-1) ) → 
  { 
I4.4   prepare & multicast (f+1)-STARTi(j) to all p ∈ π∪π′; 
I4.5 prepare & multicast ORDERi(start_oi) to all p ∈ π∪π′; 
  } 
 } 
} 
||       /Task 5 
(ORDERk(start_ok) and (f+1)-STARTk(j) received and k = eligible()) →  
{ 
I5.1 if (ACKi(start_ok) not sent) →  
 { 
I5.2 Order_Pool = Order_Pool \  
{ORDER(o): o ≥ maximum {max_committedi + 1, CCmx} }; 
I5.3  enter ORDERk(start_ok) into Order_Pool; 
I5.4  prepare & multicast ACKi(start_ok) to all p ∈ π∪π′; 
I5.5  enter ACKi(start_ok)into Ack_Pool; 
I5.6  Ai = start_ok; 
I5.7  while (∃ o < CCmx : ORDER(o) ∉ Order_Pool) do → 
  { 
I5.8   invoke retrieve(o); 
} 
} 
} 
||       /Task 6 
(ACKj(start_ok) received) → 
{// assuming ORDERk(start_ok) corresponds to (f+1)-STARTk(s) 
I6.1 if pj ∈ Acceptorss →  
 { 
I6.2  enter ACKj(start_ok)into Ack_Pool; 
I6.3  if (committable(start_ok) = true and k = eligible() ) → 
  { 
I6.4   c = k; 
I6.5   enter into Σc; 
} 
} 
} 
} // end while 
Figure 5.3 Algorithm for Install Part 
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5.6.1 Description 
The first 5 tasks of figure 5.3 correspond to the respective 5 phases of Install part (fig 
5.1). Task 6 is the terminal task that ends phase V and hence the Install part. Description 
of each task is given below. 
Task 1 – This task corresponds to phase I of Install. pi multicasts STATUSi(j) message 
(line I1.3) after receiving a fail-signal from Pj for the first time (lines I1.1 and I1.2). 
Furthermore, if pi finds that the coordinator has fail-signalled (line I1.4), it records c in 
variable s (line I1.5) and sets c to an invalid coordinator number (-1) in line I1.6. In this 
case, it also deletes all accepted but unacknowledged ORDER messages from its 
Order_Pool (line I1.7). pi also enters STATUSk(j) messages received from other 
acceptors in its Status_Pool(j) (line I1.10). 
Task 2 – This task simply makes the eligible() process prepare STARTi(j) message and 
multicast it to all processes (lines I2.1 and I2.2). The eligible() process uses the 
configuration-related parameters as those used in the signalled coordinator’s 
configuration Σj throughout install execution e.g., Qj and Acceptorsj. Details of the steps 
involved in construct_Start() are to be explained shortly in section 5.7.  
Task 3 – Every process, except eligible(), signs and sends STARTk,i(j) to the eligible() 
process as shown in figure 5.1. 
Task 4 – eligible() process accumulates (fj – 1) signatures (line I4.2 and I4.3) after Pj’s 
failure. It prepares and multicasts (f+1)-STARTi(j) and corresponding ORDERi(start_oi) 
(line I4.4 and I4.5).  
Task 5 – This represents the last communication phase of Install. Every process pi, on 
receiving (f+1)-STARTk(j) and corresponding ORDERk(start_ok), acknowledges the 
receipt by preparing and multicasting ACKi(start_ok) (line I5.4). Since 
ORDERk(start_ok) is a special ORDER message that corresponds to (f+1)-STARTk(j)  
which contains TransferHistory, a list of some ORDER messages, acknowledging 
ORDERk(start_ok) is taken as acknowledgement for each ORDER(o′), CCmx ≤ o′ ≤ 
PCmx, in TransferHistory. Therefore, before preparing ACKi(start_ok), pi deletes every 
acknowledged but uncommitted ORDER(o), o ≥ CCmx, from its Order_Pool (line I5.2). 
This is to make sure that pi does not end up having duplicates in its Order_Pool by 
acknowledging ORDERk(start_ok) and adding all ORDERs in TransferHistory in its 
Order_Pool. After multicasting ACKi(start_ok), pi updates its Order_Pool, Ack_Pool 
and Ai (lines I5.3, I5.5, I5.6). 
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Note that at this stage there may be some ORDER(o), o < CCmx, which may 
have not been (even) accepted at pi. This is trivial to deal with as pi can invoke a 
retrieval mechanism to recover all such messages. This is represented as invoking 
retrieve() in line I5.8 and is explained in section 5.9. In short, since 
ORDERj(CCmx) is certainly committed at some correct process, at least (fj+1) correct 
processes would have acknowledged it. Since all ACK messages are prepared in 
sequence, it is guaranteed that if pi multicasts a request to retrieve any ORDERj(o), o < 
CCmx, pi will receive at least (fj+1) responses. This will also be true for any ORDERa(o), 
a < j, which will have supporting (fa+1) ACK messages. The latter is possible because 
after failure of a coordinator Pj, the eligible() process Pk only gets installed at any 
process pi after ORDERk(start_ok), and hence every ORDERj(o′), CCmx ≤ o′ ≤ PCmx,  
becomes committed with quorum size Qj (and not Qk).  Hence, new coordinator starts 
its regime after making sure that all orders from its predecessor coordinator become 
committed with the preceding configuration parameters.  
Task 6 – This is the last task of Install part involving only computation. It ends when 
ORDERk(start_ok) gets committed at pi. Again, it is important to point out that the 
quorum used for this commitment is the one used in previous configuration (line I6.3, 
also see suffix of Acceptors in I6.1). It is only after ORDERk(start_ok) gets committed, 
pi updates the coordinator number to the process number of the eligible() (lines I6.4) 
and enters into new configuration (line I6.5). Pk is considered as current coordinator and 
Normal part execution begins. Note that it is implicit here that since Normal part 
execution is resumed with a new value of c = k, configuration parameters will be used 
correspondingly i.e., nk, fk, Qk and Acceptorsk. 
5.6.2 An Example Scenario 
Let us consider a system working in Σa with Pa as coordinator. Say, Pa fail-signals after 
multicasting ORDER(x), x > 1. Pb receives FSa and executes Install as eligible(). Pb 
waits for Qa STATUS messages and multicasts STARTb. Let us assume ORDER(x) was 
committed at some process, hence, it would be included in STARTb. Say, Pb is 
successfully installed at some Qa processes. Let pi be a process connected via slow links 
and does not receive FSa for a long time. Hence pi will still be working in Σa. Say pi has 
only received orders up till ORDER(u), u < x.  
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Now assume that Pb multicasts orders up to ORDER(y) and fail-signals. Let Pc 
be the eligible() process, which is successfully installed at Qb processes. Like before, 
assume that ORDER(y) was committed, hence it will certainly be a part of STARTc. 
Now, when at this stage pi receives STARTc, which contains FSa and FSb, it knows that 
Pc is the current coordinator. But STARTc does not contain messages sent by Pa which pi 
did not receive. Hence, pi will try to retrieve these messages. We note here that since 
STARTb contains ORDERs from Pa and STARTb is committed by Qa, out of which at 
least (fa+1) will be correct processes knowing about all committed orders from Pa. pi is 
guaranteed to get at least (fa+1) responses for all orders from Pa and at least (fb+1) 
responses for all orders from Pb. Hence, slow processes can get synchronized with 
others at any time and can fill all missing orders from any predecessor coordinators.   
To summarize, Pa, Pb and Pc are three consecutive coordinator processes.  Pa 
and Pb fail-signalled after ordering some requests. We note the following two points. 
1. TransferHistory of STARTb contains only ORDERa messages (by Pa) and that of 
STARTc contains only ORDERb messages.  
2. STARTb (respectively STARTc) is committable when Qa (resp. Qb) processes 
acknowledge. 
Hence, at least Qa (resp. Qb) processes will know about all orders from Pa (resp. Pb) 
before Pc can start ordering new requests. Since from Qa (resp. Qb), at least fa+1 (resp 
fb+1) processes are correct, Therefore, it is easy to conclude that any process pi, that 
needs to retrieve some missing messages from any of the predecessor coordinators Px, is 
guaranteed to receive at least (fx+1) responses. 
5.6.3 Exceptional Case: Last Coordinator 
When eligible() = (f+1) (not fi+1), pf+1, which is going to be the last coordinator, installs 
itself. This is the only exceptional case where a non-FS process executes Install as 
eligible(). Therefore we note below a couple of exceptions needed in the regular 
execution of Install part.  
1. Being a non-FS process, pf+1 only prepares single-signed STARTf+1 message. 
2. Since all f failures have occurred in the system, STARTf+1 message no longer needs to 
be secured with the help of (fc+1) acceptor signatures (more on this in subsection 
5.10.2). Hence phases III and IV shown in figure 5.1 are not executed by any process 
when the system moves to the last configuration Σ(f+1). 
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5.7 Construction of STARTc+(c) 
STARTc+(c) message, like any other doubly-signed message, is constructed in two steps 
i.e., first pc+ creates and signs the message and then p′c+ verifies and double-signs it (see 
figure 3.4 for output endorsement steps). However, STARTc+(c) is a special message 
whose construction relies on the set of STATUSi(c) messages received so far. Two 
issues arise because of this reliance as described below.  
Firstly, we note that STARTc+(c) is prepared with the help of STATUSi(c) 
messages received from at least a quorum. Since quorum used by pc+ can be different 
from the one used by p′c+, STARTc+(c) constructed by the two processes independently 
may not be same but yet correct. Therefore we define quorum used in the preparation of 
STARTc+(c) to be consisting of the first Qc STATUSi(c) messages received at Pc+. Since 
pc+ and p′c+ are synchronized for the messages they receive (see ISIQ in figure 3.3, 
chapter 3), this will make STARTc+(c) construction identical at both processes. 
Therefore both pc+ and p′c+ wait for the arrival of first set of Qc STATUSi(c) messages 
before starting construction of STARTc+(c) message. We note here that although it is this 
set that mainly contributes towards the contents of STARTc+(c) message, later arriving 
STATUSi(c) messages are also significant and may be needed for conflict resolution. To 
distinguish between the two, we assume that the Status_Pool(c) consists of two 
portions. One named Foundation_Pool(c), comprises of the first arriving Qc STATUSi(c) 
messages, while the second named Advanced_Pool(c) contains all later arriving 
STATUSi(c) messages.  
Second issue is concerned with the way pc+ (or p′c+) resolves conflicts, if any 
found in STATUS(c) messages of their Foundation_Pool(c). Recall that the evidence to 
identify a plant against a committed message ORDER(o, r) is guaranteed to be available 
within the STATUSi(c) messages received by the time this conflict appears i.e. in whole 
Status_Pool(c) (Foundation_Pool(c) + Advanced_Pool(c)). This will be in the form of 
at least (fc+1) STATUSi(c) messages having included ORDER(o, r). Hence both pc+ and 
p′c+ are guaranteed to choose ORDER(o, r) consistently. However for a plant against an 
uncommitted ORDER(o, r), no guarantee can be given about the number of STATUSi(c) 
messages having included ORDER(o, r). Since the time instant at which pc+ and p′c+ will 
be resolving this conflict may be different, the total number of STATUSi(c) messages in 
the Advanced_Pool(c) of the two processes at those respective moments may also be 
different. Hence it may happen that pc+ finds more than fc STATUSi(c) messages 
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containing ORDER(o, r) while p′c+ does not or vice versa. This will cause inconsistency. 
We therefore propose below a solution to avoid such a situation. 
Analysing the problem, we conclude that it can be solved if pc+ and p′c+ 
exchange the evidence that they have used from STATUSi(c) messages of 
Advanced_Pool(c) to construct their respective STARTc+(c) messages. Hence both pc+ 
and p′c+ bundle this evidence into a message called PRE-STARTc+(c) and send it to each 
other. PRE-STARTc+(c) has following two components  
(a) Single signed STARTc+(c), individually constructed by both pc+ and p′c+.  
(b) ProofBag: list containing evidence corresponding to every ORDER included in the 
TransferHistory of STARTc+(c) in (a).  
 
Figure 5.4. Extended representation of phase 2 of Install part 
Once the PRE-STARTc+(c) messages are exchanged, normal output 
endorsement procedure is initiated. Figure 5.4 shows the detailed version of phase II 
from the 5 phases of Install part (Fig 5.1). Details of phase IIA, named PRE-START 
phase here, have been added. This phase depicts message communication between the 
two paired processes within the eligible() FS process (the only active FS process in the 
system) as described above. The latter is depicted as P2 in figure 5.4. Recall that 
activities in this phase are a part of the construct_Start() procedure used in figure 5.3 
(line I1.7). Figure 5.5 below shows an outline of steps executed in this procedure with 
the context that Pc has fail-signalled and eligible() = c+ is executing the Install.  
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Construct_Start() 
{ 
CS1 wait until |Foundation_Pool(c)| = Qc; 
CS2 prepare PRE-STARTc+(c) and send it to counterpart process; 
CS3 wait until PRE-STARTc+(c) received from counterpart process; 
CS4 prepare STARTc+(c) using the two PRE-STARTc+(c); 
CS5 if (leader) → // for pc+ 
{ 
CS6  send single-signed STARTc+(c) to counterpart; 
CS7  wait until double-signed STARTc+(c) received from 
counterpart; 
CS8  return double-signed STARTc+(c); 
 } 
CS9 else // for p′c+ 
 { 
CS10  wait until single-signed STARTc+(c) received from 
counterpart; 
CS11  verify and sign single-signed STARTc+(c); 
CS12  return double-signed STARTc+(c); 
 } 
} 
Figure 5.5. Steps for START construction; construct_Start() 
Lines CS1 – CS4 of figure 5.5 are executed by both processes in the pair 
symmetrically, which represent preparation and exchange of PRE-STARTc+(c) between 
the two followed by preparation of STARTc+(c) using the two PRE-STARTc+(c) 
messages. (This is indicated by information flow between p2 and p′2 in PRE-START 
phase of figure 5.4.) What follows is the normal output endorsement procedure initiated 
by leader process pc+ (line CS6). Follower process p′c+ receives, verifies and double 
signs the STARTc+(c) sent by leader (lines CS10, CS11). Double-signed STARTc+(c) is 
returned back (line CS12) to the calling program so that it can be multicast to all (line 
I1.7 figure 5.3). Leader also returns this message after receiving it from the follower 
(line CS7 and CS8).  
Rest of this section contains steps of preparation of PRE-STARTc+(c) and 
reconstruction of STARTc+(c), each in a separate subsection below. The procedure for 
preparation of these messages is same for both pc+ and p′c+. We therefore describe it for 
one of them i.e. pc+ only.   
5.7.1 Preparation of PRE-STARTc+(c) 
pc+ uses Foundation_Pool(c) to construct the two components of PRE-STARTc+(c); 
single-signed STARTc+(c) containing TransferHistory and the corresponding ProofBag. 
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Advanced_Pool(c) is used only to resolve conflicts and is mentioned explicitly where 
used. Recall that Foundation_Pool(c) contains STATUSi(c) messages, and a STATUSi(c) 
contains HistoryProof and AckHistoryi. The following construction procedure is 
described in terms of these two components. 
pc+ goes through all HistoryProofs in Foundation_Pool(c) and selects the one 
containing the proof for the largest o among all. This will form the smallest o of 
ORDER(o) in TransferHistory i.e., CCmx. We denote the proof for ORDER(CCmx) as 
HistoryProof(CCmx). ORDER(CCmx) is added as first element in TransferHistory and 
HistoryProof(CCmx) in ProofBag. Since ORDER(CCmx) is definitely acknowledged by 
at least (fc+1) correct processes, TransferHistory of STARTc+(c) is constructed to contain 
only ORDER(o ≥ CCmx). Hence the first element of ProofBag justifies the lowest 
numbered ORDER in TransferHistory. If all the HistoryProofs in the 
Foundation_Pool(c) are null, first element of ProofBag will be set to null. In this 
situation pc+ will be expecting the lowest order number in all non-empty AckHistorys in 
Foundation_Pool(c) to be either 1 or start_oc. The former represents the case where c = 
1 (Pc was first coordinator), while the latter is the case when Pc’s attempt to install itself 
was unsuccessful i.e. ORDERc(start_oc) was sent by Pc but could not become 
committed. 
There is a possibility of pc+ having max_committedc+ < CCmx. In this case, pc+ 
enters all ACKs from HistoryProof(CCmx) in its ACK_Pool and considers 
ORDER(CCmx) as committed. This requires max_committedc+ and commit_count to be 
updated accordingly. Updating max_committedc+ is easy but for commit_count, pc+ 
needs to be in possession of an authentic ORDER(o) and corresponding r for every o, 
max_committedc+ < o ≤ CCmx. Since clients are assumed to be sending requests to all 
processes faithfully, receiving r corresponding to all these ORDERs is not considered a 
problem. Hence the update can only be done if pc+ has locally accepted each of these 
ORDERs.  For every ORDER(o), o < CCmx, not being accepted yet, pc+ triggers retrieval 
mechanism as described in section 5.9 to recover those messages. 
As mentioned earlier, TransferHistory contains all ORDER messages that bear 
a chance of having been committed. This means that it must contain every authentic 
ORDER(o ≥ CCmx) that was included in any AckHistoryi in Foundation_Pool(c), as was 
indicated as a caveat in subsection 5.3.2. pc+ inspects all AckHistorys and for every 
successive ORDER(o, r)  above CCmx, it does the following.  
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a. If there exists an ACK(o) corresponding to ORDER(o, r) in at least (fc+1) 
STATUSi(c) messages, pc+ adds ORDER(o, r) in TransferHistory and a set of distinct 
(fc+1) ACK(o) messages in ProofBag.  
b. In case of an ORDER(o, r)  having less than (fc+1) supporting ACK(o) messages, pc+ 
first performs spuriousness check in the following way.  
If  r = request from client cli with request number ri and  
m = number of requests from cli that were assigned order numbers in the range 
[o-1, CCmx+1] i.e. whose order messages have been included in TransferHistory  
then ri should satisfy the following equation 
ri = commit_count[i] + m +1 
For example if the latest committed request sent by cli is 10 i.e. 
commit_count[i] = 10. Suppose CCmx is computed as 20. Therefore TransferHistory 
will contain ORDERs from 20 above. Let the ORDER of concern be ORDER(30) for 
which pc+ needs to perform spuriousness check. Say ORDER(30) corresponds to 
request number 13 from client cli i.e., ri = 13. pc+ then checks if there are ri - 
commit_count[i] - 1= 13 – 10 – 1 = 2 ORDER messages in TransferHistory below 
30 corresponding to request numbers 11 and 12 from cli. If this is not the case then 
ORDER(30) is considered spurious. 
Once ORDER(o, r) is identified as non-spurious message, it may fall into 
any of the following two categories: 
Conflict-free Order: This is the situation when every ACK(o) in 
Foundation_Pool(c) refers to same ORDER(o, r).  
Conflict-resolved Order: This is the situation when multiple conflicting ORDER 
messages are found corresponding to same o in Foundation_Pool(c). Conflict is 
resolved in the way explained in subsection 5.3.3 using all AckHistorys in the 
Status_Pool(c) (Foundation_Pool(c) + Advanced_Pool(c)) for evidence. Let 
ORDER(o, r) be the chosen conflict-resolved order.  
For both cases above, pc+ adds ORDER(o, r) in TransferHistory and one of 
the corresponding  ACK(o) from an AckHistory in the ProofBag. 
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5.7.2 Adjusting STARTc+(c) using received PRE-STARTc+(c) 
pc+ carries out the following steps to reconstruct STARTc+(c). Let us use suffix c+ for 
components of PRE-STARTc+(c) produced by pc+, c+′ for the ones produced by p′c+ and 
suffix start for the ones that are recomputed for the final STARTc+(c). These suffixes are 
only used in this subsection for clarification purposes. Recall that CCmx is computed by 
using STATUS messages in Foundation_Pool only. Since the messages in this pool at 
both pc+ and p′c+ are same, CCmx computed at the two processes will also be same.    
(a) pc+ constructs TransferHistorystart for the new STARTc+(c) in the following way. For 
every successive ORDER(o), starting from o = CCmx, it selects ORDER(o, r) from 
TransferHistoryc+ and adds it into TransferHistorystart except the following two 
cases: 
1. When there exists an ORDER(o, r′), r ≠ r′, in TransferHistoryc+′ with more than 
fc corresponding ACK(o) messages as evidence in ProofBagc+′, or  
2. When ORDER(o) does not exist in TransferHistoryc+ i.e. when largest o in 
TransferHistoryc+′ > largest o in TransferHistoryc+.  
It is only in these two situations when ORDER(o, r′) from TransferHistoryc+′ 
is selected. Every order is re-checked for spuriousness in the way described for 
PRE-STARTc+(c) construction.  
(b) It then computes PCmx = the largest o in TransferHistorystart and start_oc+  =  PCmx + 
1. 
pc+ sends this newly prepared STARTc+(c) to p′c+ to get signed. p′c+ compares it 
with locally produced STARTc+(c) and signs it if match found. 2-signed STARTc+(c) is 
then multicast to all processes.  
5.8 Identifying Source Number 
Up till this point, a simple assumption has been made to explain the complicated task of 
construction of STARTc+(c). Pc+ was assumed to be working in Σc when it received the 
fail-signal from Pc. This assumption may not always hold. We will refer to the big 
picture sketched in subsection 5.1.1 to explain the complication of the situation. Recall 
the initial assumption about having an observer client. It was highlighted that the 
eligible process faces a dilemma. That is, it needs to find out if it is supposed to re-use a 
START message already issued by the observer client or it should wait for a new, tailor-
made START. Moreover, since there is no such observer client in reality, the eligible 
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process thus needs to decide whether there is a START message generated by the 
predecessor coordinator which it can re-use or it should prepare a new one. In order to 
make this decision, the eligible process needs to collect some details from other 
processes. For example, it needs to know the identification of the latest coordinator that 
was installed at any correct process and the latest process, say Pe, which fail-signalled 
during install execution as eligible() after transmitting ORDERe(start_oe), if any. 
Concisely,  
1. If there exists a process Pe that executed install after the latest coordinator fail-
signalled but could execute only first four phases and fail-signalled after 
transmitting ORDERe(start_oe), Pc+ needs to identify this situation about Pe. This is 
to enable Pc+ to re-use ORDERe(start_oe). Otherwise, 
2. Pc+ needs to identify the process number c of the largest ranked coordinator that was 
installed at any correct process. This is to enable Pc+ to recognize committed and 
possibly committed ORDERs to be included in TransferHistory. 
The process number identified by Pc+ is called Source Number and is denoted 
by s. We show that the value of s can be identified with the help of Status_Pool. First 
we introduce a data structure named Status_Board maintained by Pc+ and then explain 
the procedure for identification of s.  
Recall that STATUSi(k) message is multicast by pi in response to every fail-
signal received (line I1.3 in fig 5.3). Pc+ maintains a Status_Pool(k) for every Pk ∈ 
Signalledc+. This collection is called Status_Board. Status_Board helps Pc+ handle the 
identification of source number in the following way. 
Recall that process pi sends an empty AckHistoryi and null HistoryProof when 
it receives fail-signal from a non-coordinator FS process, say Pu (see STATUSi(j) in 
subsection 5.5.1). Let us call such a STATUSi(u) message empty and a Status_Pool(u) 
containing all empty STATUS(u) messages empty pool. Hence an empty Status_Pool(u) 
represents that at least a quorum could not install Pu and never entered (and will never 
enter) configuration Σu. Note that the converse is not always true i.e. that the eligible() 
process could not be installed successfully does not necessarily result in empty 
Status_Pool. For example, an eligible coordinator Pe may fail-signal after executing first 
4 phases of Install part. Some correct process pv which may have multicast 
ACKv(start_oe) will include ACKv(start_oe) in its AckHistoryv. In other words, a non-
empty Status_Pool(e) does not necessarily mean that Pe was installed successfully and 
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Σe was entered. However, any non-empty Status_Pool(e) contains important 
information.  
Identifying the source number thus becomes simple for Pc+. Pc+ computes s as 
the largest j, j < c+, such that every Status_Pool(k) has Qj STATUS(k) messages and it is 
an empty pool, j < k < c+. This process number j will correspond to e or c, whichever 
applicable, as indicated in 1 and 2 above. Hence, by using Status_Pool(j), Pc+ can either 
re-use ORDERj(start_oj), if any provided in one of the AckHistorys or inspect all 
AckHistorys to gather the ORDERs sent by Pj. 
5.9 Retrieval Procedure 
Process pi may need to retrieve some ORDERc(o) from signalled coordinator Pc, which 
it had not accepted and is also not included in the TransferHistory of the 
received/prepared STARTc+(c) message. Hence every ORDERc(o), o < CCmx, which has 
not been accepted by pi needs to be retrieved. Therefore pi multicasts a REQUEST(o) 
for every such ORDERc(o). Every correct process pj, having had ORDERc(o) in its 
accepted messages, unicasts REPLY(o) to pi containing ORDERc(o). pi is guaranteed to 
get at least (fc+1) distinct REPLY(o) messages because of the reasons explained in 
subsection 5.6.1 (see Task 5). 
5.10  Discussions 
This section provides additional insight to some aspects of Install part by discussing the 
rationale behind them. 
5.10.1  Why only one Status_Pool(c) is sufficient to construct 
STARTc+(c)? 
A Coordinator Pc, c ≠ 1, is not considered installed at a correct process pi until 
ORDERc(start_oc) sent by Pc gets committed at pi (lines I6.4-I6.8 in fig 5.2). This is 
when pi enters configuration Σc and starts acknowledging any further ORDER messages 
sent by Pc. This procedure can cause three possible situations. 
− Situation 1: Pc was installed at pi successfully 
Outcome: STATUSi(c) multicast in response to FSc will contain 
proof_of_commitment for ORDERc(max_committedi) in HistoryProof, 
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max_committedi ≥ start_oc. If  max_committedi > start_oc, STATUSi(c) contains 
ORDER messages sent by Pc during its regime.  
That max_committedi = start_oc represents a situation when no ORDERc(o), o > 
start_oc, sent by Pc was committed after the installation of Pc. If Pc had sent any 
ORDER message and if pi had acknowledged any of them, then AckHistoryi will 
contain all those acknowledged ORDERs. In this case, HistoryProof reflects the fact 
that ORDERs sent by predecessor coordinator Pc-, c- < c, have been committed. pi 
had entered Σc. 
− Situation 2: Pc fail-signalled during installation. pi received FSc when it had only 
acknowledged but not committed ORDERc(start_oc).  
Outcome: STATUSi(c) multicast in response to FSc will contain 〈ORDERc(start_oc), 
ACKi(start_oc)〉 pair in AckHistoryi. This will be the only pair included in 
AckHistoryi as no ORDERc(o), o > start_oc, sent by Pc could have been 
acknowledged by pi. pi had not entered Σc. Note that it is the only situation where a 
non-empty STATUSi(c) message indicates that Pc was not installed successfully and 
only an attempt was made.  
− Situation 3: Pc fail-signals and FSc reaches pi even before it acknowledges 
ORDERc(start_oc). 
Outcome: STATUSi(c) multicast in response to FSc will be empty. pi had not 
entered Σc. 
The three situations above show that a non-empty STATUSi(c) message carries 
information about last committed and all acknowledged but uncommitted ORDER 
messages sent by Pc. If there was no ORDER sent by Pc after its installation, a non-
empty STATUSi(c) message carries information about all acknowledged but 
uncommitted ORDER messages sent by the predecessor of Pc (by having 
ORDERc(start_oc)). Hence every non-empty STATUSi(c) message covers all 
acknowledged but uncommitted ORDER messages that pi has at the time of 
transmission, if any. Since the main objective of Install part is to ensure that all those 
acknowledged ORDER messages that could have been committed at some correct 
process are taken care of when system moves from one configuration to the next, 
Status_Pool(c) is enough to gather this information. If this is found empty, which is the 
case for situation 3, the next coordinator needs to find out non-empty Status_Pool 
corresponding to the closest predecessor of Pc, which can provide this information. 
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Hence only one (the latest one) non-empty Status_Pool is needed by the next 
coordinator to construct START. 
5.10.2  Why (f+1)-START? 
This subsection highlights the need for (f+1) signatures to form (f+1)- STARTc+(c) and 
discusses why a doubly-signed STARTc+(c) is not sufficient. We first note the following 
two points. 
A. STARTc(k) message, when included in a STATUSi(c) message is highly relied upon 
by an eligible() coordinator during installation to cover all acknowledged but 
uncommitted ORDER messages by predecessor coordinators (as mentioned in 
subsection 5.10.1) 
B. Due to assumption 2A (subsection 4.1, chapter 4), Signalled state of an FS process 
is no longer a terminal state. A Byzantine faulty FS process with both constituent 
processes having failed, can plant a seemingly correct but actually corrupted doubly-
signed message (see subsection 3.6.2.3 in chapter 3). 
Say, eligible() = c- and Pc- is executing Install. Assume that phases III and IV 
of the Install protocol (see figure 5.1) responsible for collecting signatures and 
preparing (f+1)-STARTc-(k) are not executed and that phase V is instead used to commit 
the 2-signed STARTc-(k) prepared in phase II. Let us consider a situation when Pc- sends 
doubly signed STARTc-(k) while taking over as the coordinator, which is acknowledged 
by some acceptors. Furthermore, it fail-signals before STARTc-(k) could be committed at 
any correct process. Pc being eligible() starts installation process but fail-signals even 
before generating a STARTc(c-) message. As in A above, next eligible() process Pc+ will 
rely on STATUSi(c-) messages containing STARTc-(k) to construct a STARTc+(c-). As in 
B above, Pc- could have become Byzantine faulty and can produce plant for STARTc-(k) 
which can cause multiple conflicting STARTc-(k) messages or even a single planted 
STARTc-(k) to appear in Status_Pool(c-). Planted STARTc-(k), if considered by Pc+, may 
cause violation of major objective of Install i.e. Pc+ should not re-use any o of 
ORDER(o, r) issued by Pc′, c′ < c+, for any r′ ≠ r, if ORDER(o) could have become 
committed at some correct replica (subsection 5.3). To avoid this catastrophic situation, 
STARTc-(k) needs to be made fool-proof which can only be done by getting it signed by 
more than fc- processes.  Hence due to A and B above, specially to survive successive 
coordinator failures, having an (f+1)-START, becomes necessary. 
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5.10.3  Garbage collection of Status_Board 
We know that Status_Board is maintained by all acceptor processes containing a 
number of Status_Pools. We also note that a Status_Pool is solely used by an eligible() 
coordinator during construction of START message. As pointed out in subsection 5.10.1, 
for a process Pi ∉ Signalled, only one non-empty Status_Pool(j) is sufficient to 
complete this task, where j is the largest integer smaller than i for which Status_Pool(j) 
is non-empty. Hence Pi does not need to maintain any Status_Pool(k), k < j, in its 
Status_Board. 
Optimization Remark: It may be noted that since Status_Board is only used by 
potential coordinators, every process pi ∈ {π∪π′ \ {Π ∪ {pf+1}} } does not need to 
maintain a Status_Board at all. This is considered an optimization which results in 
another optimization to reduce number of message transmissions by making all acceptor 
processes to send STATUS messages only to potential coordinators.  
5.11 Performance Comparison 
This performance study follows from Study II of chapter 4. We use the same network 
setup and WAN Emulator to measure and compare the performance of Protocol-I and 
BFT when a failure occurs. This is to measure the time these two protocols take to 
switch from one configuration or view (for BFT) to the next. This comprises of the time 
during which no requests are being processed (ordered) by the system. We call this time 
Fail-Over Latency and describe it more formally for both protocols below. 
5.11.1 Defining Fail-Over Latency  
If we compare Install part of Protocol-I with that of BFT (in BFT it is actually called 
View-Change part, but we will refer to it as Install for simplicity), we find that the two 
are rather dissimilar for a comparative study. The way Install is triggered and the point 
when it is terminated i.e. when control is transferred back to Normal part is different for 
the two protocols. This difference makes it particularly difficult to come up with a 
single definition of Fail-Over Latency which could be easily applied to both protocols. 
We reproduce the two-phase diagram for Install part of BFT from chapter 2 along with 
the multi-phase diagram of Install part of Protocol-I in figure 5.6 below.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.6. Install part of the two protocols (a) BFT (b) Protocol-I 
Looking at the two diagrams (figure 5.6), one may draw analogies between 
BFT phase I and Protocol-I phase I, and also between BFT phase II and Protocol-I 
phase IV. But actually there exist the following subtle differences among them. 
Difference 1: Phase I of BFT is triggered at any process pi autonomously when a timer 
timeouts. This is when pi suspects its coordinator. Whereas in Protocol-I, it is triggered 
by the receipt of a fail-signal. Depending upon the timer and buffer values, suspicions 
by various processes can be far away from each other in time. But since a fail-signal is 
diffused into the system by a correct process, there exists a time frame during which 
every correct process would initiate this phase. That is, all correct ones may execute 
phase I of Protocol-I isochronously.  
Difference 2: End of phase II of BFT declares the new coordinator to be installed, 
which is not the case yet for phase IV of Protocol-I. Here, the new coordinator is 
considered installed only at the end of phase V. Comparing phase II of BFT with phase 
V of Protocol-I, ignoring the difference in the number of message transmissions, we 
find that although these two phases mark the end of installation process, post-
installation activities for both protocols are quite different. End of phase V in Protocol-I 
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marks the start of Normal part execution. For BFT although execution goes back to 
normal part and the system starts ordering new requests after phase II, but the 
processing of some older order messages coming from previous views is also continued. 
Hence depending upon the size of this backlog of old messages, BFT may not be able to 
perform as in normal case for some time. We refer this time as Pre-Normal Phase 
(depicted in fig 5.7). On the other hand in Protocol-I, Install part includes processing of 
this backlog and only fresh requests are dealt with once phase V ends. 
Due to these differences, it was found difficult to identify similar start and stop 
points for the measurements of Fail-Over latency of the two protocols. We therefore 
summarize the execution switch between the two parts for both protocols in a simplistic 
timeline format in figure 5.7 and formally define Fail-Over Latency in terms of 
precisely what events it includes.  
 
Figure 5.7. Timeline for events occurring during execution switch for the two 
protocols 
The time period labelled as Recovery in figure 5.7 defines the fail-Over latency 
and is measured at every process pi in the system. It can be defined as follows. 
Fail-Over latency for BFT: It is the time interval between the moment a process pi 
starts correctly suspecting current coordinator i.e. generates VIEW-CHANGE message 
and the instance it considers the new-coordinator as installed i.e. receives NEW-VIEW 
message. 
Fail-Over latency for Protocol-I: It is the time interval between the moment a process 
pi comes to know that current coordinator has failed i.e. it receives fail-signal and the 
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instance when it considers the new-coordinator as installed i.e. commits 
ORDER(start_o). 
Formally defining fail-Over latency for the two protocols does not completely 
solve the issue of trying to setup identical environment for the latency measurement of 
the two protocols. Next subsection investigates the effect of various other parameters 
choices on this measurement. 
5.11.2  Selecting parameter values  
The purpose was to keep the latency measurement environment as identical as possible 
for the two protocols. While designing the experiments following questions were 
addressed 
1. When should the fault be injected? 
A fault needed to be injected which can trigger transmission of fail-signal by the 
current coordinator in case of Protocol-I and transmission of VIEW-CHANGE 
message (suspicion) in BFT. The question arises that at what point should this be 
done. End of normal part execution for a request r i.e. commitment of ORDER(o, r) 
was an identical choice which marks the end of last phase of normal part for both 
protocols (see figure 4.5, chapter 4 for the three phase diagram). Selection of o was 
another issue. While the performance of Install part of Protocol-I is not effected by 
this selection, that of BFT may well be. This is because BFT includes all ORDER 
messages acknowledged since the latest stable checkpoint in VIEW-CHANGE 
message. For simplicity, let us assume that every checkpoint becomes stable 
immediately. This means that the bigger the difference between o and the last 
checkpoint number (the latest stable checkpoint) is, the bigger the size of the VIEW-
CHANGE message will be. However Protocol-I includes all ORDER messages 
acknowledged since the latest committed ORDER i.e. max_committed in STATUS 
message. Since commitment is not a process that runs periodically like check 
pointing in BFT, instead it runs continuously in parallel to the ordering process, 
Protocol-I is not affected by the selection of o. Hence to give benefit to BFT we 
choose o to be the same as a checkpoint number. This will essentially keep the log 
size in VIEW-CHANGE to minimum which can even be 0. For Protocol-I, fail-signal 
is generated as soon as ORDER(o) gets committed. For BFT, VIEW-CHANGE is 
generated as soon as CHECKPOINT(o) gets stable. 
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2. What batching_interval to choose? 
It was decided to test the two protocols in normal load situation. This is because 
heavy load pushes the system into saturation and time measurement of a one-off 
event in that situation cannot be fully trusted. Hence we choose batching_interval 
values from stable region only. 
5.11.3  Experiment Results 
This subsection presents fail-over latency values measured during various experimental 
setups. f takes values of 1 and 2 and both protocols were run for the two emulated WAN 
settings described in chapter 4. Experiment results are divided into three sets of readings 
corresponding to the measurements taken in three weeks. Every point in the graphs 
shown is an average over 5 readings. We first present the overall average of all three 
weeks to present the bigger picture, followed by individual readings from each set. 
Since these experiments could not be repeated hundreds of times as was done in Order 
latency measurements (chapter 4) due to long setup time involved, we also present the 
error index found in each set to give a complete picture.  
Table 5.1 shows the fail-over latency figures for both protocols with f = 1 using 
batching interval of 1500 msec. The readings are those measured at p4 (p3 for Protocol-I, 
see Table 4.0 for general identification scheme). The reason for choosing p4 is that no 
other process among all four has a neutral role of a non-coordinator process in both 
protocols. For BFT coordinator role switches from p1 to p2, hence p3 and p4 are the non-
coordinator processes participating in the execution. For Protocol-I, P1 (p1 and p′1) fail-
signals and p2 takes over as the new coordinator. Hence only p3, the last of the four 
processes, is the only non-coordinator normal process.  
Table 5.1 shows that Protocol-I performs better than BFT in both network 
configurations. This is due to the fact that since p2, the taking over coordinator in 
Protocol-I, is the last coordinator and a non-FS process, it skips phases IIA, III and IV 
of Install part (shown in figure5.6(b)). Phase IIA is only executed by an FS process and 
therefore cannot be executed by p2. Since all f failures have already occurred, START 
produced by p2 does not need to be secured by (f+1) signatures (as explained in 
subsection 5.6.3), hence the reason for skipping phase III and IV.  
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Fail-Over Latency (msec) for p4 Network 
Configuration Protocol-I BFT 
Fast WAN 201.3167 293.1333
Slow WAN 397.4833 1027.267
Table 5.1. Fail-over latency at p4 for both protocols with f = 1 using 
Batching_interval = 1500 msec 
Table 5.2 shows the fail-over latency figures for both protocols with f = 2 
measured for one of the stable batching intervals of the corresponding network 
configurations. The readings are those measured at p3 (p2 for Protocol-I) and p7 (p5 for 
Protocol-I). The reason for choosing these processes is the same as described in chapter 
4 i.e. to present figures for one of the paired and non-paired processes each. The results 
below clearly show that BFT outperforms Protocol-I. This is in accordance with the 
difference in the number of phases of communication executed in the two protocols as 
was shown in fig 5.6. However it is interesting to see that the performance gap 
decreases as a slower network configuration is tested. This is because when moving 
from a fast network configuration to a slower one, while all phases of communication 
presented in figure 5.6 for both protocols suffer high latency, phase IIA of Protocol-I 
remains same. Also latency in phase V of Protocol-I does not increase proportionally 
due to presence of faster links among the much slower ones. 
Fail-Over Latency (msec) 
p3 p7 
Network 
Configuration 
Batching 
Interval 
(msec) Protocol-I BFT Protocol-I BFT 
Fast WAN 1500 1264.5 284.0 1100.2 448.3 
Slow WAN 2500 2967.4 1243.3 2516.2 1979.3 
Table 5.2. Fail-over latency at p3 and p7 for both protocols with f = 2 using a 
stable Batching_interval 
We present the individual set readings of fail-Over latency with respect to their 
week numbers with same batching intervals (as above) in graphical form below (Fig 5.8 
to 5.10). These graphs also show the error index for each set.  
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(a) Fast (Inter-city) WAN 
 
(b) Slow (Inter-continental) WAN  
Figure 5.8. Fail-over latency at p4 with f = 1 using various network 
configurations 
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(a) Fast (Inter-city) WAN  
 
(b) Slow (Inter-continental) WAN  
Figure 5.9. Fail-over latency at p3 with f = 2 using various network 
configurations 
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(a) Fast (Inter-city) WAN 
 
(b) Slow (Inter-continental) WAN  
Figure 5.10. Fail-over latency at p7 with f = 2 using various network 
configurations 
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The following two graphs (Fig 5.11) show that when the experiment was 
repeated for more batching interval values in stable region, fail-over latency was found 
to remain stable. This extended set of readings was taken in week 4. 
 
(a) at p3 
 
(a) at p7 
Figure 5.11. Fail-over latency vs. Batching Intervals with f = 2 using Slow WAN 
at various processes 
5.11.4  Observations 
Results of the experimental study presented in above subsection quantify the 
performance gap between the two protocols due to difference in number of 
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communication phases (two for BFT and five for Protocol-I, see Fig 5.6). The 
observations can be summarized as follows. 
- BFT mostly outperforms Protocol-I considerably. 
- Protocol-I manages to reduce the performance gap in slower asynchronous 
network settings by making use of fast synchronous links. 
As explained in section 5.10, each step executed in Install part is significant. 
Hence it is clear that the performance gap between the two protocols cannot be 
improved by possibly reducing the number of phases of communication executed by 
Protocol-I in this part. We therefore try to optimize Install part of Protocol-I by reducing 
the constant overhead size of a crucial message (STATUS message) exchanged during 
its execution. In other words, we try to compensate the overhead caused by the 
increased number of message communication phases by reducing the size of the largest 
message exchanged. The optimized version of Install is called Install-II. The following 
section discusses the execution steps of Install-II in detail. 
5.12  Install-II – Optimized version of Install Part 
Before introducing Install-II steps, we describe a few minor changes in Normal part of 
the protocol that are needed to implement Install-II. They are as follows. 
1. commitable() that is defined in subsection 4.4.2 of chapter 4, is now redefined as 
follows: An ORDER(o) is said to be committed i.e. the predicate committable(o) is 
true at any pi if the following conditions are true 
1. ORDER(o) is accepted locally. 
2. ORDER(o′), o′≥o, is known to have been acknowledged by a quorum.  
  Note that local acknowledgment of ORDER(o) by pi is no longer a requirement 
for the commitment of ORDER(o); once condition 2 above is met, simple 
acceptance will suffice. Since max_committedi is the largest o committed by pi, 
every time an ORDER(o) is committed, it is set to maximum{o, max_committedi}. 
  We note that while Ai, the largest o for which pi has sent an ACK(o), increases 
only sequentially (due to the acknowledgment condition (iii) in subsection 4.4.2), 
since local acknowledgment of ORDER(o) by pi is no longer a requirement for the 
commitment of ORDER(o), max_committedi may not. For instance, if message 
transmission between the coordinator/client and pi is unduly slow, pi can receive 
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ACK(o) from Qc distinct replicas before it is able to acknowledge the ORDER(o) it 
had received.  Consequently, pi can have Ai < max_committedi.  
2. Every process pi multicasts its max_committedi in every ACKi(o) i.e., structure of 
ACKi(o) becomes 〈ACK, c, o, D(ORDER(o)), i, max_committedi〉. 
3. Every process pi additionally maintains a list called Commit_Boardi. 
Commit_Boardi is a list of the largest max_commitedj value received so far by pi in 
any ACKj(o) message from every process pj in the system. Let Commit_Boardi[j] 
represents the largest max_commitedj value received. Hence pi sets 
Commit_Boardi[j] to maximum{Commit_Boardi[j], max_commitedj} every time it 
receives an ACKj(o) message. 
As described earlier, Install-II aims to reduce the size of the largest message; in 
particular it avoids sending HistoryProof in the STATUSi(c) message. HistoryProof is a 
collection of Qc messages and is a constant overhead included in all STATUSj(c) 
messages. Since the construction of STARTc+(c) in Install relies on this proof, some 
extra computational steps need to be taken in Install-II to cope with the absence of 
information.  
Install-II has the same execution steps as Install and the protocol skeleton 
presented in figure 5.1 remains same. Changes are only needed in construction steps of 
STATUSi(c) and PRE-STARTc+(c). We describe these changes in the following 
subsections. We once again take the simple context of execution with Pc as current 
coordinator, Pj as the signalled FS process and Pc+ as the eligible() process.  
5.12.1  Construction of STATUSi(c) 
STATUSi(j) message is multicast by process pi in response to receiving a fail-signal 
from Pj, j ≥ c, where c is the rank of current coordinator. For j > c, STATUSi(j) prepared 
by pi is empty. Hence, for simplification we only consider j = c. However, one 
exceptional case is when c = -1 and Pj being eligible() started executing Install but fail-
signalled at least after completing first four phases. In this situation ORDERj(start_oj) 
multicasts by Pj, can get acknowledged by pi and hence, STATUSi(j) would include this 
order. We will generally refer to Pc as signalled coordinator but will mention Pj 
explicitly to indicate the above mentioned exceptional case, when required.  
pi first computes low water-mark, denoted as LWi. LWi is defined as the largest 
element in Commit_Boardi which is less than or equal to at least Qc elements.  
Claim 1: for a correct pi, LWi ≤ max_commitedj of at least (Qc – fc) correct pj.  
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Reason: There are at least Qc processes whose max_commited values are larger than or 
equal to LWi, of which at most fc will be faulty.  
LWi can be easily computed as: rank all nc values of Commit_Boardi in the non-
increasing order (largest value ranked first) and choose LWi to be the Qcth ranking value.  
pi then constructs STATUSi(c) message which contains  
a. Received fail-signal message: FSc,  
b. AckHistoryi: List of 〈ACKi(o), ORDERc(o)〉 pairs for every acknowledged 
ORDERc(o) in the range 
i. minimum{LWi, Ai}≤ o ≤ Ai, if c = 1, or  
ii. maximum{start_oc, minimum{LWi, Ai}} ≤ o ≤ Ai, if c ≠ 1  
c. Values of max_commitedi, Ai and LWi.  
Note1: b and c will be null when j > c. Furthermore, for the exceptional case mentioned 
above when c = -1 with eligible() = j and ORDERj(start_oj) is acknowledged by pi then 
AckHistoryi produced in response to FSj will be a singleton list containing 
〈ACKi(start_oj), ORDERj(start_oj)〉. 
Note2: In b(ii) above, both start_oc and minimum{LWi, Ai} will always be less than or 
equal to Ai. The latter is clearly true. For the former, the reason is given as follows. 
Firstly, by definition, AckHistoryi contains acknowledged ORDERs only. Since there is 
no pre-condition for acknowledgement of ORDERc(start_oc), if this ORDER is 
acknowledged, Ai would have been updated accordingly (See line I5.6 in figure 5.3) and 
Ai ≥ start_oc. However, if ORDERc(start_oc) is not acknowledged, the only reason can 
be the receipt of a fail-signal from Pc, in which case ORDERc(start_oc) would have 
already been discarded from the Order_Pool automatically. 
5.12.2  Construction of PRE-STARTc+(c) 
Let Pc+ be the eligible() FS process. Both pc+ and p′c+ prepare PRE-START 
independently as was done in Install. For the sake of simplicity, we will only describe it 
for pc+ here. pc+ computes the source number s as described in section 5.8. Let s = c and 
Status_Pool(c) be the non-empty pool containing STATUSi(c) messages from at least a 
quorum Qc. First step to construct PRE-STARTc+(c) is to compute CCmx and PCmx for 
TransferHistory, as defined in subsection 5.1.1, and then construct STARTc+(c) and the 
corresponding ProofBag. CCmx and PCmx are computed in the following way. 
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CCmx: The max_committed values received from distinct processes are ordered in the 
non-increasing (largest first) manner and CCmx is set to be the (fc+1)th value in the 
ordered list.  
Claim 2: ORDER(CCmx) is certainly committed by some correct process 
Reason: Since at most fc of the largest max_committed values can be from malicious 
processes, (fc+1)th value is guaranteed to be committed by some correct process. 
However, if pc+ receives ORDERc(start_oc) in any STATUSi(c) message and 
start_oc > CCmx then it sets CCmx = start_oc. This is to re-use already computed START 
message as highlighted in subsections 5.1.1 and 5.8. By definition, ORDERc(start_oc) 
corresponds to (f+1)-START, which contains TransferHistory. Since, TransferHistory is 
a list of ORDERs in [CCmx, PCmx], claim 2 will still hold. 
PCmx: The Ai values received from distinct processes are ordered in the non-decreasing 
manner (smallest first) and PCmx is set to be the Qcth value in the ordered list.  
Claim 3: Any ORDER(o), o > PCmx is certainly not committed by any correct process 
Reason: Since PCmx is the Qcth smallest Ai value, it is the highest Ai value among a 
quorum, say q1. Let us assume to the contrary that ORDER(o), o > PCmx, is committed 
by a correct process after receiving acknowledgements from quorum q2. Since quorums 
intersect, at least one correct process in q1 would have contributed to this commitment 
and will have Ai ≥ o. Hence, PCmx cannot be smaller than o as assumed. Thus, pc+ 
knows with certainty that no correct process could have committed any ORDER(o), o > 
PCmx, while it is taking over the coordinator role.  
Lemma 1: A correct coordinator-designate always has CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx. 
Proof: CCmx is the (fc+1)th ranked max_committed value from the top i.e. less than or 
equal to max_committed value of at least one correct process – ORDER(CCmx) is 
certainly committed by a correct process – certainly at least (Qc – fc) correct processes 
sent ACK(CCmx) – so, in any set of at least Qc STATUS messages, a correct pc+ will have 
at least one correct process pi whose Ai ≥ CCmx. If Ai is the largest of the smallest Qc A-
values, PCmx will be equal to Ai, otherwise PCmx ≥ Ai. Hence CCmx ≤PCmx. 
Algorithm executed by pc+ to construct STARTc+(c) message is given as 
Construct_Start(c) in figure 5.12. We use size_of(Status_Pool(c)) to denote the number 
of STATUS messages in Status_Pool(c).  
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Construct_Start(c) 
{ 
1.1 #S = Qc - 1; 
1.2 Repeat  
{ 
1.3 Wait for size_of(Status_pool(c)) > #S; 
1.4 #S = size_of(Status_pool(c)); 
1.5 } until STATUS_Set_found(c) = true; 
1.6 Repeat ∀ ORDER(o) ∈ Status_Pool(c), CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx 
// Construct TransferHistory and ProofBag 
{ 
1.7 Perform spuriousness check; 
1.8 Perform conflict resolution using all received STATUS messages 
in Status_Pool(c) 
} 
} 
STATUS_Set_found(c) 
{ 
2.1 Compute CCmx; 
2.2 Compute PCmx; 
2.3 if (∀ o: CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx, ∃ ORDER(o) ∈ Status_pool(c)) → 
2.4  return true; 
2.5 else return false; 
} 
Figure 5.12. START Construction Procedure 
pc+ starts its attempt to construct STARTc+(c) after receiving STATUSi(c) 
messages from a quorum only. If it cannot find some ORDER(o), CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx, it 
waits for more STATUSi(c) messages to arrive. Since values of CCmx and PCmx may 
vary with the arrival of new STATUSi(c) messages in Status_Pool(c), pc+ re-computes 
these bounds every time it attempts STARTc+(c) construction. Once pc+ finds the 
continuous stream of ORDER messages, it starts constructing TransferHistory and 
ProofBag. Proof for CCmx forms the Base of ProofBag. Note that pc+ and p′c+ are 
synchronized for the messages they receive (see ISIQ in figure 3.3, chapter 3). Hence, 
this proof can simply comprise of the process ids of the senders of the STATUS 
messages used for CCmx computation.  Algorithmic details behind lines 1.7 and 1.8 in 
figure 5.12 are the same as mentioned in subsection 5.7.1 i.e., pc+ adds every 
ORDER(o), CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx, in TransferHistory and corresponding proof in ProofBag. 
commit_count is also used to help construction of TransferHistory in the same way. 
Exchange of PRE-STARTc+(c) is followed by reconstruction of STARTc+(c) in 
the way described in subsection 5.7.2. 
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5.13  Correctness proof for Install-II 
This section presents the proof for Install-II that it satisfies the safety and 
liveness requirements.  
Background: At any moment, let the ordered list {Χr: 1 ≤ r ≤ R and (Qc - fc) ≤ R ≤ nc} 
denote the max_committed values of all correct processes arranged in the non-
increasing order (largest first). That is, Χr = max_committedi of some unique and correct 
pi and Χ1 ≥ Χ2 ≥ … ≥ ΧR.  
Claim 4: for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ (Qc - fc) and for any correct pi, LWi ≤ Χk.  
Reason: By claim 1, there are at least (Qc - fc) correct processes whose max_committed 
values are not smaller than LWi. The minimum of the max_committed values held by 
these correct processes must be no larger than Χ(Qc - fc). Therefore, LWi ≤ Χ(Qc - fc). That 
is, Χ1 ≥ Χ2 ≥ … ≥ Χ(Qc - fc) ≥ LWi. Since, Qc ≥ (2fc+1) and (Qc - fc) ≥ (fc+1). Hence, Χ(fc+1) 
≥ Χ(Qc - fc) ≥ LWi. 
Note that even if correct pi computes LWi using ‘stale’ values of 
max_committedj, claim 4 holds as max_committed values of correct processes, hence 
Χ1, Χ2, …, Χ(Qc - fc), cannot decrease with passage of time. 
Let Λωmx and Αmx respectively denote the largest of LW and A values used by 
correct processes when they prepared their STATUS messages. 
Lemma 2. Once a correct coordinator-designate pc+ receives STATUS messages from all 
correct processes, it is guaranteed to compute CCmx ≥ Λωmx and PCmx ≤ Amx.  
Proof: Since pc+ has max_committed values from all the correct processes, CCmx it 
computes will be one of Χ1, Χ2, …, Χ(fc+1), irrespective of the max_committed-values 
reported by the faulty ones i.e., CCmx cannot be smaller than Χ(fc+1), CCmx ≥ Χ(fc+1). By 
claim 4, LWi computed by any correct pi cannot be larger than Χk, 1 ≤ k ≤ (Qc - fc) i.e., 
Χk ≥ LWi or simply Χ(fc+1) ≥ LWi. Since Λωmx is computed by a correct process, Χ(fc+1) ≥ 
Λωmx and hence, CCmx ≥ Λωmx. 
PCmx is computed as the Qcth smallest A value in the Status_pool, there can be 
fc or more processes whose Ai ≥ PCmx. Even if all faulty ones report Ai larger than Αmx, 
PCmx cannot be larger than Αmx; so PCmx ≤ Αmx. 
Theorem 1 (Liveness): Once a correct coordinator-designate pc+ receives STATUS 
messages from all correct processes, it is guaranteed to have an ORDER(o) for every o, 
CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx. 
 
158 
 
Proof: By lemma 2, pc+ has Λωmx ≤ CCmx and PCmx ≤ Amx and by lemma 1, CCmx ≤ 
PCmx, which implies Λωmx ≤ CCmx ≤ PCmx ≤ Amx.   
Consider the correct process with A = Amx. By the definition of Λωmx, this 
process will have its LW ≤ Λωmx; but, Λωmx ≤ Amx = A; so, it will have minimum{LWi , 
Ai} = LW ≤ CCmx. Since Amx = A ≥ PCmx, this correct process will have in its STATUS 
message, a conflict-free or conflict-resolvable ORDER(o) for every o, CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx. 
Since pc+ has received STATUS messages from all correct processes, it has at least one 
ORDER(o) for every o, CCmx ≤ o ≤ PCmx. Hence the theorem is proved. 
Theorem 2 (Safety): When a correct coordinator-designate pc+ terminates STATUS 
message processing, none of the ORDERc(o, r) it selected for any o, CCmx ≤   o ≤ PCmx, 
will conflict with ORDERc(o, r′), r ≠ r′, committed by some correct process. 
Proof (by contradiction): Let us assume that ORDERc(o, r) conflicts with ORDERc(o, 
r′), r ≠ r′, committed by some correct process. Since both order messages are doubly-
signed and authentic, then both pc and p′c have failed and, by assumption IB, at least 2D 
time has elapsed subsequent to the first of these failures has been observed. Therefore if, 
ORDERc(o, r′), is committed by some correct process, then pc+ will already have 
received STATUS messages from at least all correct processes with at least (Qc - fc) of 
them having included ORDERc(o, r′), and only at most fc processes having included 
ORDERc(o, r). For pc+ to have selected the planted ORDERc(o, r), it must have ignored 
at least one of the (Qc - fc) received STATUS messages containing ORDERc(o, r′). But 
pc+ examines all STATUS messages received prior to termination for conflict resolution. 
Hence this is a contradiction and the assumption cannot be true. 
5.14  Install vs. Install-II 
In this section, we present a qualitative comparison of Install of section 5.4 and Install-
II. We highlight the major differences in the execution steps involved and study the 
costs and benefits of using Install-II over Install. We will refer to Install as Install-I for 
uniformity. Pc and Pc+ has the meaning of signalled and eligible() coordinator 
respectively, whereas pi (or suffix i for that matter) is used to represent any process in 
the system. 
Recall that HistoryProof and AckHistory in a STATUS message and 
TransferHistory in a START message are the main factors responsible for the large sizes 
of these messages in Install-I. Moreover, Install-II aims to reduce message size of 
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STATUS message by dropping HistoryProof. Hence, the following two benefits can be 
evidently gained by using Install-II in place of Install-I.  
(i) Size of STATUSi(c) message reduces by Qc ACK messages.  
(ii) Performance improves as time needed to sign STATUSi(c) message decreases for 
smaller size message. 
Depending on the size of individual ACK messages, the gain achieved by 
Install-II can be significant for higher values of Qc. However it is important to see if 
there is any cost behind these advantages.  
We analyse the effect of the optimization proposed in Install-II on the size of 
other components i.e., AckHistory and TransferHistory. We observe that the size of 
these lists is proportional to the extent to which the progress of Ai and max_committedi 
in any process pi is synchronized with that of any other process. For example, let us 
assume that pi is receiving all ORDER messages instantly and is able to acknowledge 
them straight away while network connection for the remaining processes is slow which 
results in delays in acknowledgements. Since pi cannot commit an ORDER(o) without 
receiving ACK(o) from at least a quorum, the difference (Ai – max_committedi) tends to 
be bigger. Hence, on receiving a fail-signal from Pc, pi will generate large AckHistoryi. 
Similarly, TransferHistory will also be respectively large. On the other hand, if 
processes are synchronized naturally due to symmetric network connections, these lists 
are more likely to be smaller in size. Observing the influence of network connectivity 
on the working of Install-I, we classify the network environment into two categories and 
compare the two algorithms with respect to these.  
Case A - Symmetric network conditions: This refers to the case where almost all 
processes are connected to each other via links of similar characteristics. Due to this 
homogenous nature, processes progress symmetrically and are naturally synchronized 
with respect to Ai and max_committedi values. 
Case B - Asymmetric network conditions: This is the case where network links 
between various processes are heterogeneous. Hence, Ai and max_committedi values of 
any process pi may be far apart from those of any other. 
Let us first analyse the behaviour of Install-I and -II in first system 
configuration. As mentioned in case A, Ai and max_committedi values of almost all 
processes will be quite close to each other, if not exactly same. For simplicity let us 
assume that these values are equal for all processes in the system. Obviously, for Install-
I, AckHistoryi produced by every process will be same with messages in the range 
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[max_committedi, Ai]. Largest of all max_committedi (and Ai) will be same as any 
max_committedi (and any Ai). This will lead to a TransferHistory containing messages 
in the range [max_committedi, Ai]. Install-II execution will also have the same effect. 
That is, since all max_committedi values are equal, LWi will be calculated to be same as 
max_committedi and hence, AckHistoryi and TransferHistory produced in Install-II will 
be same as that in Install-I. This shows that in a symmetric environment the two 
benefits listed for Install-II are simply retained. 
Case B represents heterogeneous links between processes, possibly causing 
gaps between the Ai and max_committedi values of various processes. For Install-I, the 
AckHistorys produced by various processes will include different number and range of 
messages within the respective max_committedi and Ai values. However, the lower 
bound on order number in AckHistoryi for Install-II is LWi rather than max_committedi.  
Recall that LWi is computed by pi as the Qcth highest max_committedj value received 
from every other process pj. Hence, at least (Qc - fc) correct processes will have LWi ≤ 
max_committedi and will produce larger AckHistoryi than produced in Install-I. 
TransferHistory produced in Install-I will comprise of messages starting from the 
largest max_committedi to the largest Ai found in a quorum. Whereas the same for 
Install-II will have messages from (fc+1)th largest max_committedi to the largest Ai 
found in a quorum. Hence, Install-II has a smaller lower bound for TransferHistory than 
Install-I which causes increase in the size of TransferHistory. This shows that Install-II 
achieves reduction of constant overhead size of HistoryProof by a possible increase in 
the size of AckHistory and TransferHistory when communication takes place in 
asymmetric environment. Moreover, lack of synchronization may leave Pc+ 
encountering holes in the first Qc AckHistorys received i.e., some of the messages in 
[CCmx, PCmx] may not be available. This will cause some delay as Pc+ waits to receive 
messages from more than a quorum to fill in the holes (see lines 1.3 and 1.5 in figure 
5.12). Hence, it can be concluded that Install-II may not necessarily be an optimal 
choice for highly heterogeneous environments.  
5.15  Summary 
This chapter presented the design and performance analysis of Install part of Protocol-I. 
Install part deals with the failures signalled by the coordinator FS process and transfers 
the system from current to next appropriate configuration with a new coordinator. The 
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main objective of Install is to help the eligible process to take over as the new 
coordinator in a safe and live manner.  
We discussed in detail how the Byzantine state of FS process causes 
complications in the design of Install. In summary, the signalled coordinator process 
can become Byzantine faulty and start producing undetectably corrupt double-signed 
ORDER messages. Moreover, other faulty processes in the system can collude to 
present the corrupted messages to the eligible coordinator as if the ORDERs were 
received and acknowledged before the previous coordinator fail-signalled. Install 
achieves its objectives by tackling such situations. Moreover, it is also designed to deal 
with the situation where the eligible process fails during the execution of Install.  
Description of the algorithm steps was followed by qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. Like Normal part, performance of Install of Protocol-I was compared against 
that of BFT. It was found that Install of Protocol-I incurs high latency as it involves five 
communication steps against two of BFT. Finally, we tried to optimize Install by 
reducing constant size overhead of one of the largest messages used. The optimized 
version, called Install-II, was also compared with Install. We found that Install-II 
succeeds in reducing the message size in symmetric network environments. However, 
asymmetric network environments may cause increment in other message components. 
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Chapter 6 
Protocol-II 
 
Protocol-II is a twin of Protocol-I in exploiting fail-signal facility to circumvent the FLP 
impossibility for solving consensus. The difference between the two protocols is the 
assumptions underlying the construction of FS processes. We take a new assumption set 
and design Protocol-II by carefully modifying Protocol-I to cater for the implications 
due to changes in assumptions.  
Recall that the construction of FS process is based on two core assumptions 
presented in chapter 3. Assumption 1 states that the exact bounds on absolute 
communication delays between, and relative processing speeds of, any two nodes 
implementing an FS process are known. Assumption 2 restricts number of failures 
within an FS process to one. These two assumptions are central to Protocol-0 design. 
However, the design of Protocol-I relaxes assumption 2 to form 2A which allows both 
processes to fail, subject to the condition that these failures are sufficiently apart in time. 
Assumption 1 is kept the same but renamed as 1A. In Protocol-II however, we keep 
assumption 2 same as in Protocol-0 and adopt a less restricted version of assumption 1 
instead.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We first describe the new underlying 
assumptions. Then we examine the effects of these assumptions on the behaviour of FS 
process and discuss the consequences on protocol design. Finally, we show how 
Protocol-II is derived from Protocol-I by presenting the modifications needed. 
6.1 Assumptions 
Recall that assumption 1 of an FS process (defined in subsection 3.2.1) is about the 
ability to accurately estimate a differential delay bound within which one constituent 
process that has produced an output can expect its counter-part to do the same, if the 
counter-part is also operating in a timely manner and an output is expected as per the 
order protocol. Assumption 1 states that this estimate of timing bound within the FS 
process pair is always accurate. Hence, suspicions triggered by timeouts are never false. 
However, Protocol-II adopts a less restricted version of this assumption and assumes 
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that an accurate estimate of this bound cannot be guaranteed to hold always but only 
eventually. This means that the constituent processes p and p′ can falsely suspect each 
other of untimely behaviour and generate fail-signal. Hence, fail-signal may not always 
be a true indication of occurrence of a fault. Possibility of these false indications are 
therefore admitted and dealt with in Protocol-II. We present the assumption set used in 
Protocol-II below. The relaxed assumption 1 is named as 1B and assumption 2 renamed 
as 2B (for consistency). 
IB. There is a timing instance after which the timeouts used for mutual timeliness 
checks by order processes pi and p′i implementing FS process Pi will always be 
correct. This timing instance cannot be known a priori.    
2B. At least one of the ordering processes pi and p′i does not fail.  
Note that assumption 1B is weaker than assumption 1A (or 1): the latter 
assumes the unknown timing instance to be the system initialisation time; assumption 
2B, on the other hand, is evidently stronger than 2A.  
We start by considering the implications of the new assumption set on FS 
process behaviour and then on Protocol-I. 
6.2 Implications of the New Assumption Set 
6.2.1 Status of an FS Process 
Recall that a constituent process of an FS process generates a fail-signal on detecting a 
value- or time-domain fault in its counterpart. The first implication of the new 
assumption set (due to 1B) is that constituent processes pi and p′i may find each other 
untimely even if both are non-faulty. However, we note that a process in this situation 
cannot disambiguate whether the counter-part is suffering a failure or the delay estimate 
turns out to be temporarily inaccurate. Thus, for safety reasons, it must assume the 
former and generate a fail-signal. Hence, both temporary inaccuracy in timeout 
estimation and occurrence of fault constitute the causes of fail-signal generation. 
Obviously, at this point the fail-signalled FS process cannot act as the coordinator; in 
other words, the constituent processes cannot work in active mode but must revert to 
passive mode and continue their mutual-checking. If they find each other timely again at 
a later stage then they can work in active mode again when needed. Therefore, if a fail-
signal is generated due to an apparent time-domain failure, the signalled process should 
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be allowed to act as coordinator if and when the constituent processes subsequently find 
each other timely .  
This implication is captured by the constituent processes pi and p′i of an FS 
process Pi maintaining a status variable statusi which indicates the current operative 
status of Pi and can take values up, down or temporarily_down. statusi is irreversibly set 
to down when a constituent process of Pi observes a value domain failure of its 
counterpart. 
6.2.2 Change in Acceptors 
Recalling the configurations and Acceptors defined for Protocol-I, we note that the 
signalled coordinator FS process is considered to have failed and is therefore not an 
acceptor for the next configuration. That is, when Pi fail-signals in Σi, system moves 
from Σi to Σi′ , i′ > i and Pi ∉ Acceptorsi′. With assumption 1B, a fail-signal cannot be 
attributed to a true failure. Hence, in the above scenario, Pi may be a process with both 
correct constituent processes, temporarily finding each other untimely. If this is the 
case, removal of Pi from Acceptorsi′ will violate the definition of Acceptors. This is 
because removal of an FS process in Protocol-I guaranteed removal of at least one 
faulty process from the Acceptors set which is no longer true for Protocol-II. Hence, the 
definition of fi = f – (i-1) and Qi will also not be applicable. Moreover, in the worst case, 
this elimination can result in exclusion of all correct processes leaving behind f faulty 
processes and 1 correct non-FS process in the system which violates safety. Therefore, 
in Protocol-II, Pi must be allowed to participate in order assignment as an acceptor 
(working in passive mode) even after fail-signalling. This implication leads to a change 
in the definition of Acceptorsi, which is elaborated in a subsequent section. 
6.2.3 Number of FS processes 
The third implication (due again to assumption 1B) is that since every fail-signal may 
not be indicating a true failure, it can no longer be ascertained that f failures have 
occurred once f distinct FS processes have fail-signalled. Therefore, if we choose an 
unpaired process as the (f+1)th coordinator, it cannot be expected to be non-faulty. So, 
no unpaired process should be trusted for the coordinator role simply because f FS 
processes have fail-signalled. So, only an FS process can act as the coordinator and the 
system now requires (at least) (f+1) process-pairs. We add another shadow process p′f+1 
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to be paired with pf+1 to form FS process Pf+1. Hence, the system architecture becomes 
like that of Protocol-0 with the total number of processes n = 3f+2 and only paired 
processes being allowed to act as coordinators.  
Note that having (f+1) FS processes does not mean that all (f+1) FS processes 
cannot fail-signal at the same time. This situation, if it happens, cannot prevail forever. 
There will be at least one FS process in which both constituent processes are non-faulty 
and see each other timely starting from some unknown time. So, there is an FS process 
whose operative status will eventually be always up. That is, eventually at least one 
‘perfect’ FS process will emerge, where a perfect FS process is an FS process whose 
constituent processes are non-faulty and the timing estimates used within it are greater 
than or equal to the actual delays. The problem is to enable such a perfect process to 
become the coordinator when it emerges. Note also that in the worst case scenario, there 
may be only one perfect FS process and until that perfect FS process emerges and 
becomes the coordinator, no ordering will take place and the system remains in an 
unstable state.  
6.2.4 Impact on Install 
The last implication is due to assumption 2B. Since at most one constituent process of 
an FS process can fail, the FS process of Protocol-II reverts back to the 3-state model 
used in Protocol-0 (see figure 3.1). This means that the Byzantine state of an FS process 
no longer exists. Hence, the signalled coordinator cannot become Byzantine faulty and 
start producing planted ORDER messages which Protocol II does not have to deal with.  
This implication results in a modest simplification of the most complex part of 
the Protocol-I i.e., the Install part.  The  resulting simplifications are two-fold; 
construction of START and reduction in number of communication phases of Install. 
Recall that the construction process of START message is the major source of 
complication which is due to its handling spurious and conflicting plants. This process 
is much simplified in Protocol-II as such planted messages cannot exist due to 
assumption 2B. However, unlike Protocol-0 and like Protocol-I, Protocol-II is designed 
to cater for the inconsistent failing state of an FS process. This is achieved by keeping 
the basic protocol operation same as Protocol-I with passive FS processes and unpaired 
processes participating as non-coordinators in quorums. 
Secondly, the absence of Byzantine state makes phases III and IV of Install of 
Protocol-I redundant for Protocol-II (see figure 5.1). Recall that these phases deal with 
 
166 
 
collection of (f+1) signatures and construction of (f+1)-START. The purpose of these 
phases was to make START an incorruptible message. In Protocol-II we assume that one 
of the constituent processes in an FS process always remain correct. Hence, a double-
signed message is incorruptible. Hence, Install of Protocol-II reduces to three phases of 
communications, illustrated in figure 6.1, where last phase is for commitment of 
ORDER(start_o) that encapsulates the double-signed START instead of (f+1)-START. 
 
Figure 6.1. Three Communication Phases of Install for Protocol-II 
6.3 System Architecture 
The system architecture is similar to the one used in Protocol-0, as shown in figure 6.2. 
The system consists of (2f+1) nodes each of which, as before, hosts service process si 
and order process pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ (2f+1). Additional (f+1) shadow nodes are added in the 
system. Each shadow node N′i hosts shadow process p′i and is paired with pi to form FS 
process Pi executing Protocol-II. As before, process sets are defined as follows.  
Π  = Set of all FS Processes = {P1, P2, …, Pf+1} 
π  = Set of all order processes co-located with service processes = {p1, p2, …, p2f+1}; 
π′ = Set of all shadow order processes (not co-located with service processes)  
= {p′1, p′2, …, p′f+1}. 
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Figure 6.2. System Architecture  
6.4 Protocol Design 
Protocol-II only allows FS processes to play the coordinator role. Among all (f+1) FS 
processes, only the coordinator FS process works in active mode with remaining acting 
as passive FS processes. Like Protocol-I, all order processes including the unpaired ones 
participate in order assignment. As in previous protocols, the protocol is structured into 
two parts: Normal and Install. 
At system start, P1 is assigned the coordinator role. Normal part is executed by 
all processes to assign order numbers to clients’ requests. Normal part remains exactly 
the same as Protocol-I (explained in subsection 4.4.2).  
When P1 fail-signals, execution at each process is switched to Install. Install 
part will attempt to install P2 as the new coordinator. This may result in either of the 
following two scenarios.  
(i) P2 is installed as the new coordinator and Normal part execution resumes. 
(ii) P2 cannot be installed as it is down or temporarily down. In either case, 
installation attempt will be made for P3. 
Given assumption 1B, the possibility of finding all successive FS processes, P2, 
…, Pf+1, to be down or temporarily down cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the attempt to 
install an FS process as coordinator must cycle back to P1 underpinned by rational that a 
perfect FS process must emerge eventually. In the worst case, if all f FS processes have 
a faulty constituent process, this search for coordinator will continue until the only 
perfect FS process in the system emerges and is installed. This may take several cycles. 
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With the assumption about eventual accuracy of timing bounds, the perfect FS process 
will eventually stabilize with always up status and the cyclic attempt at Installation will 
end.  
Thus, under Protocol-II, the system can be regarded to be moving through a 
series of potential configurations. The ith configuration Σi, i ≥ 1, refers to the system 
configuration with FS process Pc acting as the coordinator for the kth time, k ≥ 1. Note 
that the configuration number i is no longer the same as the rank c of the FS process 
playing the coordinator role – reflecting the possibility of an FS process Pc that once 
relinquished the coordinator role can again take it up in a later cycle if statusc changes 
from temporarily down to up meanwhile. The relation between i and c  is given by c = 
[(i-1) mod (f+1)] + 1, i ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ c ≤ (f+1). Hence, Σi can be expressed as follows.  
Σi = { p1, p′1, … pc-1, p′c-1, Pc, pc+1, p′c+1, … pf+1, p′f+1, pf+2, …, p2f+1} 
Note that unlike Protocol-I, the number of configurations that the system can 
go through is no longer limited to (f+1) but can be finitely large. That is, system will 
move from Σf+1 to Σf+2, from Σ2f+2 to Σ2f+3 and so on. Moreover, configurations Σc, 
Σc+(f+1), Σc+2(f+1) etc., are identical with Pc acting as coordinator. For example, if f = 4, P5 
will be acting as the coordinator in Σ5, Σ10, Σ15 and so on. Also, if Pi becomes 
(permanently) down before entering into Σi+k(f+1), k ≥ 0, then attempts to realise Σi+k′(f+1), 
k′ ≥ k, will not be successful. That is, if P5 changes its status to down before entering 
Σ10, configurations Σ10, Σ15, Σ20,…etc., will be absent in that protocol run. 
Now we revisit the definition of other configuration parameters. Due to 
assumption 1B, FS process can oscillate between up and temporarily_down status 
during unstable periods. As perfect FS process cannot be identified, signalled processes 
should not be eliminated from Acceptors (as noted in subsection 6.2.2). Recall that in 
Protocol-I, only the FS process Pc′ that succeed the coordinator Process Pc in rank is 
allowed to participate as acceptor i.e., only for c′ > c. In protocol-II however, the FS 
processes that precede the coordinator in the rank order can later become a coordinator 
and therefore must be retained as acceptors. So, we define Acceptorsi to consist all 
processes in the system. Acceptorsi simply becomes  Σi and hence, |Acceptorsi| = (3f+2), 
i ≥ 1. This redefines other configuration parameters as follows: 
ni = |Acceptorsi| = (3f+2) = n 
fi = f 
Qi =  ⎣ ( ni + fi ) / 2 ⎦ + 1 = (2f+2) 
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The core concern for design of Install for Protocol-II is to ensure that every 
process pi safely moves from Σi, i ≥ 1, to some appropriate Σi′, i′ ≥ i+1. Fortunately, 
Install part of Protocol-I is sufficient to guarantee this with a few changes as explained 
below. These changes are basically needed to incorporate the cyclic search of 
coordinator and the new relation between a configuration number and the number of the 
FS process acting as coordinator in that configuration. 
6.4.1 Definition of eligible() 
Pc is said to be eligible to act as the coordinator in Σi if c = [(i-1) mod (f+1)] + 1 and if 
FS processes eligible to act as coordinators for all Σg, 1 ≤ g ≤ i-1, have indicated their 
unwillingness to act or to continue acting as the coordinator for their respective 
configurations. Next subsection describes how an eligible FS process can show its 
unwillingness to act as coordinator for a particular configuration. 
6.4.2 Showing unwillingness for a configuration  
We first note that in Protocol-0 and Protocol-I, fail-signal is a sure indication of a 
failure and the signalled FS process is considered as failed once and for all. Due to 
assumption 1B, this concept is no longer valid for Protocol-II. Hence fail-signal is not 
taken as a permanent failure here but just as unwillingness to accept coordinator-ship 
for a particular configuration. Secondly, we require a mechanism by which an eligible 
FS process can signal its unwillingness to act as the coordinator. This is achieved by 
tagging the fail-signal with the configuration number.  
A fail-signal multicast by pi for configuration Σj is denoted by FSi(j), where Σj 
is one of the designated configurations for which Pi is eligible to act as coordinator. It is 
assumed here that such fail-signal messages tagged with specific configuration numbers 
can be autonomously generated by a correct eligible process. 
We note that FSi(j) cannot just be multicast at anytime an internal fault is 
detected because the fault may be temporary and Pi may become up again before the 
system is ready to enter into Σj. Therefore, FSi(j) is prepared and multicast at following 
two occasions. 
1. Pi is already working as coordinator in Σj and detects an internal time- or value-
domain fault. 
2. statusi = down or temporarily_down and eligible() = i. 
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In the first case, pi detects a failure while working as coordinator in Σj and 
multicasts fail-signal to show unwillingness to continue playing the coordinator role. 
statusi is updated to down or temporarily_down according to the detected fault being 
value - or time-domain respectively. Second case is when pi is down but finds itself 
eligible for next configuration due to unwillingness of all preceding coordinators (see 
eligible definition in subsection 6.4.1 above). Hence, it shows its unwillingness to take 
over as the new coordinator by multicasting fail-signal.  
6.4.3 Fail-Signal FSi(j) 
Recall that a fail-signal is generated by a constituent process without consultation with 
its counterpart. Moreover, every constituent process, say pi, is provided with a fail-
signal message singly signed by its counterpart p′i at the time of system initialization. 
For Protocol-II, we assume the provision of multiple such singly-signed fail-signal 
messages each tagged with a configuration number j, for all configurations that Pi will 
be coordinating i.e., j = i + k(f+1), k ≥ 0. Hence, these single-signed messages are 
double-signed and multicast by a constituent process when the need arises.  
Of course, the number of configurations that pi will cycle through before 
getting stabilized at one cannot be known at system start. Hence, provision of an infinite 
number of single-signed fail-signal messages to pi is not possible in practice. Hence, 
FSi(j) is redefined to have the following two fields. 
1. Double-signed FSi – This is the same as has been used for Protocol-0 and -I. 
2. Unwilling(j) – This is an integer that holds the value of the configuration number j 
for which pi does not want to play coordinator role. 
Thus, only a single-signed fail-signal needs to be provided to pi as before. 
When pi needs to show its unwillingness to become or continue to act as coordinator for 
Σj, it double signs the fail-signal message to form double-signed FSi. pi then prepares 
FSi(j) to include FSi and Unwilling(j), signs it and multicasts to all processes.    
Optimization Remark: In case of detection of a value-domain fault, pi irreversibly 
changes statusi to down and hence will never play coordinator role for any successive 
configuration. pi indicates this permanent failure by using a boolean variable perm. 
perm is set to true and is added as a special field in FSi(j). This special FSi(j) is 
multicast as soon as statusi is changed to down. j corresponds to the current 
configuration number if Pi was working as the coordinator at the time of detection, 
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otherwise it is the number of the next configuration for which Pi was supposed to be the 
coordinator. Any process receiving this special FSi(j) message, considers pi to have 
failed permanently and hence will not wait for any further fail-signal messages from pi 
to show unwillingness for any successive configuration. Pi keeps working as a passive 
FS process but will neither act as a coordinator nor will send any more fail-signal 
messages. 
6.4.4 Other minor changes 
1. STATUSi(j) 
Every process pk prepares a STATUSk(j) for every FSi(j) and multicasts to all. 
STATUSk(j) is prepared as in Protocol-I except that here j refers to a configuration 
number and not the coordinator FS process number. Hence, STATUSk(j) will contain 
messages that were sent in Σj, if any. Otherwise an empty STATUSk(j) is sent. 
2. Source Number s 
Say Pi is the eligible FS process with statusi = up. It prepares STARTi by identifying 
source number s and using the corresponding Status_Pool(s). However, as for j in 
STATUSi(j) above, s corresponds to the latest realized configuration number now. 
Recall that s was sent in START message so that all processes can use Qs and 
Acceptorss to commit ORDERi(start_oi). Since now Qs and Acceptorss are constants, 
START no longer needs to carry the source number. Recall that no conflict 
resolution or spuriousness check is needed and hence, construction of START 
becomes very simple. 
3. Signalledi 
Recall that Signalledi contains fail-signal messages of all FS processes. This set is 
multicast as a part of STARTi to prove failure of all predecessor coordinators of Pi 
and to justify Pi’s attempt to install as new coordinator. The equivalent in Protocol-
II is to send fail-signal messages corresponding to at least (f+1) preceding 
configurations. This will cover each coordinator’s unwillingness for at least one 
preceding configuration and will be sufficient to justify Pi’s attempt. If Pi is 
attempting to install as coordinator of Σj, where j = [i + l(f+1)], l ≥ 0 then Signalledi 
will consist of fail-signal messages for configurations from min{1, i + (l-1)(f+1)} to 
[(i-1) + l(f+1)]. If a fail-signal for a configuration in this range is not received by Pi, 
this will be due to the corresponding coordinator being permanently down. Pi uses 
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the special fail-signal message sent by that process with perm = true as evidence 
(see optimization remark in subsection 6.4.3). 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter presented Protocol-II designed with different underlying assumptions than 
the earlier protocols presented in this thesis. Protocol-II shares the basic structure with 
Protocol-I and hence can be considered its twin. The new assumption set consists of a 
less restricted timing requirement but a stronger failure pattern assumption as compared 
to Protocol-I. That is, it allows the timing estimates to be inaccurate but only to hold 
eventually. Moreover, it only allows at most one failure within FS process.   
It was shown that the two assumptions lead to two major changes. Firstly, since 
timing estimates can be inaccurate, fail-signal is no longer a sure indication of fault. 
Hence, although ineligible to play the role of coordinator, signalled process is allowed 
to participate as acceptor. This gives new meaning to fail-signal, which is now 
generated to show unwillingness for coordinator-ship of a given configuration and not 
to signal failure. Also, system needs to expand to have (f+1) FS processes now to let 
only the FS processes play the role of coordinator. The coordinator search may go in 
cycles through all (f+1) FS processes and in the worst case, all of them may be 
temporarily down at the same time.  
Secondly, due to the presence of at least one correct process in FS process, FS 
process behaviour is represented with the original 3-state model without Byzantine 
state. This simplifies Install part of the protocol in two ways; first is that no spurious or 
conflicting plants need to be identified as signalled coordinator can never become 
Byzantine faulty and secondly number of phases of communication is reduced.  
The new protocol design is presented in terms of amendments that need to be 
done in Protocol-I to adapt to the new assumptions. This mainly includes redefining 
configurations and Acceptors sets and dealing with the effects of these changes. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This thesis introduced a new class of Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols that optimally 
use fail-signal processes to circumvent the FLP impossibility. It studied the design and 
analysis of three total-order protocols. Each of these protocols caters for different sets of 
assumptions that can possibly be made in the construction of fail-signal process. The 
three sets of assumptions cover a range of system contexts from near ideal to solely 
practical ones. The performance of one of the proposed protocols was extensively 
examined and compared against a canonical protocol in various network settings. The 
study gave encouraging results. This chapter summarizes the work presented in this 
thesis and presents some directions for future work. 
7.1 Summary 
The FLP impossibility needs to be circumvented for achieving a correct total order. This 
is typically done by using randomization or making weak synchrony assumptions. 
Randomized protocols [Ben83, EMR01, KS01] guarantee liveness in probabilistic terms 
to be a certainty with the passage of time. Every replica randomly chooses its estimate 
of the decided value from a set of initially proposed values. The protocol strives to get 
estimates of all replicas to converge to a single decision value.  
Protocols of the second category make some assumptions about the bounds on 
communication delays between, and relative processing speeds of, replicas in the 
system. These can be further divided into two groups. First is a partitionable approach 
[BDM97, BBD97, ADK+92, EMS95] which assumes that estimates of these bounds are 
rarely violated. Replicas suspect other replicas to be failed when the associated bounds 
are violated. The suspecting replicas then reach agreement to exclude the suspected 
replicas from the group. Thus, when the bounds are violated, this approach can lead to 
formation of multiple groups or partitions each consisting of correct replicas that do not 
mutually suspect each other and do suspect all others. (Hence the term  partitionable.)  
The second is the non-partitionable approach [Lam98, CT96, CL99, DFK+96, 
KMM97], which allows violations of bounds but assumes that these will eventually 
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hold and also a pre-determined bound on the number of failures which is never violated. 
These two assumptions together eliminate the need to exclude the suspected ones. Most 
of the protocols in this class tend to be coordinator-based with one replica acting as the 
coordinator at a given time. The coordinator is empowered to enforce its decision on 
others. This has two performance implications: communication tends to 1-to-n or n-to-1, 
rather than n-to-n. Secondly, the failure monitoring is focused only on the coordinator; 
if the coordinator remains unsuspected, ordering is swift and the part of the protocol 
activated here is termed an the Normal part. If, on the other hand, the coordinator is 
suspected, replicas choose another peer as the coordinator often according to a pre-
determined ranking of replicas. This change-over is the most expensive part of the 
protocol opearions which we refer to as the Install part. It is guaranteed to lead to 
Normal part, once the bound estimates used hold and false suspicions cease.   
The protocols presented in this thesis belong to the non-partitionable class but 
use a different approach to circumvent FLP impossibility which essentially disallows 
false suspicions of coordinators. This approach involves using redundancy to construct 
a special process, called the fail-signal (FS) process, to perform the coordinator role. 
This FS process signals on failure and the failure characteristics are otherwise the same 
as that of a benign crash. That is, when FS process detects an internal fault, it stops 
working after signalling its stopping. Since the failures are no longer quiescent, FLP 
result ceases to apply. This approach is not new and has been explored by [MES03]. 
[MES03] replaced every process of a partitionable group communication protocol 
named Newtop by an FS process. The new system was called FS-Newtop.  Since fail-
signal is a sure indication of failure, no false suspicions exist and correct processes 
exclude from the group only the processes that have signaled. This prevents system 
from splitting into virtual partitions. However, FS-Newtop needs more than optimal 
number of replicas. 
A significant benefit of using FS process abstraction for a total-order protocol 
design is that the solution does not have to rely on any synchrony assumption for either 
liveness or safety. However, synchrony assumptions are made for construction of FS 
process; otherwise a solution would not be possible [FLP85]. Thus, this approach limits 
the scope of synchrony assumption to (FS) process-level and not across system-level. 
Moreover, it transforms the Byzantine behaviour of constituent processes into crash of 
the FS process. But these benefits come at a cost which is in the form of restriction of 
the location of simultaneous faults. That is, the constituent processes of an FS process 
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cannot fail simultaneously. The aim of this thesis is to exploit fail-signal abstraction to 
the fullest extent and design Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols that are optimal in 
redundancy requirement and demonstrably efficient. In this thesis, we assume that a 
process pair constitutes an FS process. 
We began by presenting the construction and characteristics of FS processes in 
chapter 3 in detail. An FS process was shown to be in one of three states: Working, 
Signalled and Failing. It was also shown that an FS process can exhibit two-facing 
behaviour in failing state which becomes problematic in the protocol design. The two 
core assumptions used in the construction of FS process are (1) bounds on 
communication and processing delays are known and (2) at most one constituent 
process can fail. Chapter 3 introduced a rudimentary Byzantine fault-tolerant total-order 
protocol named Protocol-0 which demonstrated the use of FS process while assuming 
that the failing state is never encountered. Finally, we analysed the effects of including 
failing state in the solution and proposed some modifications to handle these effects. 
Chapter 4 extended the design of Protocol-0 and proposed an advanced 
protocol, Protocol-I. Protocol-I uses a collection of FS and non-FS processes and thus 
involves a major step forward over the earlier work of [MES03]. It also defines two 
mode of operation for FS process; Active and Passive. Moreover, it relaxes assumption 
2 used in Protocol-0 to allow both constituent processes to fail as long as the failures are 
sufficiently apart in time. This adds the fourth state named Byzantine state to the FS 
process model. Protocol-I has two parts. Chapter 4 focussed on Normal part which is 
executed so long as the coordinator has not fail-signalled. We also presented a 
comprehensive performance study to evaluate the practicality of Protocol-I. BFT 
[CL99], a protocol well-known for its best performance in normal situations was used 
for comparison purposes. The experiments were performed in LAN and emulated WAN 
configurations with changing parameters like size of the system and cryptography 
techniques. The experiment results showed that Protocol-I outperforms BFT in all runs 
and the performance gap is more pronounced in slower WAN configurations. 
Chapter 5 described the Install part of Protocol-I. Install part deals with all 
complications due to arbitrary behaviour of FS as well as non-FS processes in 
Byzantine state. It was shown that Install of Protocol-I involves more communication 
phases than that of BFT. This is the cost paid by Protocol-I for achieving high 
performance in Normal part. Performance study for Install showed higher latency trends 
of Protocol-I against BFT. However, the gap was found to be smaller for small number 
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of replicas and fast WAN configuration. Moreover, in attempt to reduce constant size 
overhead of a large message of Install, an optimized version, named Install-II, was 
proposed with correctness proof and critical analysis. Install-II was deemed to be useful 
in symmetric network environments.  
Finally, Chapter 6 completed the family of protocols by presenting Protocol-II. 
Protocol-II relaxes the synchrony assumption used in the first two protocols and allows 
the estimates of timing bounds to be inaccurate. However, like most of other non-
partitionable system protocols, for liveness guarantees, used timeouts are assumed to 
hold eventually. Protocol-II retains the failure assumption used in Protocol-0. We have 
described Protocol-II as a variant of Protocol-I by discussing only changes needed to 
deal with the effects of new assumptions. 
7.2 Conclusions 
We have developed a family of Byzantine fault-tolerant order protocols by carefully 
applying a technique long-known for building robust process abstractions [SS83]. These 
abstract processes, called fail-signal processes, only crash and signal their failure before 
crashing. Consequently, not only the order latency and the message overhead fall but 
also the protocol becomes easier to implement and no synchrony assumptions need to 
be made among the (un-paired) processes that do not have to cooperate to build the fail-
signal abstraction. These benefits come at a cost: constituent processes cannot fail 
simultaneously. We meet this requirement by assuming that if both constituent 
processes fail, the failure occurrences are separated by a threshold interval (assumption 
2A in Protocol-I) or that at least one process never fails (assumption 2 in Protocol-0 and 
2B in Protocol-II). Results from performance study of Protocol-I showed that Normal 
part of Protocol-I performs better than BFT, whereas Install part is outperformed. 
However, since failures are assumed to be a rare event, the cost is not considered very 
high.  
7.3 Future Work 
It is known that public key cryptography is the major contributor to high latencies of 
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols. Researchers have found a way around this by 
replacing it with more efficient symmetric encryption schemes, particularly Message 
Authentication Codes (MACs). However, this replacement is not very straightforward. 
 
177 
 
This is majorly because of the inability of MACs to authenticate the sender of the 
encrypted message by a third party. This will specifically affect Install part of our 
protocols, say Protocol-I, where proof_of_commitment in STATUS and (f+1) signatures 
in (f+1)-START are used to authenticate the corresponding signed messages. However, 
MACs can be adopted by carefully changing the authentication mechanism in the 
protocol at the expense of communication of extra messages as shown by [CL00]. 
Hence, it would be interesting to see the performance improvement in the proposed 
protocols after adapting to MACs and to compare it with the MAC version of BFT 
[CL00].  
Both assumption 2A and 2B (or 2) rule out both the constituent nodes of an FS 
node to fail simultaneously, say, due to the same underlying cause e.g., a failure of 
common power supply or a natural disaster when both nodes are housed at the same 
location. They require exercising measures to ensure failure independence between the 
nodes and in particular eliminating any possible common failure modes through means 
such as diversity of node hardware and operating systems and housing the nodes at 
distinct locations. In this thesis, we assume that fail-independence can be sufficiently 
assured to make assumption 2A realistic in practice. However, we would like to conduct 
some research on the average width of window of vulnerability (2D time) and the time 
it takes to compromise a node. This will also include study on various defense 
mechanisms that can be utilized to prevent early compromise/failure of a constituent 
node. Moreover, we note that assumption 2B is a stronger assumption since it expects at 
least one node to remain non-faulty throughout the mission time. The larger is the latter, 
the less likely that it will hold. For longer operative periods, we require that the FS 
process be built using more than two processes when 2B is assumed; more precisely, 
each of the selected replica nodes to form FS node (see Figure 1.1) needs to be 
supplemented with φ, φ > 1, shadow nodes and at most φ nodes can fail in a given FS 
node. 
IT infrastructures have increasingly been targeted by malicious attacks and 
intrusions. To keep the maximum number of failures to the assumed bounded value 
during the life time of the system i.e. f-out of-n in the system and φ out of (φ+1) in an 
FS process, replicas should be allowed to participate after recovering from faults. In our 
proposed protocols this extension in the form of recovery can be both at system level 
and FS process level. That is, the signaled FS processes to be included back in the 
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system and faulty constituent processes back in the FS process after they have been 
repaired. This allowance will need several issues to be considered. For example, 
inclusion of the repaired processes should be viewed consistently by all processes in the 
system, the state of the repaired processes should be updated to the latest, new public 
keys of the repaired processes should be made known to all, some mechanism needs to 
be added to authenticate earlier messages signed by these processes before occurrence 
of failures but yet an adversary should not be allowed to send malicious messages as if 
they were sent earlier by exploiting old (leaked) public key etc. 
After measuring the performance of the proposed protocol in failure-free and 
crash-like failure situations, we would like to see the effect on performance in various 
scenarios with faulty processes exhibiting arbitrary behaviour. This may effect the size 
of messages exchanged in Install/View-Change part and can also result in frequent 
suspicions in BFT. Moreover, we would like to see to what extent damage can be 
caused by violation of assumption 2A (2D time assumption), quantifying which is not 
trivial. Also, after experimenting in controlled environment, it would be interesting to 
see if the comparative figures are retained in real networks like PlanetLab [WWW1]. 
As highlighted earlier, the protocols presented in this thesis do not rely on any 
synchrony assumption for liveness on system-level. Hence, the performance is solely 
dependent on actual network conditions and true failures. This feature makes these 
algorithms ideal to be used to implement an e-service. This service can be used by 
various distributed applications needing to reach consensus on some action during their 
execution. Hence, it would be interesting to implement these protocols or their variants 
as a web service. Our paper [IE07] discussed this idea and proposed an earlier version 
of Protocol-0 as a Distributed Consensus Engine for large-scale self-organizing network 
applications. 
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